McCULLOCH V. MARYLAND: A MATTER OF
MONEY SUPPLY*
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The reasons for the original existence of the United States
Bank lay in Alexander Hamilton's desire for a convenient source
of money supply. As the Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton
stated this openly in the report he sent to Congress in 1790 advocating the Bank's establishment.' Its continuance in 1811, the
year when its original charter expired,2 and its re-establishment
in 1816 were justified on the same grounds.' The money the
Bank supplied was of course its paper notes, based on the gold
and silver it held and on its credit as reflected by the public's
confidence in the soundness of its practices. 4
That the power to regulate the nation's money supply
should be found resident in the national legislature seems selfevident to us today. That such a power to regulate, including the
power to issue paper money, should be by the Constitution fixed
in Congress seems almost as evident. Therefore, the power to
create a national bank as the proper instrument to achieve that
end seems similarly evident. These powers could with great
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1 SECRETARY OF TREASURY'S REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK, 1st Cong., 3d Sess., 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 2031 (1790), reprintedin 9 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 67 (W. Lowrie
& M. Clarke eds. 1832) [hereinafter AMERICAN STATE PAPERS] and 7 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 305 (H. Syrett &J. Cooke eds. 1963) [hereinafter HAMILTON
*

PAPERS].

2 Congress granted the Bank's original charter in 1791. See Act of Feb. 25,
1791, ch. 10, § 3, 1 Stat. 191, 192. The original charter was set to expire on March
4, 1811. Id. In 1809, Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin advocated the rechartering
of the Bank to Congress. See Secretary of Treasury's Report to the Senate, 10th
Cong., 2d Sess., 19 ANNALS OF CONG. 456 (1809), reprinted in 10 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS, supra note 1, at 351, and LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, 116 (M. Clarke & D. Hall eds. 1832) [hereinafter M.
Clarke & D. Hall].
3 See Secretary of Treasury's Report on the State of the Finances, 14th Cong.,
1st Sess., 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 1602, 1639 (1815), reprinted in 11 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS, supra note 1, at 17.
4 See Secretary of Treasury's Report on a National Bank, 1st Cong., 3d Sess., 1
ANNALS OF CONG. at 2032-35 (1790), reprinted in 9 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra
note 1, at 67-68 and 7 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 306-08.
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plausibility be said to be based on the expressed power in Congress "to coin money, regulate the value thereof."' 5 In fact, both
Treasury Secretary Dallas and Congressman John C. Calhoun
justified the re-establishment of the Bank in 1816 on just these
grounds. Nevertheless, when the constitutionality of the establishment of a national bank was challenged in McCulloch v. Maryland,6 these were not the grounds advanced on its behalf. Instead
its counsel argued, as Hamilton had originally argued in 1791,
that the Bank was conveniently incidental to a variety of expressed powers and consequently "necessary and proper."' 7 They
argued further that the Bank as a national instrument was by the
constitutional implication of the supremacy clause immune from
state taxation. 8
The United States Supreme Court followed these arguments. ChiefJustice John Marshall writing for the Court held that
the Bank was a convenient means to proper ends and therefore
"necessary and proper." 9 As an instrument of the national government it was immune from state taxation.1l
Marshall's opinion is commonly regarded as his masterpiece."i With the instincts of a rhetorician, employing the technique of the free association of images, he persuaded his readers
first as to the rightness of his result and then, their support secured, of the rightness of his reasons. Stirring their hearts and
lulling their minds with his magnificent eloquence, he convinced
5 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, para. 5.
6

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

7 See id. at 324-26 (arguments of Mr. Webster); id. at 353-59 (arguments of Mr.

Wirt); id. at 383-90 (arguments of Mr. Pinkney). Counsel for the Bank advocated a
substantially greater breadth for the necessary and proper clause than that advanced by either Hamilton or Madison in THE FEDERALIST. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 203-06 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST No.
44, at 302-06 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
8 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 326-30 (argument of Mr. Webster); id. at
360-62 (argument of Mr. Wirt); id. at 390-400 (argument of Mr. Pinkne>). Arguments relying upon the supremacy clause were advanced despite Hamilton's repeated assurances in THE FEDERALIST that the sovereign power of the state to tax
was not in any way limited by the Constitution except as it specifically provided. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 207-08 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1931).
9 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413-14.
10 See id. at 425-31.

I I E.g., Frankfurter,John Marshall and The JudicialFunction, 69

HARV.

L.

REV.

217,

219 (1955) ("I should like to follow James Bradley Thayer in believing that the

conception of the nation which Marshall derived from the Constitution and set
forth in M'Culloch v. Maryland, is his greatest single judicial performance."); Pious
and Baker, McCulloch v. Maryland, Right Principle, Vrong Case, 9 STAN. L. REV. 710
(1957). (McCulloch v. Maryland is "[o]ften considered the greatest of Chief Justice
John Marshall's decisions.").
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them of the necessity and the propriety of Union, federal
supremacy and the second national bank. In the process he
penned immortal words of constitutional lore, words which succeeding generations of judges and lawyers, professors and stuand
dents are fond of wrenching from their context
12
conclusions.
result-oriented
own
their
to
appropriating
To appreciate John Marshall's masterpiece, we must understand the necessities that governed both the conclusions he had
to reach and the difficulties he had to avoid or overcome. In the
avoidance, if not the complete resolution, of these difficulties, the
immortal words themselves were a necessary device. We should
first, however, attend to the necessity of the result.
1. The Necessity of the Result: The 1791 Charter
From the start of his tenure as Secretary of the Treasury, 3
Hamilton pursued measures calculated to expand the nation's
money supply. On September 22, 1789, eleven days after his appointment he issued a circular to the customs collectors, requesting that they accept the demand notes or thirty-day paper of the
Bank of North America and the Bank of New York "in payment
of the duties, as equivalent to Gold and Silver."' 4 The Act of
Congress of July 31, 1789 had required the payment of duties in
gold and silver.' 5 Characteristically, Hamilton gave this statute a
liberal construction to accomplish his policy, to "facilitate remittances from the several States, without drawing away their Specie; an advantage in every view important."' 6 In fact, a few days
later, he indicated his desire to include the paper of the Massachusetts Bank. The paper of "the banks of North America and
New York being always represented by a specie fund, I consider
as equivalent to Gold and Silver," he wrote and, he believed, the
12 "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and

all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. ChiefJustice Marshall's axiom has
frequently come to stand for an elaborate defense of the ends justifying the means.
But it should be remembered that this aphorism was employed in McCulloch to legitimatize governmental action, not to invalidate it.
13 Washington submitted to the Senate the nomination of, among others, Alexander Hamilton as Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. 5 HAMILTON
PAPERS, supra note 1, at 365.
14 5 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 394.
15 Ch. 5, § 30, 1 Stat. 29, 45 (1789).
16 Treasury Department Circular from Alexander Hamilton to Customs Collectors (Sept. 22, 1789), reprinted in 5 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 394.
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paper of the Massachusetts Bank was "on a similar footing." 17 In
fact, as he was shortly told, the circulating paper of the Bank of
North America seldom equaled half the sum of its specie.' 8
The following month, Hamilton wrote to William Bingham,
the founder and a director of the Bank of North America, soliciting his views on the finances and debts of the United States.' 9
The Government, Bingham responded, must assume the outstanding debt of the United States, and raise taxes to pay the interest and reduce the principle. But as an
[i]ncrease of Taxes forces money out of its natural Circulation,
as representing Industry & carries it into a new Channel ...it
becomes necessary for a Statesman, who has recourse to the
Expedient of augmenting the revenue of the Society by Taxes,
to endeavor, by all possible Means, to increase the Quality of
Circulating Medium. 2 °
Bingham suggested that this might be effected, "by turning a
great Portion of the Gold & Silver of the Country into an active &
productive Stock, by taking it imperceptibly out of Circulation, &
Supplying the full Demand, by Substituting Paper to perform their
functions, & become the dead Stock of the Community."'" To accomplish this, the administration might derive advantages from the
operations of a national bank whose capital stock, in view of the considerable demand on it for the purposes of circulation, should be
extensive. The Government would give a sanction to its paper circulation by receiving it in revenue.2 2
Bingham merely confirmed what Hamilton himself had concluded almost ten years earlier in a letter to Robert Morris. 2" The
central necessity of the country, he wrote then, was to "erect a mass
of credit that will supply the defect of monied capitals and answer all
the purposes of cash .
"..."24A scheme that would annihilate paper
credit and force the country to depend completely on specie for
17 Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Benjamin Lincoln, Collector of Customs
at Boston (Sept. 25, 1789), reprinted in 5 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 399.
18 See Letter from Thomas Willing of the Bank of North America to Alexander
Hamilton (Oct. 1, 1789), reprinted in 5 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 418.
19 See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to William Bingham (Oct. 10, 1789), re-

printed in 5 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 432-33.
20 See Letter from William Bingham to Alexander Hamilton (Nov. 25, 1789), re-

printed in 5

HAMILTON PAPERS,

supra note 1, at 551.

21 Id.
22
23

Id.
Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Robert Morris (Apr. 30, 1781), reprinted in

2 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 604.
24

Id. at 617.
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commerce, revenues and government finance was, he added, "altogether visionary and in the attempt would be fatal. We have not a
competent stock of specie in this country, either to answer the purposes of circulation in Trade, or to serve as a basis for revenue.' '25
If paper money was destroyed, the economy would be reduced to
barter, a method so inconvenient as to be destructive of commerce
and industry. Furthermore, there would be insufficient specie available to pay half the annual public revenues. 2 6 On the contrary, "the
health of a state particularly a commercial one depends on a due
quantity and regular circulation of Cash, as much as the health of an
animal body depends upon the due quantity and regular circulation
of the blood."' 27 A sound paper, however, had to be supported by
specie and by private credit and the interest of monied men. It was
only in the establishment of a national bank that these ingredients
could be combined and a sound paper credit founded.2 8
In his report to Congress in December 1790, these were the
essential ingredients of the proposal Hamilton made for the establishment of the United States Bank. 29 Following the outline of his
argument to Morris and the recommendations of Bingham, he enumerated the principal advantages of a national bank. First, through
the issuance of its paper, the Bank would quicken circulation and
augment the active or productive stock of the country.30 Second, by
facilitating the massive formation of capital, it would help the government obtain loans, especially in sudden emergencies, as in time
of war. 3 ' Third, by quickening circulation, more money would be
Id. at 619.
Id. Prior to the American Revolution, Hamilton estimated, the amount of
cash in circulation was thirty million dollars, of which about eight million had been
in specie. Since he considered the proper revenue of a state to be one-fourth of a
nation's wealth, he concluded that the amount of revenue properly available to the
states and nation to be about seven and a half million, less than the nation's available specie. Id. at 609.
27 Id. at 620.
28 See id.
29 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. For both the concept of a national
bank and the details of his formulation, Hamilton relied heavily on European
precedents, particularly on the Bank of England, and on European theory, particularly on Adam Smith's WEALTH OF NATIONS. See Introductory Note to SECRETARY OF
TREASURY'S REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK, 1st Cong., 3d Sess. (1790), reprinted in 7
HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 236. Additionally Hamilton relied on American
precedents, particularly in connection with the establishment of the Bank of North
America. J. COOKE, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 88 (1982).
30 See SECRETARY OF TREASURY'S REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK, 1st Cong., 3d
Sess., I ANNALS OF CONGRESS at 2034 (1790), reprinted in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS,
supra note 1, at 68 and 7 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 309. See also supra note
23 (for Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Robert Morris).
31 See SECRETARY OF TREASURY'S REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK, 1st Cong., 3d
25
26
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available to facilitate the growth of the nation's wealth and the payment of taxes. 2 Moreover, the Bank's extension of paper credit, in
facilitating the growth of productivity, would increase exports. The
resulting improvement in the balance of trade and foreign exchange
rate would lead to an influx and therefore growth of specie. 33 Finally, since the settlement of the nation's interior districts tended to
draw off money and the consequent scarcity of capital hampered the
development of manufactures, an increase of capital would aid in
the development of both the interior and manufactures. 4
Some aid to circulation, Hamilton concluded, was necessary.
How was it to be done? "The emitting of paper money by the authority of Government is wisely prohibited to the individual States,
by the National Constitution; and the spirit of that prohibition
ought not to be disregarded, by the Government of the United
States." 5 While paper emissions under the general authority might
have some advantages not applicable to state paper, "in great and
trying emergencies, there is almost a moral certainty of its becoming
mischievous." 3 6 Then in a forecast of present-day governmental
policies, Hamilton continued:
The stamping of paper is an operation so much easier than the
laying of taxes, that a government, in the practice of paper
emissions, would rarely fail, in any such emergency, to indulge
itself too far in the employment of that resource to avoid, as
much as possible, one less auspicious to present popularity. If
it should not even be carried so far as to be rendered an absolute bubble, it would at least be likely to be extended to a degree which would occasion an inflated and artificial state of
things, incompatible with the regular and prosperous course
Sess., 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS at 2034 (1790), reprintedin 9 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS,
supra note 1, at 68 and 7 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 309.
32 See SECRETARY OF TREASURY'S REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK, 1st Cong., 3d
Sess., 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS at 2034 (1790), reprintedin 9 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS,
supra note 1, at 68 and 7 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 309.
33 See SECRETARY OF TREASURY'S REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK, 1st Cong., 3d
Sess., 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS at 2039-40 (1790), reprinted in 9 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 70 and 7 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 316-17.
34 SECRETARY OF TREASURY'S REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK, 1st Cong., 3d Sess., 1
ANNALS OF CONGRESS at 2043 (1790), reprinted in 9 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra
note 1, at 71 and 7 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 320-21.
35 SECRETARY OF TREASURY'S REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK, 1st Cong., 3d Sess., 1
ANNALS OF CONGRESS at 2043 (1790), reprinted in 9 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra
note 1, at 71 and 7 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 321.
33 SECRETARY OF TREASURY'S REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK, 1st Cong., 3d Sess., 1
ANNALS OF CONGRESS at 2044 (1790), reprinted in 9 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra
note 1, at 71 and 7 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 322.
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of the political economy. 3 7
Deficit spending rather than taxation would be the funding prescription. Public paper, issued on the mere authority of the government,
had no inherent standard to gauge the amount of paper necessary to
satisfy the needs of circulation. Private paper payable in coin, on
the other hand, would return to the Bank for redemption if more
were to be issued than necessary. 38
Other reasons influenced Hamilton against the issuance of a paper money by the national government. The monied interests were
against it for the same reasons as Hamilton, and such opposition
had influenced the Convention in the framing of the Constitution to
limit the powers of Congress in monetary matters to "coin Money,
regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures." 9 A motion, modeled on the Articles of Confederation, to grant Congress the further authority "to
emit bills of credit on the credit of the U[nited] States" had been
introduced but defeated 40 for the very reason that if paper emissions were not prohibited, the monied interests would oppose the
Constitution.'" These individuals asserted that a governmental paper emission would destroy the public credit rather than enhance it.
Of course, it could be argued, as it was almost a century later,
that the defeat of the proposal to authorize the emission of bills of
credit was not conclusive as to the intent to specifically prohibit
their emission. 4 2 But it appears it was so understood. It was an im37 SECRETARY OF TREASURY'S REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK, 1st Cong., 3d Sess., 1
ANNALS OF CONGRESS at 2044 (1790), reprinted in 9 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra
note 1, at 71 and 7 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 322.
38 SECRETARY Or TREASURY'S REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK, Ist Cong., 3d Sess., 1
ANNALS OF CONGRESS at 2044 (1790), reprinted in 9 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS,
note 1, at 71 and 7 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 322.
39 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, para. 5 (emphasis added).

supra

40 On August 16, 1787, a motion to strike "and emit bills on the credit of the
United States" carried by a vote of 9-2. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 303, 308-09 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND].
41 Id. at 309.
42 This argument was advanced by James B. Thayer in his article, Legal Tender, 1
HARV. L. REV. 73 (1887), based on his reading of Madison's notes on the motion, as
follows:
Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS moved to strike out "and emit bills on the
credit of the United States." If the United States had credit, such bills
would be unnecessary; if they had not, unjust and useless.-Mr. BUTLER
seconds the motion.-Mr. MADISON. Will it not be sufficient to prohibit
the making them a tender? This will remove the temptation to emit them
with unjust views; and promissory notes, in that shape, may in some
emergencies be best.-Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. Striking out the
words will leave room still for notes of a responsible minister, which will
do all the good without the mischief. The moneyed interest will oppose
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portant power and, as Mason observed in the debates, Congress
the plan of government, if paper emissions be not prohibited.-Mr.
GORHAM was for striking out without inserting any prohibition. If the
words stand, they may suggest and lead to the measure.-Mr. MASON
had doubts on the subject. Congress, he thought, would not have the
power unless it were expressed. Though he had a mortal hatred to paper money, yet, as he could not foresee all emergencies, he was unwilling to tie the hands of the legislature. He observed that the late war
could not have been carried on, had such a prohibition existed.-Mr.
GORHAM. The power, as far as it will be necessary or safe, is involved in
that of borrowing.-Mr. MERCER was a friend to paper money, though,
in the present state and temper of America, he should neither propose
nor approve of such a measure. He was consequently opposed to a prohibition of it altogether. It will stamp suspicion on the government, to
deny it a discretion on this point. It was impolitic, also, to excite the
opposition of all those who were friends to paper money. The people of
property would be sure to be on the side of the plan, and it was impolitic
to purchase their further attachment with the loss of the opposite class
of citizens.-Mr. ELLSWORTH thought this a favorable moment to shut
and bar the door against paper money. The mischiefs of the various experiments which had been made were now fresh in the public mind, and
had excited the disgust of all the respectable part of America. By withholding the power from the new government, more friends of influence
would be gained to it than by almost anything else. Paper money can in
no case be necessary. Give the government credit, and other resources
will offer. The power may do harm, never good.-Mr. RANDOLPH,
notwithstanding his antipathy to paper money, could not agree to strike
out the words, as he could not foresee all the occasions that might
arise.-Mr. WILSON: It will have a most salutary influence on the credit
of the United States to remove the possibility of paper money. This
expedient can never succeed whilst its mischiefs are remembered; and
as long as it can be resorted to it will be a bar to other resources.-Mr.
BUTLER remarked that paper was a legal tender in no country in Europe.
He was urgent for disarming the government of such a power.-Mr. MASON was still averse to tying the hands of the legislature altogether. If
there was no example in Europe, as just remarked, it might be observed,
on the other side, that there was none in which the government was
restrained on this head.-Mr. READ thought the words, if not struck out,
would be as alarming as the mark of the beast in Revelation.-Mr. LANGDON had rather reject the whole plan than retain the three words, "and
emit bills."
Thayer, supra, at 76-77 (quoting 5 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 434-35 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]).
The final vote on the motion for striking out the words "and emit bills" was as
follows: New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye, 9; New Jersey, Maryland,
no, 2. 2 FARRAND, supra note 40, at 310.
Virginia's affirmative vote
was occasioned by the acquiescence of Mr. Madison who became satisfied that striking out the words would not disable the Gov[ernment]
from the use of public notes as far as they could be safe & proper; &
would only cut off the pretext for a paper currency and particularly for
making the bills a tender either for public or private debts.
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Madison wrote later, in his Notes to the debates, that he joined
in the vote against the authorization, satisfied that it "would not disable the Govt from the use of public notes as far as they would be
safe & proper; & would only cut off the pretext for a paper currency
and particularly for making the bills a tender either for public or
private debts." 4 4 That is to say, the Government would be free to
issue paper notes as an incident to borrowing, provided they were in
such denominations as to make them unsuitable for currency. Luther Martin, who against the majority favored the emission of a paper money in times of emergency, reported in his Address to the
Maryland Legislature after the Convention that the vote against the
power to emit bills of credit was a vote against the emission of a
national paper money.4 5 These reasons, the opposition of the monEditor's note to id. at 310 (emphasis added).
From the fact that five of the eleven speakers in this debate, Madison, Mason,
Gorham, Mercer and Randolph, had spoken as not in being favor of a complete
prohibition of the emission of paper, Thayer argued in Legal Tender that "it is reasonable to suppose that a considerable number shared the opinion of Gorham, that
striking out was not equivalent to prohibition." Thayer, supra, at 78. Silence,
Thayer suggested, rather than outright prohibition, was the policy. In other words,
the framers from the beginning artfully envisioned a policy of implied powers.
But this supposition runs counter to the view Mason expressed and others
shared that Congress "would not have the power unless it were expressed." 2 FARRAND, supra note 40, at 309 (statement of Col. Mason). It runs counter to what
Madison wrote as to his understanding of the motion: that while the Constitution
would permit the national government to issue bills and notes as an incident to its
power to borrow, it would not permit the government to employ these bills and
notes as a paper currency. See Editor's note to id. at 310; see also infra text accompanying note 44. What was forbidden was the issuance of paper in small denominations suitable for ready circulation. Thayer's suggestion also runs counter to what
Luther Martin publicly stated in his Address to the Legislature of Maryland after
the Convention. See infra note 45; B. HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA
91-95 (1957); KNOX, UNITED STATES NOTES iv preface (1884). See also infra Appendix (discussing subsequent history of bills of credit as a national circulating
medium).
43 2 FARRAND, supra note 40, at 309.
44 See Editor's note to id. at 310.
45 Address by Luther Martin to the Maryland State Legislature (Nov. 29, 1787)
(reporting proceedings of Constitutional Convention), reprintedin 3 FARRAND, supra
note 40, at 56-57. In pertinent part, Martin stated as follows:
By our original articles of confederation, the Congress have a power to
borrow money and emit bills of credit, on the credit of the United
States; agreeable to which, was the report on this system as made by the
committee of detail. When we came to this part of the report, a motion was
made to strike out the words "to emit bills of credit." Against the motion we urged, that it would be improper to deprive the Congress of that
power; that it would be a novelty unprecedented to establish a government which should not have such authority; that it was impossible to
look forward into futurity so far as to decide, that events might not hap-
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ied interests and the intent of the framers, led Hamilton to seek the
alternative of creating a national bank which would do the job for
the Government which it could not do for itself.
Was the alternative, the creation of a national bank constitutional? Hamilton in his report to Congress assumed that it was.
The record of the Constitutional Convention beclouds Hamilton's
assumptions. Late in the Convention, Madison, troubled by the history of the Continental Congress, made a motion to confer on Congress the power to grant corporate charters "where the interest of
the U[nited] S[tates] might require [and] the ... States may be inpen, that should render the exercise of such a power absolutely necessary;
and that we doubted, whether, if a war should take place, it would be
possible for this country to defend itself, without having recourse to paper
credit, in which case, there would be a necessity of becoming a prey to our
enemies, or violating the constitution of our government; and that, considering the administration of the government would be principally in the
hands of the wealthy, there could be little reason to fear an abuse of the
power by an unnecessary or injurious exercise of it. But, Sir, a majority
of the convention, being wise beyond every event, and being willing to
risk any political evil, rather than admit the idea of a paper emission, in
any possible event, refused to trust this authority to a government, to
which they were lavishing the must [sic] unlimited powers of taxation, and
to the mercy of which they were willing blindly to trust the liberty and property of the citizens of every State in the Union; and they erased that clause
from the system.
Id. at 205-06.
But for a contrary position, see the statement of Charles Pinckney in the South
Carolina ratifying debates. See Address by Charles Pinckney on the 10th Section of
Article 1st of the Federal Constitution (May 20, 1788), reprinted in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 42, at 333. While deprecating the issuance of state paper money
and paper money in general, he maintained that "if paper should become necessary, the general government still possess the power of emitting it, and Continental
paper, well funded, must ever answer the purpose better than state paper." 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,supra note 42, at 335. These remarks were made not in connection
with a discussion of Congressional power under Article I, section 8, but in a discussion of the limitations on state power under Article I, section 10. The remarks
seem calculated to reassure his listeners on the occasional federal use of paper
emissions in time of necessity in order to gain their acceptance of the total prohibition of state emissions. His statement, however, when viewed in the light of the
statements of Madison and Martin and the early contrary practice of the United
States government before the Civil War, is not persuasive. The weight of the early
authority runs the other way. Paper money in general was in dispute. See id. at 20,
169-70, 173 (statements made in North Carolina debates); 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 42, at 290-91 (statements made in Virginia debates).
Jackson Turner Main, in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION
1781-1788 (1961), concluded that the Federalists, consisting of merchants and
other town dwellers, farmers depending on major towns or producing for export,
generally favored hard money and opposed paper, whereas with some exceptions,
it was the subsistent farmer of the interior who favored paper. South Carolina
planters, although Federalist, favored paper. Id. at 7. This would explain Pinckney's remarks quoted above.
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competent." 4 6 On December 31, 1781, the Continental Congress
had passed an ordinance establishing a banking corporation under
the name of the President and Company of the Bank of North
America,4 7 whose purpose was to aid the government of the United
States by its money and credit, to supply the loss of useless paper
money and to help revive commerce. A week later Robert Morris,
then serving as Superintendent of Finance under appointment of
the Continental Congress, 4 8 sent copies of the ordinance to the governors of the thirteen states, recommending to the several states the
passage of such laws as they might judge necessary to give the ordinance its full effect. 49 The recommendation was made because, as
Madison, who also served in the Continental Congress, reported at
the time, "the general opinion though with some exceptions was
that the Confederation gave no such power and that the exercise of
it would not bear the test of a forensic disquisition." 5 The Bank,
however, he then added, supposed that a charter from Congress
51
would give it "a dignity and preeminence in the public opinion.
While some members felt the bank's importance, others, he wrote,
want of power to encharter it and an unwillingness to
perceived 5the
2
it.
assume
Madison concluded that:
Some thing like a middle way produced an acquiescing rather
than an affirmative vote. A charter of incorporation was
granted, with a recommendation to the States to give it all the
necessary validity within their respective jurisdictions. As this
is a tacit admission of a defect of power I hope it will be an
antidote against the poisonous tendency of precedents of
usurpation. 51
The Bank's directors, in consequence, sought a charter from the
state of Pennsylvania, which in turn granted one in terms identical
to that granted by Congress. The Bank accepted it as the authority
46

2

FARRAND,

supra note 40, at 615 (statement of Mr. Madison). The motion was

made on September 14, by way of amendment to a motion providing "for cutting
canals where necessary."
47 See 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1186 (Dec. 31, 1781) (G.
Hunt ed. 1912).
48
49

See

50

Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Jan. 8, 1782), reprintedin 6
289 (E. Burnett ed. 1933); see

HAMMOND,

Id. at 50.

supra note 42, at 46-47.

LETrERS OF MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS

E. BURNETT,

THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS

515-16 (1941).

51 Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Jan. 8, 1782), reprintedin 6

LETTERS OF MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
52 Id. at 290.
53 Id.

supra note 50, at 289.
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under which its operations were to be conducted.5 4 Similar laws
were passed by the legislatures of New York5 5 and Massachusetts. 5 6
In light of this background, Madison at the Constitutional Convention asserted that if Congress were to have the power to charter
a bank, a specific constitutional provision to that effect would be
helpful. But opposition developed. It was termed "unnecessary,"
described as too controversial, offensive to banking interests in Philadelphia and New York, and generally suggestive of mercantile monopolies-and was therefore withdrawn.5 ' Hamilton's assumption
of the Bank's constitutionality was in the face of that history.
Hamilton, however, was not unmindful of the concerns raised
in the debates at the Constitutional Convention. In organizing the
Bank, he took care not to offend the monied interests. Under his
plan, the Bank's capital stock would not exceed ten million dollars,58
four-fifths of which would come from private subscriptions, 59 payment for which would be made one-fourth in gold and silver coin
and three-fourths in continental debt securities assumed by the
United States.6" Payment in land was not acceptable because, unlike
paper, it was not a liquid asset, 6 1 and moreover, no provision was
made for the acceptance of state debt securities assumed by the
United States. For these reasons, while the plan won support in the
North, it alienated the South.
54 Act of March 17, 1787, ch. 82, 1787 Pa. Laws 249.
55 Act of April 11, 1782, ch. 35, 1782 N.Y. Laws 462.
56 Act of March 9, 1793, ch. 21, 1793 Mass. Acts 244.
57 2 FARRAND, supra note 40, at 615-16. Thomas Jefferson later reported that
Justice Wilson, one of the framers from Pennsylvania, had said privately during the
debates on the bank bill in the House in 1791 that the motion had been defeated

for fear of the anti-bank party in Pennsylvania. 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON (P. Ford, ed. 1904) [hereinafterJEFFERSON WRITINGS]. In substance, it agrees
with Madison's notes, that the motion was defeated, because it was considered too
controversial. Jefferson also referred to this history as a further reason for rejecting
the bill to establish the Bank in his opinion to President Washington. See Opinion
Letter from Sec'y of State Thomas Jefferson to Pres. Washington (Feb. 15, 1791),
M. Clarke & D. Hall, supra note 2, at 92.
58 See SECRETARY OF TREASURY'S REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK, 1st Cong., 3d
Sess., 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS at 2053 (1790), reprinted in 9 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS,
supra note 1, at 74 and 7 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 334.

59

See

SECRETARY OF TREASURY'S REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK, 1st

Sess., 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS at 2056 (1790),
supra note 1, at 75 and 7 HAMILTON PAPERS,
60

See

reprintedin 9 AMERICAN
supra note 1, at 337.

SECRETARY OF TREASURY'S REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK, 1st

Sess., 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS at 2053 (1790), reprintedin 9 AMERICAN
supra note 1, at 74 and 7 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 334.
61

See

supra note 1, at

OF CONGRESS at 2050 (1790),
74 and 7 HAMILTON PAPERS,

reprinted in 9 AMERICAN
supra note 1, at 330.

Cong., 3d

STATE PAPERS,

SECRETARY OF TREASURY'S REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK, 1st

Sess., 1 ANNALS

Cong., 3d
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At first Hamilton's bill had clear sailing. On December 23,
1790, the Senate moved to consider his report and prepare a bill.6 2
Two weeks later the bill was reported.6" The debates were in secret, 64 but we know from later comments in the House, that no constitutional objection was raised.6 5 On January 20, 1791, the bill was
passed and sent to the House. 6 6 There it quickly moved through
committee, was reported and read for the third time on February
1.67

Upon the third reading, practical and policy objections were
raised for the first time. As stated, while Hamilton's plan had provided for the partial payment of bank capital in the continental debt
securities assumed by the United States, it had made no provision
for the acceptance of state debt securities also assumed by the
United States. 6' Assumption at par of both continental and state
debt had been approved by statute the previous year over southern
and western protest that it would reward speculators, mostly in the
Northeast, who had bought up the debt certificates at a substantial
discount before the introduction of the assumption bill. 6 9 It had
carried due to a compromise over the establishment of the nation's
capital in the Residence Act whereby the seat of government would
be temporarily located in Philadelphia until 1800 and permanently
on the Potomac thereafter. 70 The compromise, arranged by Hamilton and Jefferson, was secured by the shift of enough votes in the
62
63

2

64
65

See M. Clarke & D. Hall, supra note 2, at 36.
See generally 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1903-09 (1791) (statement of Rep. Ames).

ANNALS OF CONG.

1738-39 (1790).

Id. at 1741.

Ames complained that the bill was allowed to pass out of the Committee of the
whole in the House in silence, and that the objections to the bill were first raised by
its opponents in the debates themselves. Id. Thus, he stated, the bill's friends were
obliged to reply to the objections "without premeditation." Id.
66 Id. at 1748.
67 Id. at 1891.
68 See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
69 A considerable portion of all debt paper, in some states at least half, had
passed into the hands of speculators. BEARD, ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF JEFFERSONIAN
DEMOCRACY 133 (1936). As in the case of the bank bill, southern opposition in the
House was led by Madison of Virginia, Stone of Maryland and Jackson of Georgia.
See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. Opposition to assumption of debt was
generally based on the windfall that speculators would reap, which seemed to work
an injustice on the original holders who were, for the most part, revolutionary vet-

erans. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS

OF CONG.

1162-63 (Gales ed., 1790) (statement of Rep.

Jackson); 2 id. at 1173, 1225-26 (1790) (statement of Rep. Jackson); 2 id. at 1266,
1270-71 (statement of Rep. Madison); 2 id. at 1258-60 (statement of Rep. Stone).
For the statutes incorporating assumption of debt, see Act of August 4, 1790,
ch. 34, 1 Stat. 138 (1790); Act of August 5, 1790, ch. 38, 1 Stat. 178 (1790).
70

Act of July 16, 1790, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 130 (1790).
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House from Maryland and Virginia to assure the adoption of
assumption. 7 '
In the meantime, as Representative Stone of Maryland said, the
greatest part of the continental debt had "travelled eastward of the
Potomac."-7 2 If state debt were excluded from the formation of the
Bank's capital, it would deprive the southern states "of the advantage that might have been given to the only paper they have." ' 73 The
Treasury proposal would, as Madison put it, give "an undue preference to the holders of a particular denomination of the public debt"
and, referring to the probable quick subscription of capital, a preference to those in or near Philadelphia, the seat of the government
and the proposed seat of the Bank.7 1 Jackson of Georgia had previously declared that the bill would benefit only the merchants in a
small part of the country, meaning the Northeast, and would constitute a monopoly for the benefit of a private corporation.7 5
These arguments explain the reasons for the motion made on
February 3, that the bill be recommitted "for the purpose of altering
the time or manner of subscribing; so that the holders of State securities, assumed to be paid by the United States, may be on a footing with the holders of other securities, formerly called national
securities.",76 The motion was defeated by a margin substantially
the same as that which ultimately favored the passage of the bill.7 7
From the final vote, it is known that the membership divided on regional lines, everyone from the North with one exception voting for
the bill and almost everyone from the South voting against. 78 It
seems a fair inference that had the motion for recommittal passed,
southern opposition would have been withdrawn.
There was another practical reason underlying southern opposition. Besides selecting Philadelphia as the seat of the Bank,7 9 the
bill provided for a term of twenty years for the Bank's charter.80
Southerners feared that the public, grown accustomed to the con71 See Editorial Note to Thomas Jefferson's Opinion on the Constitutionality of
the Residence Bill, reprinted in 17 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 163 (J. Boyd

ed. 1965).
72 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1930 (1791) (statement of Rep. Stone).
73 Id. at 1930.
74 Id. at 1895 (statement of Rep. Madison).
75 Id. at 1891 (statement of Rep. Jackson).
76 M. Clarke & D. Hall, supra note 2, at 45.
77 Id. at 45. The vote on recommittal was thirty-eight against and twenty-one in
favor. Id. The vote for passage of the bill was thirty-nine in favor and twenty
against. Id. at 85.
78 See id. at 85.
79 Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 192 §§ 1, 5 (1791).
80 Id. § 3.
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centration of finance and government in Philadelphia, might not
want them separated, leading later to a movement to undo the provisions of the Residence Act, requiring the transfer of the capital to
the Potomac in 1800.1 In the joint provisions for Philadelphia and
for a charter of twenty years they suspected a northern plot. This
suspicion was strengthened by the fact that at that time Hamilton's
supporters in the Senate were blocking the consideration of a bill
amending the Residence Act to change the boundaries of the territory bordering on the Potomac in minor, though necessary, respects.8 2 Charges and countercharges were made. Northerners
argued that southern opposition to the bank bill was implicated in
its defense of the seat of the government. Stone answered that such
charges "betray[ed] a consciousness of an attack." 83 If northerners
believed "this scheme tends to break the faith of the Union pledged
to the Potomac, it is no wonder they suppose we oppose it upon that
ground."8 4 Rumors abounded. Southern opposition would be
dropped, it was reported, if the term of the Bank's charter were limited to ten instead of twenty years.8 5 The change was not made and
the debates continued, centering on the Constitution and ultimately
on the meaning of "necessary and proper."
In the constitutional arguments, Madison took the lead for the
South. The political power of the federal government he said, was
"not a general grant, out of which particular powers are excepted; it
[was] a grant of particular powers only, leaving the general mass in
other hands. So it had been understood by its friends and its foes,
and so it was to be interpreted."8 6 Although he did not refer to it in
express terms, his position was essentially based on the principle
encapsulated in the soon-to-be-adopted tenth amendment that "the
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." 8 7
Specifically, Madison argued that a power to grant charters of
incorporation had been proposed at the Constitutional Convention
81

See supra text accompanying note 70.

See Editorial Note to 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 36 (J. Boyd ed.
1974).
83 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1930 (1791) (statement of Rep. Stone). The remarks to
82

which Stone was responding were apparently unreported.
84
85

281.
86

Id.
See Editorial Note to 19

2

ANNALS OF CONG.

87 U.S. CONST.

THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,

supra note 82, at

1896 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison).

amend. X.
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and rejected.8 8 More specifically, he said, the bill before the House
did not lay within one of the expressed powers.8 9 It was not an incident to the taxing power. It laid no tax whatsoever. 90 It was not an
incident to the borrowing power. "It [did] not borrow a shilling."9
It did not fall within the necessary and proper powers, because the
clause was "merely declaratory of what would have resulted by unavoidable implication, as the appropriate ... technical means of executing those powers.''92 The means must be more than merely
conducive to or facilitating the end of a specified power. They must
be necessary to the end and incident to the nature of the specific
power. To argue otherwise would distort the basic constitutional
intent of a national government of limited and expressed delegated
powers. 9 3 A corporate bank was not such a necessary and proper
means. The power to create it "was in its nature a distinct, an independent and substantive prerogative, which not being enumerated in the Constitution, could never have been meant to be
included in it, and not being included, could never be rightfully
exercised.""

The proponents of the bill, and later Hamilton in his opinion to
President Washington on its constitutionality, took issue with this
position in two respects. According to Hamilton, Congress could
exercise not only the expressed powers but also such powers as a
sovereign government must possess in order to effect its objects.
These implied powers were as much delegated as the expressed
powers. 9 5 In fact, he argued for the existence of a third set of pow88

2

ANNALS OF CONG.

1896 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison).

89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1897 (statement of Rep. Madison).
92 Id. at 1898 (statement of Rep. Madison).
93 See id.
94 Id. at 1900 (statement of Rep. Madison). Edmund Randolph and Thomas
Jefferson, who were Attorney General and Secretary of State respectively in Washington's Cabinet, would repeat these arguments when they later gave their opinions
to the President as to the constitutionality of the bill. See generally Opinion Letter
from Edmund Randolph, United States Att'y Gen., to Pres. Washington (Feb. 12,
1791), reprintedin M. CLARK & D. HALL, supra note 2, at 86-89; Letter from Edmund
Randolph, United States Att'y Gen., to Pres. Washington (Feb. 12, 1791), reprinted
in M. CLARK & D. HALL, supra note 2, at 89-91; Opinion Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Sec'y of State, to Pres. Washington (Feb. 15, 1791), reprinted in M. CLARK & D.
HALL, supra note 2, at 91-94. Jefferson explicitly referred to the proposed tenth
amendment, then designated as the "12th Amendment." Id. at 91.
95 Opinion Letter From Sec'y of Treasury Alexander Hamilton to Pres. Washington (Feb. 23, 1791), reprinted in M. CLARKE & D. HALL, supra note 2, at 96. It was
the argument that Justice Bradley would advance after the Civil War in his concurring opinion in the Legal Tender Cases:
Such being the character of the General government, it seems to be a
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ers, "resulting" powers, flowing in consequence of the exercise of
one of the expressed powers, .as for example, the power of the
United States to exercise supreme jurisdiction over conquered
territory.9 6
Congress in the exercise of its implied powers, Hamilton continued, could do whatever was "necessary and proper," which
meant merely "needful, requisite, incidental, useful or conducive to," and
not "absolutely or indispensably" necessary. The latter construction, he maintained, was unduly restrictive.9 7 To create a corporation as an instrument in the achievement of a specified power was an
implied power.9 8 Denying that the corporate status was of itself a
separate and important substantive matter, Hamilton contended
that the Bank was not invalid simply because it was a corporation. 99
Since its operations would be useful or conducive to the collection
of taxes,' 0 0 borrowing,10 t the advance of commerce 1 2 and the provision of an army and navy in time of sudden emergency,10 3 its creation was an exercise of implied powers, incidental to the great
objects of government, and therefore "necessary and proper."
From these arguments for and against the establishment of a
national bank, two main issues emerged. First, whether the power
to create a corporate bank required a specific expressed power? Secself-evident proposition that it is invested with all those inherent and
implied powers which, at the time of adopting the Constitution, were
generally considered to belong to every government as such, and as being essential to the exercise of its functions.
Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 556 (Bradley, J., concurring). In any case, the
government had the power to make its currency legal tender under the necessary
and proper clause in order that it might carry on during the Civil War and "vindicat[e] its authority and existence." Id.
96 Opinion Letter From Sec'y of Treasury Alexander Hamilton to Pres. Washington (Feb. 23, 1791), reprintedin M. Clarke & D. Hall, supra note 2 at 96. This was
in fact the theory Chief Justice Marshall followed in justifying in part the power of
Congress to legislate in the Florida Territories acquired from Spain. American Ins.
Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511 (1828). See also Justice Strong's reliance on these
powers in his opinion for the Court in the Legal Tender Cases: "Congress has often
exercised, without question, powers that are not expressly given nor ancillary to
any single enumerated power. Powers thus exercised are what are called by Judge
Story in his Commentaries on the Constitution, resulting powers, arising from the
aggregate powers of the government." Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 535
(1870).
97 Opinion Letter From Sec'y of Treasury Alexander Hamilton to Pres. Washington (Feb. 23, 1791), reprinted in M. Clarke & D. Hall, supra note 2, at 97-98.
98 Id. at 97, 101-02.
99 See id. at 97.
100 Id. at 97, 105-06.
iOi Id. at 105, 107-08.
102 Id. at 97, 105-06, 108-09.
103 Id. at 106, 109.
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ond, whether the "necessary and proper" clause meant to confer on
Congress the power to do what was "needful, requisite, incidental,
useful or conductive to" or "absolutely or indispensably" necessary? In their arguments, Madison and Hamilton set forth opposing
theories not only of constitutional power but also of the nature and
status of the corporation.
As Gerard Henderson stated in "The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law",' 4 there were at the
time the Constitution was framed two divergent conceptions regarding corporations:
The restrictive theory tends to emphasize the extraordinary
character of the privileges with which the members of a corporation are endowed, and the high nature of the act of sovereignty by which their corporate franchise is conceded. The
liberal theory looks upon a corporation rather as a normal
business unit, and its legal personality as no more than a convenient mechanism of commerce and industry. Of the restrictive theory, the economic substratum may be said to be the
jealousy of local interests, the fear of world competition. Of
the liberal theory, the material basis is the growing
interna05
tionalism of business, of trade, of investment. 1
Traditionally, the corporation had been a monopoly, created by
the Crown in a supreme act of sovereignty. To the American colonist, it connoted a great, largely uncontrolled, privileged trading
company, like the East India Company. 0 6 This thinking affected
the debates in the Constitutional Convention. The motions to enable Congress expressly to create corporations were, as stated
10 7
above, opposed in part on grounds of monopoly and privilege.
Moreover, some of the states in ratifying the Constitution had appended adjurations against a Congressional power to create commercial corporations, 0 8 leading proponents of the bank bill to
distinguish a banking corporation from that of the ordinary commercial corporation.' 0 9 Hamilton, in opposing the traditional theory, relied on a newer order, one advocated by Adam Smith, of a
free trade among the nations, and of a nation's wealth expanding by
virtue of its trade. To expand a nation's trade, it was more appro104

G.

HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CON-

105

(1918).
Id. at 3 (footnote omitted).

106

Id. at 10-11.

STITUTIONAL LAw

E.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 40, at 615-16 (statements of Rep. King).
108 See, e.g., I ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 42, at 323 (Massachusetts); id. at 326
(New Hampshire); id. at 330 (New York); id. at 337 (Rhode Island).
109 See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1945-54 (1791) (statement of Rep. Gerry).
107
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priate to think in terms of business units rather than single human
persons and to render the corporation an ordinary business instrument. Therefore to create a corporation, it was not necessary that
Congress possess an extraordinary power. The power should itself
be ordinary, and where its exercise would be conducive to one of
the expressed powers, it should be considered incidental to it or
implied."o
The argument of Madison, Jefferson and Randolph against the
creation of national corporations had rested on the then prevailing
theories regarding the nature of a corporation. Their second argument, based on the "necessary and proper" clause, rested on their
understanding that the federal government was limited under the
Constitution as a matter of historical fact and that fact would shortly
be commemorated in the tenth amendment. A construction of implied powers inconsistent with these limitations was in their view a
distortion of the historical intent. Hamilton's response to that argument ignored history and focused on the nature of government:
whatever a government is empowered to do, it may do by whatever
means it deems expedient.
What did "necessary and proper" mean? An examination of
what Hamilton and Madison had written just three years before in
110 See, e.g., Opinion Letter from Sec'y of Treasury Alexander Hamilton to Pres.
Washington (Feb. 23, 1791), reprinted in M. Clarke & D. Hall, supra note 2, at 95112. In his discussion concerning the suitability of a corporation as an instrument
of trade with a foreign country he stated:
Suppose a new and unexplored branch of trade should present itself
with some foreign country; suppose it was manifest that, to undertake it
with advantage, required a union of the capitals of a number of individuals, and that those individuals would not be disposed to embark without
an incorporation, as well to obviate the consequences of a private partnership, which makes every individual liable, in his whole estate, for the
debts of the company, to their utmost extent, as for the more convenient
management of the business; what reason can there be to doubt, that
the national Government would have a constitutional right to institute
and incorporate such a company? None.
Id. at 110-11.
The utility of the Hamiltonian view of corporations quickly became apparent in
the succeeding decades as the number and variety of corporations chartered by the
various states increased. The business of the United States being business,
America became commercial first and corporate second. The eighteenth century
constitutional scruples of Madison and the framers appeared out of date even by
the time McCulloch v. Maryland was argued. By then the principal argument against
the Bank was that it was not "necessary and proper." The force of the argument
based on the uniqueness of its corporate nature had been largely lost by the widespread existence of energetically competing corporate state banks. See infra note
372-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ultimate vindication of the
Hamiltonian view.
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The Federalistimpels the conclusion that they had there expounded a
strict construction of the clause. Hamilton in writing his opinion to
Washington in 1791 had to ignore these earlier positions, whereas
Madison's argument in the House was entirely consistent with them.
In expounding the meaning of "necessary and proper" in The
Federalist, Madison began by explaining why the Constitution had
not "copied the second article of the existing confederation which
would have prohibited the exercise of any power not expressly delegated."''
Practically, he reasoned, that provision could not be literally observed. The Continental Congress had to have recourse to
a doctrine of implied powers. Therefore, because the Congress established under the Constitution had more extensive powers, it had
been considered advisable to provide for the exercise of implied
powers by the added measure of the "necessary and proper"
clause." 2 But notice how, in the final sentence of the following paragraph, he attempted to soothe the fears of his worried readers with
the addition of the qualifying "indispensably" to the "necessary and
proper" clause:
Had the Convention taken the first method of adopting the
second article of confederation; it is evident that the new Congress would be continually exposed as their predecessors have
been, to the alternative of construing the term "expressly" with
so much rigour as to disarm the government of all real authority whatever, or with so much latitude as to destroy altogether
the force of the restriction. It would be easy to shew [sic] if it
were necessary, that no important power, delegated by the articles of confederation, has been or can be executed by Congress, without recurring more or less to the doctrine of
construction or implication. As the powers delegated under the
new system are more extensive, the government which is to
administer it would find itself still more distressed with the alternative of betraying the public interest by doing nothing; or
of violating the Constitution by exercising powers, indispensably necessary and proper; but at the same time, not expressly
granted. '
This was vintage Madison: patrician ambiguity declaring on the one
hand a doctrine of implied powers actually written into the Constitution and suggesting thereby a grant of powers somewhat broader
than the grant of the specified powers, but on the other, countersuggesting by the modifying "indispensably" a shadow of implicaIII
112
113

THE FEDERALIST

See id.
Id. at 303-04.

No. 44, at 303 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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tion closer to noon than three o'clock. He continued in similar vein,
arguing at greater length for the practical necessity of some modicum of implication, and then in counter-weighing terms that the
modicum of implication had been limited to the "unavoidable":
Had the Convention attempted a positive enumeration of the
powers necessary and proper for carrying their other powers
into effect; the attempt would have involved a complete digest
of laws of every subject to which the Constitution relates; accommodated too not only to the existing state of things, but to
all the possible changes which futurity may produce: For in
every new application of a general power, the particularpowers,
which are the means of attaining the object of the general
power, must always necessarily vary with that object; and be
often properly varied whilst the object remains the same.
Had they attempted to enumerate the particular powers
or means, not necessary or proper for carrying the general
powers into execution, the task would have been no less chimerical ....

114

Having used the broad language that Hamilton would employ in his
opinion to Washington in 1791115 and Marshall in his opinion in
McCulloch," 6 Madison in conclusion once again shifted direction
and sounded the language of limited implication:
Had the Constitution been silent on this head, there can be no
doubt that all the particular powers, requisite as means of executing the general powers, would have resulted to the government, by unavoidable implication. No axiom is more clearly
established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is
required, the means are authorised; wherever a general power
to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it, is included. Had this last method therefore been pursued by the Convention, every objection now urged against
their plan, would remain in all its plausibility; and the real inconveniency would be incurred, of not removing a pretext
drawing into
which may be seized on critical occasions for
7
question the essential powers of the Union.'
Madison's ambiguity, pointing at the same time in the opposite
directions of liberal construction and implied powers, when read
quickly, and of a stricter construction of "unavoidable implication,"
when read more carefully, was probably calculated. After all,
Madison was not only the father of the Constitution, but a practicing
Id. at 304.
115 See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
116 See infra notes 383-90 and accompanying text.
117 THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 304-05 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
114
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politician. His carefully constructed argument would furnish materials for both sides when in the future the meaning of the "necessary
and proper" clause would be debated. Justifiably, advocates for the
state of Maryland before the Court in McCulloch would point to the
limiting phrases of "indispensably" and "unavoidable implication"
and call for the strictest of constitutional constructions." 8 Modern
day commentators, accustomed to the contemporary reality of a federal government operating with the broadest of unwritten powers,
consider the unqualified sweeping passages of Madison's Federalist
argument justification enough.
The temptation to calculated ambiguity had certainly been
great. On the one hand there was the great desire to see the Constitution ratified. To this end The Federalisthad been written. But the
"necessary and proper" clause had been one of the great stumbling
blocks. "Few parts of the Constitution have been assailed with more
intemperance than this,"" 9 he wrote. It had been called the
"sweeping clause" and as such attacked in the state ratifying conventions.' 2 0 Discreet disclaimers of its sweeping nature were in orSee text infra accompanying notes 331-32.
(J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
120 Objections to the "necessary and proper" clause had been raised early in the
ratifying process. In the Pennsylvania debates, James Wilson, one of the framers,
disputed against the contention that by virtue of the clause "the powers of Congress were unlimited and undefined." Assuming the line that Hamilton took in
THE FEDERALIST, Wilson replied that: "It is saying no more than that the powers
we have already particularly given, shall be effectually carried into execution." 2
118

119 THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 303

ELLIOT'S DEBATES,

supra note 42, at 468 (Pennsylvania) (statement of Mr. Wilson).

(For a review of Hamilton's position in THE FEDERALIST see infra notes 126-28 and
accompanying text.) Later, Wilson asserted "that the powers are as minutely enumerated and defined as was possible, and .. .the general clause, against which so
much exception is taken, is nothing more than what was necessary to render effec-

tual the particular powers that are granted." 2

ELLIOT'S DEBATES,

supra note 42, at

481 (Pennsylvania) (statement of Mr. Wilson). See also 2 id. at 531, 537-38 (statements of Mr. M'Kean) (defending the necessary and proper clause).
In Virginia, the followingJune, the opponents of the Constitution renewed the
objections against the "necessary and proper" clause. George Mason, who was also
a framer, contended that the powers of the new government should be confined to
such as were only "absolutely necessary." 3 id.at 32 (Virginia) (statement of Mr.
Mason). Patrick Henry warned first against the dangers of implied powers and the
uncertain and ambiguous language of the Constitution. 3 id. at 167 (Virginia)
(statement of Mr. Henry). Later, he argued more specifically against the dangers
arising from the "necessary and proper" clause, which he called, "the sweeping
clause." 3 id. at 437.
On the other hand, Randolph, again as one of the framers, attempted to assure
his listeners of the clause's benignity:
This formidable clause does not in the least increase the powers of Congress. It is only inserted for greater caution, and to prevent the possibility of encroaching upon the powers of Congress. No sophistry will be
permitted to be used to explain away any of these powers; nor can they
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der. Soothing reassurances of its harmlessness had to be given. But
on the other hand Madison, believing in the necessity of implied
possibly assume any other power, but what is contained in the Constitution, without absolute usurpation.
3 id. at 206 (Virginia) (statement of Mr. Randolph). This of course was again a line
borrowed from Hamilton's remarks in THE FEDERALIST, that the phrase meant
nothing, but was added only out of an abundance of caution. See infra text accompanying note 121.
George Nicholas followed in a similar vein. The clause had been termed "the
sweeping clause" and was being represented as "replete with great dangers." 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 42, at 245 (Virginia) (statement of Mr. Nicholas). But,
he added:
[T]he Constitution had enumerated all the powers which the general
government should have, but did not say how they were to be exercised.
It therefore, in this clause, tells how they shall be exercised. Does this
give any new power? I say not. Suppose it had been inserted, at the end
of every power, that they should have power to make laws to carry that
power into execution; would this have increased their powers? If, therefore, it could not have increased their powers, if placed at the end of
each power, it cannot increase them at the end of all. This clause only
enables them to carry into execution the powers given to them, but
gives them no additional power.
2 id. at 245-46. In other words again, as Hamilton had said in THE FEDERALIST and
Wilson had said in the Pennsylvania debates, the clause was purely executory.
Later in the Virginia Convention, Nicholas repeated the argument, adding it would
be construed as such by the judiciary. 2 id. at 443.
Madison continued along the same lines:
If that latitude of construction which he contends for were to take place
with respect to the sweeping clause, there would be room for those horrors [described by Patrick Henry]. But it gives no supplementary
power[.] It only enables them to execute the delegated powers. If the
delegation of their powers be safe, no possible inconvenience can arise
from this clause. It is at most but explanatory. For when any power is
given, its delegation necessarily involves authority to make laws to execute it[.] Were it possible to delineate on paper all those particular
cases and circumstances in which legislation by the general legislature
would be necessary, and leave to the states all the other powers, I imagine no gentleman would object to it. But this is not within the limits of
human capacity. The particular powers which are found necessary to be
given are therefore delegated generally, and particular and minute specification is left to the legislature.
3 id. at 438-39 (Virginia) (statement of Mr. Madison). See also 3 id. at 455.
Mason replied that the sweeping clause might be used by Congress to limit the
freedom of the press as necessary to provide for the general welfare and to preserve the peace against seditious writings. To prevent this he advocated the passage of an amendment to the Constitution, whereby it was provided that powers
not expressly delegated to the United States be deemed reserved to the states. See
3 id. at 441-42 (Virginia) (statement of Mr. Madison). Henry and Grayson followed
with similar arguments: There should be an express bill of rights limiting the powers of the federal government. A specific enumeration of the important rights preserved should be followed by a declaration "that every power and right not given
up was retained by the states." 3 id. at 449 (Virginia) (statement of Mr. Grayson);
see 3 id. at 445-49 (statement of Mr. Henry). From this it can be seen that the fears
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powers, probably desired that the ratification of the Constitution be
based on a public defense of the doctrine, such as he had given.
Practically, ratification following such a defense would strengthen
Congressional powers and afford a ready justification for their
exercise.
Hamilton's writings in The Federalist went to greater lengths
than Madison in limiting the extent of the "necessary and proper"
clause. Linking that clause with the supremacy clause, he wrote:
generated by the language of the "necessary and proper" clause led to the advancement of the Bill of Rights, culminating in the tenth amendment.
Randolph then admitted he had reservations concerning the clause. Departing
from what he said earlier, that the clause did "not in the least increase the powers
of Congress," he now said that the construction advanced by Madison and Nicholas
was too "narrow," but he countered that that advanced by its opponents was too
"extravagant." 3 id. at 463 (Virginia) (statement of Gov. Randolph). He put forward his own thesis, one which would be adopted during the debates on the bank
bill in 1791 by Rep. Sedgwick in the House, and later by Marshall in his opinion in
McCulloch v. Maryland. See infra note 383 and accompanying text.
Randolph argued:
A constitution differs from a law; for a law only embraces one thing, but
a constitution embraces a number of things, and is to have a more liberal construction .... The American constitutions are singular, and
their construction ought to be liberal. On this principle, what should be
said of the clause under consideration? (the sweeping clause.) If incidental
powers be those only which are necessary for the principal thing, the
clause would be superfluous.
3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,supra note 42, at 463 (Virginia) (statement of Gov. Randolph).
But, Randolph added, the scope of incidental powers must not be so limited:
"The principle of incidental powers extends to all parts of the [constitutional] system." If you then say that the President has incidental powers, you would reduce it
to tautology. I cannot conceive that the fair interpretation of these words is as the
honorable member says." 3 id. But the adversaries of the clause were equally extravagant in their construction.
In truth, Governor Randolph concluded,
the clause is ambiguous, and . . .that ambiguity may injure the states.
My fear is, that it will, by gradual accessions, gather to a dangerous
length. This is my apprehension, and I disdain to disown it. I will praise
it where it deserves it, and censure it where it appears defective.
3 id. at 470. Nevertheless, he would support the clause with its defects because he
would support the Constitution with all its defects. See 3 id. at 470-71. The solution lay in later amendment.
Later Randolph as Attorney General, when passing on the constitutionality of
the Bank bill, abandoned his own thesis for the position taken by Madison in THE
FEDERALIST, of incidental powers narrowly constrained by absolute necessity and
unavoidable implication. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
Also noteworthy were the delegates comments during the New York ratifying
debates, where it was argued that the powers granted under the "necessary and
proper" clause were practically illimitable and as such a dangerous threat to state
constitutions, particularly when considered in relation to the taxing clause and the
provision for the common defense and the general welfare. See 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 42, at 330-41 (statements of Messrs. Williams & Smith).
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These two clauses have been the sources of much virulent invective and petulant declamation against the proposed constitution, they have been held up to the people, in all the
exaggerated colours of misrepresentation, as the pernicious
engines by which their local governments were to be destroyed and their liberties exterminated-as the hideous monster whose devouring jaws would spare neither sex nor age,
nor high nor low, nor sacred nor profane; and yet strange as it
may appear, after all this clamour, to those who may not have
happened to contemplate them in the same light, it may be
affirmed with perfect confidence, that the constitutional operation of the intended government would be precisely the same,
if these clauses were entirely obliterated, as if they were repeated in every article. They are only declaratory of a truth,
which would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication from the very act of constituting a Foederal
Govern2
ment, and vesting it with certain specified powers.'1
He continued in this vein:
What is a power, but the ability or faculty of doing a
thing? What is the ability to do a thing but the power of employing the means necessary to its execution? What is a LEGISLATIVE power but a power of making LAws? What are the
means to execute a LEGISLATIVE power but LAws? What is the
power of laying and collecting taxes but a legislative power, or a
power of making laws, to lay and collect taxes? What are the
proper means
of executing such a power but necessary and
22
proper laws? 1
He gave as an example:
[A] power to lay and collect taxes must be a power to pass all
laws necessary and proper for the execution of that power; and
what does the unfortunate and calumniated provision in question do more than declare the same truth; to wit, that the national legislature to whom the power of laying and collecting
taxes had been previously given, might in the execution of that
123
power pass all laws necessary and proper to carry it into effect?
This process, he added, would lead to the same result in the
case of all the other powers declared in the Constitution. It was
expressly to execute those powers, "that the sweeping clause, as it
has been affectedly called, authorises the national legislature to pass
121 THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 204 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
122 Id. at 204-05.
123 Id. at 205. See also supra note 120 (discussing Wilson's statements in the Penn-

sylvania ratifying debates and those of Nicholas in the Virginia debates).
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all necessary and proper laws." 124
In other words, the necessary and proper clause explained the
obvious: "The declaration itself, though it may be chargeable with
tautology or redundancy, is at least perfectly harmless."'' 25 To answer the question of why then the clause was introduced, Hamilton
replied: "to leave nothing to construction[!]" 126 Finally, he wrote:
"The propriety of a law in a constitutional light, must always be de1 27
termined by the nature of the powers upon which it is founded."
Three years later, however, in his 1791 opinion to Washington,
Hamilton abandoned his Federalist position and wrote instead:
The whole turn of the clause containing it, indicates that it was
the intent of the convention, by that clause, to give a liberal
latitude to the exercise of the specified powers. The expressions have a peculiar comprehensiveness ....

To understand

the word as the Secretary of State [Jefferson] does, would be
to depart from its obvious and popular sense, and to give it a
restrictive operation; an idea never before entertained. It would
word absolutely, or indisbe to give it the same force as if the
1 28
pensably, had been prefixed to it.

We may conclude that Hamilton regarded his former position
in The Federalist as campaign oratory, serviceable for the moment to
get the Constitution ratified. Nevertheless, these Federalist words of
Hamilton, campaign oratory or whatever, and of Madison, ambiguous talk or straight talk, would be quoted to Marshall in the oral
arguments in McCulloch v. Maryland,129 and would confront that
great jurist with the difficulties of overcoming the arguments based
124 THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 205 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also
supra note 120 (quoting initial statements of Randolph in the Virginia debates).
125 THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 205 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
126 Id. at 206.
127 Id.

128 Opinion Letter of Sec'y of Treasury Alexander Hamilton to Pres. Washington
(Feb. 23, 1791), reprintedin M. Clarke & D. Hall, supra note 2, at 98. Jefferson in his
opinion to Washington had assumed Hamilton's previously held position with respect to the interpretation of the necessary and proper clause. See Opinion Letter
of Sec'y of State Thomas Jefferson to Pres. Washington (Feb. 15, 1791), reprinted in
M. Clarke & D. Hall, supra note 2, at 92-93.
129 See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 362, 372 (references to extracts from THE FEDERALIST in the arguments of Luther Martin). By that time Madison would be in agreement with Hamilton, that the Bank was constitutional. See infra notes 277-78 and
accompanying text.
Even then a politician's life was easier than a judge's. While judges are expected to be reasonable, consistent, faithful to history and legislative and constitutional intent, politicians are permitted to be, if not faithless and irrational, at least
inconsistent and supple enough to do the work of the moment.
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on "tautology or redundancy," and "indispensably necessary" and
"unavoidable implication."
To return to the central issue, was the authorization of the
United States Bank truly an exercise of a "necessary and proper"
power? If we accept Madison's position in The Federalist that a necessary power was one either "indispensably necessary"' 130 or having
resulted by unavoidable implication, as a requisite means to the execution of a general power, 13 the authority to create the Bank was in
either case doubtful. If we accept Hamilton's position in The Federalist that the phrase "necessary and proper," meant little, was
"chargeable with tautology or redundancy," and left "nothing to
construction," 132 clearly the Bank was unauthorized. If, however,
we accept Hamilton's position in his opinion to Washington, that
"necessary" meant merely incidental to or conducive to the realization of an expressed power, 1 3 3 clearly the Bank was "necessary."
Even if the Bank was necessary, however, was it "proper"?
What did that word mean? If one were to have applied the test fashioned by Hamilton in The Federalist,'34 one should have asked
whether the operations of a bank essentially partook of the nature of
the powers upon which it was purportedly founded: tax collection,
borrowing, the regulation of commerce and the provision for an
army and a navy. 135 Madison during the debates had referred to
this test in passing: the "necessary and proper" clause limits the
means to those "necessary to the end, and incident to the nature of
the specified powers."136 Beyond denying that the operations of the
Bank pertained to tax collection or borrowing, 3 7 he did not, however, pursue this argument further. Randolph, in his opinion to
Washington, regarded the phrase "and proper" as without independent meaning: it was, he wrote, "among the surplusage which
138
as often proceeds from inattention as caution."'
Hamilton on the other hand, in his opinion to Washington purporting to show the Bank's propriety, wrote that there was "a natural and obvious relation between the institution of a bank, and the
See supra text accompanying note 113.
See supra text accompanying note 117.
132 See supra notes 125 & 126 and accompanying text.
133 See supra text accompanying note 97.
134 See supra text accompanying note 127.
135 See supra text accompanying notes 100-03.
136 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1898 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison).
137 See id. at 1896-97.
138 Opinion Letter of Att'y Gen. Edmund Randolph to Pres. Washington (Feb.
12, 1791), reprinted in M. Clarke & D. Hall, supra note 2, at 89.
130
131
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objects of several of the enumerated powers of the Government." 39
First, he referred to the relation of the Bank to the collection of
taxes. The designation of the money or thing in which taxes were to
be paid was both a proper and necessary exercise of collecting them.
Congress had already designated gold and silver. Not without precedent, it could have designated payment in the commodities upon
which the duties were laid or it could have designated their payment
in state paper money, state bank bills or in United States Treasury
bills.' 4 ° This, he said, was indisputable. But was it? In view of the
constitutional proscription against the issuance of state paper
money,' 4 ' would it have been constitutional for Congress to give
validity to this outlawed currency by accepting it in payment of bills
owed to the federal government? This seemed hardly in keeping
with the intent of the framers and seemed at odds with the constitutional provision.
Hamilton went further. The United States Government could
have issued its own demand bills and set aside a special fund in the
Treasury for the purpose of paying these bills "in order to support
their credit, and give them a ready circulation."' 42 The constitutionality of this as well, he said, was indisputable. Such a Treasury
operation would in effect be a bank: "A deposite [sic] of coin or
other property, as a fund for circulating a credit upon it, which is to
answer the purpose of money." 43 But could the United States have
adopted a plan which led to the circulation of paper money?
Granted such Treasury bills did not constitute legal tender, did they
not nevertheless constitute the issuance of a federal paper money
suitable for circulation, which the framers had specifically rejected? 4 4 Did not this rejection limit the government's power to
borrow to the issuance of bills and notes in such amounts as to make
them unsuitable for purposes of circulation? The intent of the Convention had been to confine the circulating medium to gold and silver. Hamilton's plan was to evade that intention by providing for
the circulation of a paper medium by a bank, which for the most part
139

Opinion Letter of Sec'y of Treasury Alexander Hamilton to Pres. Washington

(Feb. 23, 1791), reprinted in M. Clarke & D. Hall, supra note 2, at 105.

140 Id. at 106. Hamilton failed to mention the fact that despite the designation by
Congress of gold and silver as the acceptable medium of payment, he had, on taking office, ordered the collection of duty payments in state bank paper. See supra
text accompanying notes 13-17.
141 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See also supra note 35 and accompanying text.
142 Opinion Letter of Sec'y of Treasury Alexander Hamilton to Pres. Washington
(Feb. 23, 1791), reprinted in M. Clarke & D. Hall, supra note 2, at 106.
143 Id.
144 See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
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was privately owned. A federal private bank would be better than a
state private bank, he had said in his original report on the Bank,
which was true. If paper money was to flourish, it was better that it
5
should be federal paper.money.

14

Hamilton next argued to Washington: "A bank has a direct relation to the power of borrowing money, because it is a usual, and,
in sudden emergencies, an essential instrument, in the obtaining of
loans to Government." 46 This was related to the provision for raising armies and navies. Practically speaking, however, "[b]orrowing
money presupposes the accumulation of a fund to be lent."' 147
Without banks, such accumulations usually do not exist. Therefore,
in order for the government to borrow, it must create the conditions
under which banks can exist.' 4 8 This, of course, was an argument
based on the sheerest expediency. He did not add the obvious: that
unless the banks were authorized to undertake the forbidden business of issuing a circulating paper money, they would not organize;
and that therefore, as a quid pro quo for the availability of this private capital in time of need, the banks must be allowed the quasimonopolistic privilege of creating money. Nor did he add that the
loans themselves would also be in the form of paper money, which
through government expenditure would circulate into the stream of
commerce. By this device, the government would also evade the
spirit of the Constitution. The paper money it would accept and
circulate would not be its own, but that of its creature, the private
United States Bank.
Thirdly, he argued:
[A] bank has, also, a natural relation to the regulation of trade
between the States, in so far as it is conducive to the creation
of a convenient medium of exchange between them, and to the
keeping up a full circulation, by preventing the frequent displacement of the metals in reciprocal remittances. Money is
the very hinge on which commerce turns. And this does not
mean, merely gold and silver; many other things have served
the purpose, with different degrees of utility. Paper has been
See Secretary of Treasury's Report on a National Bank, 1st Cong., 3d Sess., 1
9 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 1,
note 1, at 322-23. For a discussion of
Hamilton's preference for federally-issued paper money, see supra notes 35-38 and
accompanying text.
146 Opinion Letter of Sec'y of Treasury Alexander Hamilton to Pres. Washington
(Feb. 23, 1791), reprinted in M. Clarke & D. Hall, supra note 2, at 107.
147 Id. at 108.
148 See id.
145

ANNALS OF CONG. 2044 (1790), reprinted in
at 71-72, and 7 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra
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49
extensively employed.1

Circulation and exchange could not be solely restricted to coin, he
added, because the whole or almost all of it might be carried out of
50
the country.1
In other words, some form of paper money was a practical monetary and economic necessity 'and therefore, Hamilton argued, a
practical governmental necessity. He need hardly have added that if
it was a practical governmental necessity, it was a constitutional necessity. He had already given his opinion on that subject in the The
Federalist:
[N]ations pay little regard to rules and maxims calculated in
their very nature to run counter to the necessities of society.
Wise politicians will be cautious about fettering the government with restrictions, that cannot be observed; because they
know that every breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence, which ought
to be maintained in the breasts of rulers towards the constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for other breaches,
where the same plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is less
urgent and palpable.' 5 '
Necessity, therefore, would overcome impropriety. In constitutional terms, whatever was "necessary" was also "proper." Madison
had echoed these thoughts in The Federalistwhen he wrote, justifying
the Continental Congress's administration of the Western Territory
without the least color of constitutional authority under the Articles
of Confederation: "[T]hey could not have done otherwise. The
public interest, the necessity of the case, imposed upon them the
task of overleaping their constitutional limits. But is not the fact an
alarming proof of the danger resulting from a government which
' 52
does not possess regular powers commensurate to its objects?"'
For both Madison and Hamilton, therefore, as expressed in The Federalist, necessity was the ultimate governmental element overcoming
impropriety. Again, what was necessary was both "necessary and
proper.
What was necessary in Hamilton's mind in 1791 was some form
of a national paper currency as a convenient source of money sup149

Id.

150 Id. Finally, in his closing remarks he emphasized the "very essential advantage

to trade in general .. .to the existence of a bank circulation, equal, in the public
estimation, to gold and silver." Id. at 112. It prevented hoarding of specie and
facilitated the ready payment of taxes. Id.
151 THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 163 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
152 THE FEDERALIST

No. 38, at 249 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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ply. The national government, however, could not very well issue it,
because the monied interests would oppose the issuance of government paper money. State paper was expressly forbidden. State bank
paper, though in existence, was hard to control and did not suit the
requirements of a national uniform currency. Therefore, as Bingham had recommended,' 3 a national bank paper currency was necessary. To issue this currency, the creation of a national bank was
also necessary. The essential characteristic of such a bank would be,
beyond the mere collection and deposit of money, the lending and
circulation of its paper.
Obviously the authorization of such a power was not appropriate to Congress' power to coin money and regulate its value and the
value of foreign coins, because as the word "coin" suggests, the
framers had provided only for a metallic currency. To justify a bank
and its paper currency, recourse had to be made to a variety of powers. Or as Henry Clay would put it, when arguing against the constitutionality of the Bank, during the 1811 debates to renew the Bank's
original charter:
This vagrant power to erect a bank, after having wandered
throughout the whole Constitution in quest of some congenial
spot whereupon to fasten, has been at length located .. .on
[the] provision .... to lay and collect taxes, [etc.] .. .The

sagacious Secretary of the Treasury in 1791 pursued the wisest
course-he ha[d] taken shelter behind general, high sounding,
and imposing terms. He has declared, in the preamble to the
act establishing the bank, that it will be very conducive to the
successful conducting of the national finances; will tend to
give facility to the obtaining of loans, and will be productive of
considerable advantage to trade and industry in general.1 5 4
The justification was flimsy and if challenged was transparently
bare. It was a makeshift providing for an alternate national paper
currency, despite the Constitution. Significantly, it was not attacked
on that direct ground, but on the populist grounds that the authorization of a corporate, monopolistic money-making privileged bank
was not expressly delegated. The debates, never once descending
to the specific question of whether a national bank with powers to
create a uniform circulating paper money was valid, swirled instead
around the most abstract of questions: whether the "necessary and
proper" clause meant, irrespective of circumstance, "indispensably
153

154

See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
22 ANNALS OF CONG. 211 (1811) (statement of Rep. Clay).
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necessary" or "needful, requisite, incidental or conducive to an expressly delegated power."
For a variety of practical reasons, the Bank's proponents and
opponents preferred to keep the debate in the abstract. For its proponents, it was a matter of forensic tactic. It was clearly preferable
to join issue on what was essentially a generic and therefore necessarily imprecise issue, thereby avoiding the joinder on the more
damaging, specific issue of whether the creation of a paper-issuing
bank would violate a constitutional prohibition against the issuance
of paper money. Moreover, on a practical level, as one Bank proponent observed during the debates, 15 5 and as Madison's private correspondence indicates, 15 6 the people were not concerned. (As with
most politicians, if the people are not concerned, they are not concerned.) For the Bank's opponents, it was a matter of political strategy. Madison may have been genuinely concerned about the force
of doctrinal precedence. In the Continental Congress he had been
anxious about the propriety of the chartering of the Bank of North
America' 5 7 and in the Constitutional Convention it was he who had
made the lost motion to confer upon Congress the specific power to
grant corporate charters. 1 58 But it is doubtful that such anxieties
moved the rest of his party. Indeed on the theoretical level, Jefferson, an opponent of the Bank had on prior occasions followed the
160
doctrine of implied powers, 159 as he would in the future.
Realistically Madison's constitutional arguments represented
the formal defense behind which his party could advance and protect its practical interests. First, it wished to provide for the acceptance of state paper, as well as continental paper, in satisfaction of
the Bank's capital subscription requirements.' 6 ' Second, it wished
to insure that the national capital be permanently established on the
Potomac. 162 In the end, Hamilton and the North had the votes for
155 See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. at 1914 (1791) (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
156 See Letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison (Feb. 26, 1791), reprinted

in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 398 (C. Hobson & R. Rutland eds. 1981);
Letter from Richard Bland Lee to James Madison (Apr. 17, 1791), reprinted in 14 id.
at 6 (1983); Letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison (Apr. 20, 1791),
repinted in 14 id. at 10.
157 See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
158 See supra notes 46 and 57 and accompanying text.
159 See 17 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 71, at 195-97 (Jefferson's opinion on the constitutionality of the Residence Bill, justifying the permanent location of the seat of government on the Potomac).
160 See Act of Oct. 31, 1803, ch. 1, 2 Stat. 245 (authorizing Jefferson to effect the
Louisiana Purchase).
161 See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
162 See supra notes 70, 81-84 and accompanying text.
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the Bank bill. It passed and was submitted to Washington for his
163
signature.
Washington, however, shared southern concerns. For national
reasons, he had supported the initial decision to establish the capital
permanently on the Potomac, and, it has been suggested, was one of
the prime movers of the bill amending the Residence Act.' 6 4 Perhaps not coincidentally then, on February 25th, the day Hamilton's
supporters in the Senate dropped their opposition to consideration
of the amendment to the Residence Act, Washington signed the
Bank bill into law.1 6 5 The following day the Senate approved the
Residence Act amendment and it passed the House without recorded debate. 1 66 The measures for the Bank in Philadelphia and
the capital on the Potomac, it has been argued, were interrelated:
Washington with the assistance of Hamilton, bridged the differences
67
of North and South in the national interest.
2.

The Non-necessity of the Result: The Expiration
of the Bank in 1811

One would think that when the Republicans swept to power
in 1801 the United States Bank would have been in trouble. With
Thomas Jefferson as President and James Madison as Secretary
of State, it would seem as though the Bank would have had no
friends in high places and that the war unto death waged against
it some thirty years later by President Andrew Jackson would
shortly have been initiated. This was not to be the case. To the
crucial position of Secretary of the Treasury, Jefferson appointed
Albert Gallatin and Gallatin strongly approved the Bank's operations and favored its rechartering upon its expiration in 1811.168
Gallatin was neither an ordinary cabinet minister nor an ordinary Republican. Coming to the House of Representatives in
1795, he had assumed Republican leadership in the House almost at once, supplanting Madison. 6 9 His source of power, acM. Clarke & D. Hall, supra note 2, at 85 (Feb. 4, 1794).
See 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 82, at 26.
Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191.
See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 2024, 2026. It was signed into law by Washington: Act
of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 214.
167 See 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 82 at 36-40 (discussing
163
164
165
166

the inter-relationship between the Bank Bill and the Residence Act). The situation

was complicated by a supplement to the Bank Bill, which the southerners
threatened to kill by delay. Id. at 39.
168 See infra note 179.
169 ADAMS,
GALLATIN].

LIFE

OF

ALBERT

GALLATIN
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cording to Henry Adams, "lay in [his] courage, honesty of
purpose, and thoroughness of study."' 7 °
In the House, the principal issues to which Gallatin devoted
himself related to constitutional construction and finance. The
constitutional issues were the usurpation of power by the national government in general and, more particularly, by its executive branch. The prior chartering of the United States Bank,
however, did not strike him as a substantial constitutional issue.17 Nor as a member of the House was he concerned with its
practical operations. Instead he had applied himself to the government's fiscal matters. Finding the Republicans in the House
completely unprepared and unorganized in these affairs, he applied himself to their study and through his subsequent complete
mastery of the subject occupied the field almost exclusively. He
became the Republican spokesman on finance, succeeded in organizing the appointment of the first House Ways and Means
Committee, and formulated Republican fiscal policy. ' 72 Spending
having had until then exceeded revenue, he proposed economy.
Since economy could not be sensibly affected otherwise, he proposed the necessity of specific appropriations. These appropriations demanded due knowledge of the subject: accordingly, he
demanded reports from the executive departments as a check on
prodigality. As a measure necessary to limit spending to income,
he proposed the postponement of an efficient navy until the payment of the national debt. 7 1 In short, almost the entire corpus
of Jeffersonian economic and fiscal1 74policy originated with Gallatin. He was Jefferson's Hamilton.
With this background in mind, it was natural that when the
Republicans and Jefferson finally captured the executive branch
of government in 1801, Jefferson should appoint Gallatin his
Secretary of the Treasury. In the Treasury, Gallatin assumed the
Id. at 154.
See id. at 156-57. Prior to going to Congress, Gallatin had served in the Pennsylvania House of Assembly, where he had been instrumental in the state legislature's adoption of a law chartering the Bank of Pennsylvania which had a
relationship to the state similar to that of the Bank of the United States and the
United States government. Id. at 43. As representative of the western farmers of
that state, he was moreover, aware of the need for an adequate money supply. His
constituents had suffered severely from the need to raise cash in order to pay the
federal excise tax laid on whiskey in 1791. Their economy being based on barter,
Gallatin had remonstrated against the adoption of the federal law, while serving in
the Pennsylvania Assembly. Id. at 45-46.
172 ADAMS, GALLATIN, supra note 169, at 157.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 268.
170
171
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lead for the administration's fiscal policies.' 7 5 He persuaded Jefferson, despite the latter's vehement contrary opinion, to accept
on practical grounds the establishment of a branch of the United
States Bank at New Orleans. Brushing aside the President's constitutional and political protestations, Gallatin argued:
I am extremely anxious to see a bank at New Orleans; considering the distance of that place, our own security and even that
of the collector will be eminently promoted, and the transmission of moneys arising both from the impost and sales of land
in the Mississippi Territory would without it be a very difficult
and sometimes dangerous operation. Against this there are
none but political objections, and those will lose much of their
force when the little injury they can do us and the dependence
1 76
in which they are on government are duly estimated.
Jefferson yielded and Gallatin procured from the Republican Congress an act authorizing the establishment of the New Orleans
branch. 177
With the change of administrations, in 1809, Gallatin continued
as Secretary of the Treasury under Madison. 71 In that capacity he
soon had to deal with the pressing problem of the United States
Bank whose charter was to expire on March 4, 1811. Toward the
close of the 1808-09 legislative session he sent a report to the Senate strongly representing the advantages to be derived from the
Bank. 179 First, the Bank provided a safekeeping of public monies,
thereby affording one of the best securities against delinquencies.
Second, at its own risk and expense, it transmitted public monies
over the extensive territory of the Union. Third, it afforded a safe
and easy collection of the revenues. Fourth, it had theretofore been
eminently useful in advancing loans which, under different circumstances, were necessary.18 0 It was true, he added, many of these
services could be supplied by the numerous banks now established
by the several states, but not with the same facility and to the same
extent. Moreover, the Bank's superior capital afforded the greater
security against possible losses and a greater resource with respect
to loans. Finally, it was not appropriate that the national govern175

176

See id. at 267-71.

Id. at 321-22.

177 Id. at 322. See Act of Mar. 23, 1804, ch. 32, 2 Stat. 274.
178 ADAMS, GALLATIN, supra note 169, at 392. Madison had originally

intended to

appoint Gallatin as Secretary of State but a determined opposition to this nomination in the Senate prevented this. d. at 390-92.
179 See Secretary of Treasury's Report to Congress, 11th Cong., 1st Sess., 19 ANNALS OF CONG. 456-61
180 Id. at 458-59.

(1809).
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ment should "in respect to its own operations, be entirely dependent on institutions over which it has no control whatever."' 1 8' This
was especially important in times of emergency,1 8 2 he added, with a
prescient assessment of the country's difficulties in the approaching
war with Great Britain.
In the following session of Congress, the appropriate House
committee, in accordance with Gallatin's suggestion, reported a bill
extending the Bank's charter with certain modifications.' 8 3 Federalists were in favor, but old Republicans opposed. The bill went off
without action to the next Congress,'8 4 when it was reintroduced
and at last considered. In the meantime, opposition from local interests had been mounted against it. Newly chartered state banks,
hoping to succeed to the profits of the expiring United States Bank,
importuned various state legislatures to instruct their United States
Senators to vote against renewal. The legislatures in Massachusetts,
85
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia and Kentucky fell into line.'
Petty and personal arguments were used: The Bank's stock was
owned largely by Englishmen and its profits should accrue to Americans; the Bank was owned by Federalists and in their hands constituted a monarchical "engine of despotism."' 8 6 Finally, against
Gallatin personally, it was argued off the record that a vote against
the Bank was a vote of no confidence in him and his fiscal policies of
economy in spending. His enemies desired to drive him from
office. '

8 7

During the debates, constitutional arguments for and against
the bill were advanced in both houses. In the House, Burwell of
Virginia led the attack against the Bank, relying on the old Madisonian argument that a corporate bank was not within the delegated
powers and since not "absolutely necessary" was not within the
reach of the "necessary and proper" clause.' 88 Congressman Porter
of New York, relying on the tenth amendment and inveighing
against the justification of the Bank as within the various powers of
tax collecting, borrowing, commerce and defense, countered that:
"The very circumstance of referring this right to many different
Id. at 459.
Id.
183 Bill to Renew the Charter of 1791 Establishing a National Bank, I th Cong.,
1st Sess., reprinted in M. Clarke and D. Hall, supra note 2, at 122-32.
184 See ADAMS GALLATIN, supra note 169, at 417.
185 See 5 ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 327-28 (1921).
186 5 id. at 329.
187 Id.
188 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 585 (1811) (statement of Rep. Burwell).
181

182
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heads of authority is, in itself, conclusive evidence, that it has no
very direct relation to any of them."'189 The doctrine of implied or
constructive powers, he said, was the doctrine of general expediency, which once established would warrant Congress in the enactment of any law not expressly prohibited by the Constitution. The
constitutionality of the Bank thereby "is not made to depend on the
peculiar applicability of the measure to any particular power. . . but
• . . on its general tendency to promote the ultimate objects for
which these different powers were given. In other words, it is made
to depend on its expediency. ' 190

The arguments against the Bank were further refined. Congressman Wright used Hamilton's words in The Federalist against
him: that the declaration in the "necessary and proper" clause
though "chargeable with tautology or redundancy, is at least perfectly harmless."''
Wright observed:
Here we find one of the framers of this instrument, when defending this article, called the "sweeping clause," from the
charge of its being used to extend the powers of Congress, or
to embrace other than the specific powers, himself confining it
to the express powers, and indeed
declaring that it gave no
19 2
power, was a mere tautology.
On the other side, Representative Fisk from New York made
the familiar arguments based on implied powers and added a new
one: that the constitutionality of the Bank was assured by prescription, that is, accepted practice. The Congress of 1791 had enacted
the bill. A Republican Congress had in coming to power acquiesced
in its validity by laws in 1804 and 1807, extending the operations of
the Bank to New Orleans and classifying the counterfeiting of its
notes a capital offense. 19 3 Prescription was one of the grounds upon
which Marshall would, in 1819, base his approval of the Bank in McCulloch v. Maryland.' 4 It was also the ground on which Madison
would rely in proposing the recharter and signing the bill which
eventually effected it in 1816.'
The argument, however, did not
189 Id. at 634 (statement of Rep. Porter).

190 Id. at 645 (statement of Rep. Porter).
191 Id. at 677 (statement of Rep. Wright) (citation omitted). See also supra note
130 and accompanying text.
192 22 ANNALS Or CONG. 677 (1811) (statement of Rep. Wright).
193 See id. at 604-05 (statement of Rep. Fisk). For the act creating the Bank at
New Orleans, see supra note 177 and accompanying text. For the act denominating
counterfeiting a capital offense, see Act of Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, § 18, 3 Stat. 275.
194 See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401-02 (1819).
195 See Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), reprinted in M. Clarke & D. Hall, supra note 2, at 778-80.
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pass unchallenged. Congressman Porter, in response to Fisk,
termed the doctrine fatal to the principles of a written constitution.
96
In effect, he argued, as Chief Justice Taney would in Dred Scott,,
that the meaning of the Constitution could never be determined by
practice. 9 7 The text was always a tabula rasa.
There were then competing schools and competing rules of
constitutional interpretation. Those arguing against a specific federal power-here the establishment of a federal bank-would customarily contend that its legitimacy could only be tested by
reference to the constitutional text, thus largely rendering the "necessary and proper" clause a surplusage. While those arguing in
favor of the specific federal power would point beyond the text to
basic governmental principles or to the very practical considerations
that made of the power's exercise a basic governmental and practical necessity, and to infer from such necessity that it was constitutionally "necessary and proper." Against the pejorative imputation
of a doctrine of implied powers, the latter school would contend
that the strict restriction of "necessary and proper" to the realm of
the "absolutely necessary" was itself a matter of implication.' 9
To justify the Bank, Representative Nicholson, of the broad
constructionist school, attempted to link the clause with a fundamental principle underlying the entire federal system:
In the federative system . . . the rule to be observed in the

distribution of its powers, between the Confederated States
and the Federal head, is .

.

. this: Can any particular power,

which is about to be vested somewhere, be exercised in local
and separate districts or States, consistently with the safety
and good of the whole? If it can, it ought of course to be exercised by the respective State governments. All other powers,
which cannot be thus confided, consistently with the safety and
good of the whole, ought to belong to the General
196

See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 432 (1856) (discussing the

authority of Congress to legislate in the Louisiana Territory). The power could
not, despite the authority of American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542

(1828), be ascribed to the power in Article IV, section 3, para. 2, to "make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory." It must rest only on the latter
alternative put forth in that opinion, on "the inevitable consequence of the right to
acquire territory." 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 543. Taney's tactic was to deny legitimacy to

any construction of a written text of the Constitution based on accepted practice.
The alternate construction, based on an implied power, could then more easily be
subjected to an elaborate construction of the written text of the "due process"
clause.

22 ANNALS OF CONG. 642-43 (1811) (statement of Rep. Porter).
198 Id. at 668-69 (statement of Rep. Alston).
197

19881

McCULLOCH V MARYLAND

261

Government.' 9 9
The Constitution did not exactly conform to this rule. But,
Nicholson thought, the power under consideration, the establishment of the national banking system, did. He considered it "necessary" for government revenues, borrowing and the general
welfare.2 0 0 For Nicholson, what was necessarily a matter for the national government was as a matter of constitutional principle, a matter for the national government under the "necessary and proper"
clause.2 0 ' This was somewhat procrustean, but the Bank did after
all require a constitutional bed. While the Nicholson argument may
have been wanting in finesse, it had made the essential point. Only
the national government could effectively provide a banking system.
This was so, because banks emitted bills of credit, which in turn constituted paper money and the effective circulating medium.
Part of the debates centered on the subject of paper money. A
constitutional justification for its existence was attempted. Representative Alston made the most prophetic statement. From the provision in Article I, section 10, prohibiting the states from emitting
bills of credit or making anything but gold and silver a tender in
payment of debts, he inferred a national power to issue paper
money and to make anything besides gold and silver a legal tender,
including bank paper. From this he further inferred the power to
create a bank. 2 This was far in anticipation of the eventual Legal
Tender Cases,20° albeit by a somewhat different textual route.
199 Id. at 763 (statement of Rep. Nicholson). This is analogous to the test eventually adopted by the Court for the distribution of powers between the states and the

federal government to regulate interstate commerce. See Cooley v. Port of Philadelphia Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). There was one important difference: The Constitution expressly provided for the federal regulation of

interstate commerce. It unfortunately had not provided for a national paper currency system. See generally Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
Writing for the Court, ChiefJustice Marshall stated: "Whenever the terms in which
a power is granted to Congress, or the nature of the power, required that it should
be exercised exclusively by Congress, the subject is as completely taken from the
state legislatures as if they had been expressly forbidden to act on it." Id. at 193.
200 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 764-65 (1811) (statement of Rep. Nicholson).
201 See id. at 769-79.
202 Id. at 670-71 (statement of Rep. Alston).
203 See Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).Justice Strong, writing for the

Court, placed Congress' power to make paper money a legal tender in time of war
in the "necessary and proper" clause, as incidental to both the power to maintain
an army and navy and the power to preserve the government itself during war and
rebellion, and therefore was not contrary to the Constitution. See id. at 540-47.
Thirteen years later, the Court held further that Congress also had the power to

make paper money a legal tender in time of peace, placing it in the power to borrow
and, incidentally, to issue a currency in whatever form deemed appropriate; in the
powers to coin and regulate the value of coined money, collect taxes, pay debts and

262

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 18:223

As plausible as Alston's argument was, it did not jibe with the
framers' intent as it was generally understood. The framers did not
want paper money at all.2 4 But by 1811, almost everyone outside a
narrow Virginia circle did. As Representative Garland maintained
there was not enough gold and silver in circulation to pay the government's revenues. There had to be paper money; it could not be
state paper money. Therefore it had to be national. 2°5 Representative Wright, however, took issue with Alston's position. Bank notes
were not bills of credit, and therefore as a matter of constitutional
law they did not fall within the prohibition against state bills of
credit. If they were, neither the states nor the national government
could indirectly create them. 20 6 In 1831, Madison would privately
agree with Wright, writing that the prohibition against state bills of
credit had not been intended to reach state bank notes. The framers
had not foreseen the proliferation of state banks and state bank
notes, nor their substitution as a circulation medium for gold and
silver. If they had, he added, it was questionable whether they
"would have ventured to guard against it by an additional provision. '"207 The Constitution already "had so many obstacles to
encounter.' '208
Representative Barry, returning to the principal question,
whether the creation of the Bank was "necessary and proper," put
aside the question of the Bank's necessity, and concentrated on its
propriety:
The incidental power to be exercised must not only be necessary, but .. .must [also] be appropriate, and confined to the
end in view. If ... it involves the exercise of a power that

tends to create a distinct and substantive thing, which, in its
important operations, is entirely distinct from, and independent of the power to the execution of which it was designed as a
mean; it would most certainly be improper. Such an exercise
...would

...be usurpation, and the end proposed becomes a

mere pretence for the unwarrantable assumption of power.20 9

provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; and in
the prohibition directed against a state currency in Article I, § 10, and therefore in
the "necessary and proper" clause. Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 449-50

(1883).
204 See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
205 See 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 756-58 (1811) (statement of Rep. Garland).
206 Id. at 677 (statement of Rep. Alston).
207 Letter from James Madison to CharlesJ. Ingersoll (Feb. 2, 1831), reprinted in
M. Clarke & D. Hall, supra note 2,at 778.
208 Id.
209 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 696 (1811) (statement of Rep. Barry).
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Barry then touched on the Bank's Achilles heel:
To enable [the government] to collect taxes, offices of deposite [sic] ...

would be sufficient. But instead of confining

the incidental power to be employed to the object it is
designed to accomplish, you introduce a new system of policy,
that has no more conne[ction] with the management of the
revenue than it has with the power to borrow money on the
credit of the United States, with the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations among the States, and with the Indian tribes, or than it has with the power210to raise and support
armies, or provide and maintain a navy.
Instead, he continued, a private and privileged society of individuals
set themselves up, and entering into the business of moneymaking,
emit notes that become a medium of circulation and form "a new
species of capital.""'
Having made the crucial argument, Barry proceeded to vitiate
it, by claiming that the states could adequately provide for the nation's banking and credit necessities.2 12 Something had to give. If
the constitutionality of the Bank were measured by the test of a
"necessary" relation to an expressly delegated power and if "necessary" meant, as Madison said in The Federalist, "indispensably necessary," 2 13 or simply executory, as Hamilton said in The Federalist,214
the Bank was not "necessary." Additionally, if its constitutionality
were measured by the test of a "proper" relation to an expressly
delegated power, and "proper" must be determined, as Hamilton
also had said in The Federalist, "by the nature of the powers upon
which it is founded,1 2 15 or as Barry had said in the debates, by "the
end in view, "216 the Bank was not proper. If, on the other hand,
state bank paper money were allowed to flourish, the states would
effectively determine the quantity and quality of the paper money
circulating through the nation, even though the individual states
could not constitutionally coin money or emit bills of credit. Perhaps the federal government could control this somewhat by refusing to accept paper not adequately supported by specie, but even
this would be a compromise to paper money. To carry out strictly
the framers' intent, the national government would have to insist on
210

Id. at 697.
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payment only in gold and silver, regardless of the monetary
consequences.
Crawford of Georgia, who was the proponent of the bill in the
Senate, addressed these anomalies during the Senate debates:
A rational analysis of the Constitution will refute in the most
demonstrative manner this idea of its perfection. This analysis
may excite unpleasant sensation; it may assail honest
prejudices; for there can be no doubt that honest prejudices
frequently exist, and are many times perfectly innocent. But
when these prejudices tend to destroy even the object of their
affection, it is essentially necessary that they should be eradicated. In the present case, if there be any who, under the conviction that the Constitution is perfect, are disposed to give it a
construction that will render it wholly imbecile, the public welfare requires that the veil should be rent,2 and
that its imperfec17
tion should be disclosed to public view.
He would therefore support the bill on much the same grounds
Hamilton had advanced in 1791. Senator Lloyd, who supported
Senator Crawford, put this argument in a different way:
It is impossible for the ingenuity of man to devise any written
system of Government, which, after the lapse of time, extension of empire, or change of circumstances, shall be able to
carry its own provisions into operation-hence, sir, the indispensable necessity of implied or resulting powers, and hence
the provision in the Constitution that the Government should
exercise such additional powers as were necessary to carry
those that had been delegated into effect. Sir, if this country
goes on increasing and extending, in the ratio it has done, it is
not impossible that hereafter, to provide for all the new cases
that may arise under this new state of things, the defined powers may prove only a text, and2 1the
implied or resulting powers
8
may furnish the sermon to it.

Nevertheless, later in the debates, Crawford did offer a constitutional exegesis of his own, in an attempt to show that the Constitution could, if seen in a certain light, appear to be perfect. The
Constitution gave Congress the power to coin money and regulate
its value, while forbidding the states to coin money or emit bills of
credit, because the national interest required that the coin of the
nation be uniform as to specie and value. Bills of credit were the
representation of coin or money and had in fact become the real
currency of the nation, usurping the place of coin. Therefore, Con217
218

22 ANNALS OF CONG. 134 (1811) (statement of Rep. Crawford).
Id. at 158 (statement of Sen. Lloyd).
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gress must have the power of regulating this currency as well. Necessarily this power included the power to create a bank which would
issue this representative of money. 2 i 9
This was an elliptical argument. What Crawford probably had
in mind was that the United States Bank through its discounting
practices would tend to control the quantity and thereby the quality
of state bank paper and thereby, on behalf of the national government, establish control over the currency. It was a portent of later
developments. Strictly speaking, it was beyond the framers' intent,
as we have seen. They had not envisioned a state bank paper currency, but Crawford's argument molded a present reality to the
overall intent: that the national government should control the national currency.
Crawford anticipated a second problem: a state tax on the stock
of the national bank. Such stock he regarded as national property
and, by inference, as immune from state taxation as federal forts,
magazines, arsenals, dock-yards and other needful buildings. 22 ' He
reasoned that "the right of the States to tax bank stock is inconsistent with the right of Congress to create a bank. That the right of
by immodtaxation destroys the right to create, because the States,' 22
1
erate taxation, could drive the bank out of their limits.
Crawford was familiar with this problem. In Bank of United States
v.Deveaux,2 2 2 Georgia, his home state, had laid such a tax on the
Savannah branch of the first United States Bank during the last days
of its charter.2 23 When the Bank had refused to pay the tax, Georgia
officials had entered its Savannah branch and taken away enough of
its silver to satisfy payment.2 24 An action was filed in the federal
circuit court in Georgia against the state officials for trespass.2 2 5 In
their complaint, the plaintiffs designated themselves as "The President, Directors and Company, of the Bank of the United States,"
219 Id. at 341-42 (statement of Rep. Crawford).
220 Id. at 342. Crawford was apparently relying on the provisions of Article I,
section 8, para. 17: "To exercise exclusive ...Authority over all Places purchased
by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, para 17. The weakness in this analogy is that under this
section, the consent of the state to the purchase of lands and the placement of
federal pockets within the state is presumed, whereas under the proposed bill the
property of the United States Bank would be located within a state without its
consent.
221 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 342 (1811) (statement of Rep. Crawford).
222 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
223 See id. at 63 (statement of Bank's counsel).
224 Id.
225 Id.
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established by act of Congress.2 2 6 Alleging themselves citizens of
Pennsylvania, and the defendants citizens of Georgia, the plaintiffs
based their action in part on diversity and in part on a provision in
the statute establishing the Bank and conferring upon it the capacity
to sue and be sued. 22 7 The trial court dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.2 2 8
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the enchartering statute had not intended to confer systematic federal jurisdiction in every case involving the Bank; that, nonetheless, a
corporate claim could be brought routinely in federal court by and
in the name of the corporation, provided there was some other basis
for federal jurisdiction such as diversity of citizenship of the parties;
and that since in that case the real parties in interest were the individual shareholders who came into court under the corporate name,
the federal court should, in the case of a corporate claim, look to the
citizenship of the corporation's stockholders to determine diversity. 22 9 The Court did not accept the argument advanced in a companion case, Hope Insurance Co. v. Boardman,2 s° that for diversity
purposes a corporation could be considered to have a citizenship of
its own, which would be deemed to be the state of its incorporation. 2 3 Instead it remanded the cause to the trial court for further
proceedings, to determine whether the suit was one between citizens of different states.2 3 2 This ruling, however, left the Bank to the
dubious remedy of an action in the courts of the state which had
already seized its assets. For in Strawbridge v. Curtiss,2 3 3 the Court
had earlier held that for diversity purposes in claims involving joint
interests the citizenship of all plaintiffs had to be diverse from that
of all defendants. It followed therefore that the federal courts could
not assume diversity jurisdiction of corporate litigation in which any
stockholder was a citizen of the same state as any adversary. This
requirement, as applied to corporations, was fatal to the Bank's case
Id. at 62 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 71-72. Counsel argued that the Bank's capacity deriving from the law
creating the Bank arose thereby under the laws of the United States and that consequently the federal courts had jurisdiction of any case in which the Bank was a party
by virtue of the clause in Article III of the Constitution conferring federal jurisdiction in cases "arising under" federal law. Id.
228 Id. at 63.
229 Id. at 84-92.
230 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 57 (1809).
231 Id. at 60-61. The argument was advanced byJohn Quincy Adams. See id. (argument of Mr. Adams).
232 Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 92.
233 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267-68 (1806).
226
227
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in Deveaux, because some of its stockholders were citizens of Georgia.2 34 Crawford's remarks, made in support of the Bank's claim in
that case, foreshadowed the second part of the controversial decision in McCulloch, in which the Court considered the validity of the
Maryland state tax on the Bank's branch located in Maryland.235
But Crawford was ahead of his time. The profits accruing to a
state banking system from which the national bank had been eliminated were evident. The dangers resulting from such a system without the regulatory control of the national bank had not as yet been
experienced and were therefore remote. Many in Congress lived in
the past remembering, as Representative Findley put it, the rise in
party spirit stemming from the manner in which the capital stock of
the original bank had been subscribed.236 Old Republicans could
not forget how the Federalists had benefited and remembering the
past would concentrate on the rigors of "necessary and proper."
In the Senate, Pope tried in vain to move Republicans with the
reminder that Jefferson's policy of commercial non-intercourse with
warring European powers and his Louisiana Purchase could not
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 77.
235 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 390. It should be added that following
the adoption of the 1816 statute rechartering the Bank, the Court in Osborn v.
Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), held that the statute
authorizing the Bank, inter alia, to sue and be sued in all state courts of "competent
jurisdiction, and in any Circuit Court of the United States," had intended to confer
upon the federal circuit courts jurisdiction in any case in which the Bank was a
proper party, and that therefore it could entertain a trespass action brought by the
Bank against officials of the State of Ohio irrespective of diversity. Osborn 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) at 817. It further held that federal jurisdiction in that case arose thereby
under the laws of the United States. Id. at 817-21. See also Bank of the United
States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824). By this ingenious use of
the "arising under" jurisdiction, originally advanced by counsel for the Bank in
Deveaux, the Court had overcome the rigors of the diversity test for a federal corporation as established in Deveaux and Strawbridge. The decisions in Osborn and Planters'
Bank, however, did not help state corporations. And since more and more business
in the 19th century came to be done by corporations, this meant that much commercial litigation remained closed to the federal courts. This situation persisted
until the Court under Taney, in Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson,
43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844), in a dubious exercise of statutory construction read a
recently enacted amendment affecting diversity jurisdiction as changing the requirements of Deveaux concerning the "citizenship" of state corporations. Id. at
556-59. Thereafter the citizenship of a corporate party was not determined by reference to the citizenship of its stockholders, but by reference to the state of its
incorporation. For further discussion of this issue, see Rundle v. Delaware &
Raritan Canal Co., 55 U.S. (14 How.) 80 (1852); and Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio
R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1854).
236 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 705 (1811) (statement of Sen. Findley). See supra text
accompanying note 78.
234
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have been approved without the doctrine of implied powers. 23 7
Taylor, addressing the meaning of necessity, attempted to persuade
his colleagues that "necessary and proper" did not mean "necessity" in the philosophic sense, used by Hobbes, Hutchinson, and
Hume: a substantive necessity, synonymous to fate, "co-existent
with the Deity itself, not prospective nor discretionary, bending in
one way, and in one way only."' 23 8 "Necessary" in the Constitution,
he concluded, meant what Hamilton had said it meant in 1791. It
was a term used in a technical and legal sense, governed by expediency, not by fate. Pickering repeated the argument in slightly different terms: "[Wlhatever the public good requires to be done, is
necessary and proper to be done. It is a moral, not an absolute necessity."

2 39

This was akin to the arguments advanced by Hamilton

and Madison elsewhere in The Federalist: a people expects its government to do what is necessary; and a government must do what is
necessary to keep the confidence of its people. 24 ' To Pickering, the
Bank was required for the good of the country. Therefore, it was a
political necessity. It had to be done. It had to be "necessary and
proper." The details of relating the subject to a specified power had
to be disregarded. For Pickering, the Bank was more than merely
expedient, it was nigh onto fate.
But it was really not in point in 1811 to revive simply and without much emendation the arguments of 1791. Hamilton had initially created a national bank to provide a national paper currency so
as to expand the nation's money supply and with it the nation's
trade, the nation's wealth and its wherewithal to pay its taxes, and
the national government's ability to spend and thereby provide for
the general welfare. The economy, the revenues and government
services could not have grown as they had without the centralizing
functions of a national bank to control the money supply. The Bank
had been conducive to all these things and it had worked. Now, in
1811, the Bank's adversaries wanted to put the Bank back in the
bottle and cork it up with the seal of strict construction. But the
Bank was no longer merely conducive to sound money, trade, the
revenue and government spending. It was practically essential.
Once established, it was thereafter necessary and proper.
Nevertheless, the House onJanuary 24, 1811 voted sixty-five to
sixty-four to postpone indefinitely the further consideration of the
237
238
239
240

See id. at 230-31 (statement of Sen. Pope).
Id. at 296 (statement of Sen. Taylor).
Id. at 309 (statement of Sen. Pickering).
See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
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rechartering bill.2 4 ' On February 20, the Senate voted seventeen to
seventeen on a motion to effectively kill the bill.2 4 2 Vice President
Clinton, who, in 1808, had desired the Presidency 24 3 and who as
Vice President was a decided opponent of Madison's administration, 24 4 broke the tie by voting to kill. 24 5 The power to create corporations, he said, was not expressly granted: "[I]t [was] a high
attribute of sovereignty and in its nature not accessorial or derivative by implication, but primary and independent. '2 46 With these
words from Madison's past, he struck a blow against Madison's present. The bill died, and the Bank died with it.
3.

Once Again the Necessity of the Result:
The Rechartering of 1816

Without the Bank, the country fell into financial paralysis
within three years. Even before its dissolution, financial conditions had not been auspicious. There had been an international
shortage of credit. The supply of gold and silver in the country
had been insufficient to sustain the banknotes in circulation, including that of the United States Bank.2 4 7 In 1789, when Hamilton had sought to encourage the growth of the money supply by
ordering the payment of duties in bank notes, American banking
practice had required that the total dollar amount of the bank
notes issued be less than the dollar amount held by a bank in
gold and silver. 24 8 By 1814, sound banking practice tolerated up
249
to three dollars in bank paper for every dollar held in specie.
But by then, with the country at war with Britain, banks in the
middle, southern and western states had in circulation about
forty million in paper with only seven to eight million in specie to
support it, and this unfavorable ratio was becoming worse.2 5 In
the absence of a national financial institution capable of establishing a uniform monetary system and circulating medium, gold
241 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 826 (1811).
242 Id. at 346.
243 SPAULDING, His EXCELLENCY GEORGE CLINTON 288-93 (1938).
244 Id. at 296-98.
245 See 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 346-47 (1811) (statement of Vice Pres. Clinton).
246 Id. at 346.
247 See id. at 783-85 (statement of Rep. Tallmadge).
248 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. There was also some authority that

a ratio of two to three, or indeed five to one was permissible. See 7 HAMILTON
PAPERS, supra note 1, at 253 introductory note.
249 7 ADAMS, supra note 185, at 388-89.
250 7 id. at 388. In Massachusetts, however, the situation was reversed: While its
banks held seven million in gold and silver, their bank paper totaled less than three
million. Id.
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and silver became of necessity the standard of value, and state
bank paper became valued by the amount of specie it possessed.
The amount of specie held by a state bank reflected the
health of the economy of the region in which the state was located. Gold and silver followed the balance of regional trade.
During the war years and those immediately preceding, the balance of regional trade greatly favored New England and greatly
disfavored the West and the South. Prior to the war, American
shipping had come to a halt, stopped by the embargo laws of the
Jefferson and Madison administrations. The war with Great Britain had brought the British blockades and the closing of American ports. New England, having lived off shipping and trade, at
first suffered the most. But since the embargoes had also cut off
British manufactures, Yankee capital, in need of an outlet, seized
the opportunity to invest in manufacture and supplied the Union
with goods at prices of its own fixing. As early as 1810, gold and
silver began to flow toward Boston from the rest of the country in
purchase of these goods. With the outbreak of war, the British
blockade furthered this movement. The southern and western
states, unable to send their crops to market in New England, sent
all the specie they had. By 1814, New England held half the nation's gold and silver.2 5' New England's support for the war was

therefore crucial. Its loans to the United States either in specie
or in its heavily-supported state bank notes would have enabled
the government to purchase its manufactures and wage the war
with greater facility. However, New England hated the war as
much as it hated the embargo. Instead of providing full support
to the national government, the New England merchants traded
with the British, and lent them gold and silver to the detriment of
the United States Treasury.25 2
By August 1814, the nation's finances were in a critical condition. When on August 24, the British captured and burned
Washington, financial panic ensued. By September 1, the banks
of Baltimore, Philadelphia and New York suspended payment in
specie.253 Only the banks in New England would redeem their
own paper in gold and silver. Elsewhere the currency consisted
entirely of the irredeemable bills and notes of state banks. Boston consequently set the rate of exchange. Until the blockade
could be lifted and domestic products sold abroad or in New
251
252
253

7 id. at 387-88.
7 id. at 387-89.
8 id. at 214.
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England in exchange for specie, payments in specie could not be
resumed.2 5 4 The country was in the hands of New England.
In these circumstances the United States government was no
better off. The Treasury's vaults had become drained of specie,
and its notes sold at a discount in New England and used instead
of specie in payment of its revenues. Elsewhere its revenues were
paid in irredeemable state bank notes. Any attempts to use them
in any great quantity to pay the Treasury's debts in New York or
New England, would soon render them worthless.2 5 5 In the absence of a national currency, the government was forced to leave
most of its revenues unused in the states in which they were collected. Moreover, the government was compelled to admit that
in the states where it desired to spend its money it had not the
wherewithal to pay. Finally, on November 9, 1814, the Treasury
formally notified its creditors that it could not pay the interest on
its principal debt. The United States of America was in
default.256
The remedy to this situation clearly lay in the establishment
of a national currency, which would enable the Treasury to collect its revenues in a circulating medium that everyone would accept for the payment of its debts. The obstacles, practical,
political and constitutional, were so formidable as to make this
then impossible. Gold and silver were considered the only completely valid currency. But the Treasury did not have the species
to circulate, and New England, which had, would not lend them.
Practically, therefore, resort to some sort of national paper currency would once again have to be made.
Once again, however, the Constitution with its bias against
paper money stood in the way. Madison, it will be recalled, in his
Notes to the Convention, had considered that while the framers
had disapproved of a national paper in small denominations
readily passable in ordinary currency, they had approved of bills
in large denominations. 2 5 7 Jefferson, apparently aware of this
distinction, suggested an elaborate scheme whereby the Treasury
would issue notes in large denominations for the larger purposes
of circulation and introduce a metallic money for smaller purposes. State banks would be induced or forced to withdraw their
254 Id.

255 7 id. at 215.
256 See Letter from Alexander Dallas to William Lowndes (Nov. 27, 1814), re-

printed in 10 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 872-73.
257 See 2 FARRAND, supra note 40, at 309.
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paper. The Congress would raise new taxes specifically to pay off
the Treasury notes and on their credit the notes would float.258
Alexander Dallas, Madison's then Secretary of the Treasury,
rejected this plan as impractical and politically impossible. State
banks would not withdraw their notes. And Congress, responsive to state bank pressure, would not legislate them out of existence. In competition with state bank notes, new Treasury notes
would float at a discount of at least twenty percent which, coupled with the interest they would bear, would further depress the
government. To overcome these difficulties, Congress would
have to require the government's creditors to accept Treasury
notes as legal tender. The constitutional and practical objections
to that plan were at least equally formidable.259
Representative John Eppes, chairman of the House Ways
and Means Committee, also objected to Jefferson's scheme: he
would not attempt either to drive out state bank paper or to require the acceptance of Treasury notes as legal tender. Instead
he advanced a scheme of his own, involving the issuance of notes
in small denominations payable in interest-bearing bonds, the redemption of which would be made from the proceeds of stiffly
increased taxation.260 Jefferson dismissed Eppes' plan as impractical, noting that the South did not have the money to pay the
new taxes. 2 6 1 Treasury Secretary Dallas also opposed it for the
reasons he disapproved of Jefferson's plan. The new notes, like
the existing Treasury notes, would sell at a discount while bearing interest and thus further depress the Treasury.
Dallas opted instead for a national bank, whose notes would
be accepted not by compulsion but on faith in its credit, capital
and prudential management.2 62 Eppes and his Virginia bloc opposed it on the same constitutional grounds advanced three years
earlier.26 The Federalists, formerly supporters of the Bank, now
258

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper (Sept. 10, 1814), reprinted in

14 JEFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 57, at 179, 189-90.
259 See Letter from Alexander Dallas toJohn W. Eppes (Oct. 17, 1814), reprintedin
10 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 866-69.
260

J.W.

EPPES, CHAIRMAN,

COMMrrTEE OF WAYS AND MEANS,

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 13th Cong.,
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 2, at

REPORT TO THE

3d Sess. (Oct. 14, 1814), reprinted in 10
854. See also 8 ADAMS, supra note 185, at

247-48.
261 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Oct. 16, 1842), reprinted in 14
JEFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 57, at 207, 208. See also 3 ADAMS, supra note 185, at
248.
262 See supra note 259. See also 8 ADAMS, supra note 185, at 249.
263 See 8 ADAMS, supra note 185, at 250.
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opposed it on financial and political grounds. Financially, as proposed, a bank which, by virtue of its incorporation, had limited
liability and whose capital would in almost nine-tenths part consist of existing depreciated governmental debt, was insolvent
from its inception and was therefore a fraud upon its creditors.
Politically, Federalist New England had no desire to come to the
aid of a Republican war. Dallas' plan collapsed. 2 4
Finally, Daniel Webster proposed on behalf of the Federalists another alternative: a bank with one-fourth of its capital in
specie and the balance in government securities, but without
power to suspend payment in specie, and without obligation to
loan more than two-fifths of its capital to the government.26 5
Webster's plan passed the Congress on January 20, 1815, but
was vetoed by Madison. 66 Until the end of the war, Madison
said, specie would flow out of the bank not into it. Under such
circumstances, the Bank's ability to issue notes would be so limited as not to provide a national circulating medium, and its ability to make loans to the government so limited as to render its
benefit to the government incommensurable with the grant of a
monopoly.267 Madison and Dallas thereby determined that a
non-redeemable national paper currency was the only workable
circulating medium for the duration of the war. In this regard,
they went well beyond Hamilton's more conservative scheme, of
a national paper currency convertible into specie on demand,
into the realm of a pure national paper money.
The country seemed on the verge of collapse. While Congress had been debating Webster's bill, New England, in session
in the Hartford Convention from December 15, 1814, through
January 5, 1815, had contemplated confederation and secession. 68 On January 5, the Convention recessed, awaiting the
outcome of the battle of New Orleans, fully expecting its fall and
with it a climate of despair auspicious to the advancement of its
plans. 2 69 New Orleans, however, did not fall. On February 4, five
days after Madison's veto of the bank bill, Washington heard the
Id.
28 ANNALS OF CONG. 178 (1815) (statement of Sen. Webster).
266 Veto Message from Pres. Madison to the Senate of United States (Jan. 30,
1815), reprinted in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 540-42 (J. Richardson ed. 1897).
267 Id. at 542.
268 8 ADAMS, supra note 185, at 292-309.
269 See id. at 309.
264
265
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On February 13, news

reached Washington of the signing of the peace treaty at
Ghent.2 7 ' Peace had unexpectedly saved the country from
collapse.
The effect of peace on the economy was dramatic. The
blockade and the embargo were lifted. Successive crops of
southern cotton previously confined to port were shipped to Britain in exchange for a flood of British gold, silver and manufactures. The South quickly became the wealthiest region in the
country. New England manufacturers, ruined by British imports,
laid off their workers, New England banks lost their specie, and
272
the region as a whole lost its prosperity.
In these changed economic and financial circumstances, the
South and the Republicans in Congress listened with sympathy to
Madison's annual message of December 5, 1815.273 The resumption of trade had improved the condition of the public revenue
and maintained the credit of the United States, he wrote. But a
more prudent management of the government's finances suggested further monetary changes. He added:
It is, however, essential to every modification of the finances
that the benefits of an uniform national currency should be
restored to the community. The absence of the precious metals will, it is believed, be a temporary evil, but, until they can
again be rendered the general medium of exchange it devolves
on the wisdom of Congress to provide a substitute which shall
equally engage the confidence and accommodate the wants of
the citizens throughout the Union. If the operation of the
State banks can not produce this result, the probable operation of a national bank will merit consideration; and if neither
of these expedients be deemed effectual it may become necessary to ascertain the terms upon which the notes of the Government (no longer required as an instrument of credit) shall
be issued upon motives of general policy as a common medium of circulation.2 7 4
The necessities of war had driven Madison, in disregard of any
constitutional inhibition, to the ultimate pragmatic monetary policy
270 9 ADAMS, supra note 185, at 57.
271 Id. at 58. The treaty had actually been signed on December 24, 1814. Id. at

52.

272 See id. at 91-96.
273 President Madison's Seventh Annual Message to the Senate and House of
Representatives (Dec. 5, 1815), reprinted in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 266, at 547-54.
274 Id. at 550-51.
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of a non-redeemable national circulating paper money. Prior to that,
in the message accompanying his veto of Webster's bank bill in
1815, he had already abandoned his constitutional opposition to the
national incorporation of a bank. Before stating his reasons for the
veto, Madison had adverted to "the question of the constitutional
authority of the Legislature to establish an incorporated bank," and
considered it "as being precluded in [his] judgment by repeated
recognitions under varied circumstances of the validity of such an
institution in acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches
of the Government, accompanied by indications, in different modes,
'
of a concurrence of the general will of the nation." 275
This was the
theory of prescription advanced by Representative Fisk in the House
debates of 1811.276 With Madison's adoption, it achieved the status
of a constitutional doctrine.2 7 7
Undoubtedly the pressures of practicality and necessity, as well
Id. at 540.
See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
Years later, in 1831, during the controversy surrounding the renewal of the
United States Bank charter, Madison reflected at length on this doctrine, comparing it to the doctrine of stare decisis governing judicial decisions. The reasons for
it, he wrote, lay first, in
275

276
277

the good of society . . .that the rules of conduct of its members should

be certain and known, which would not be the case if any judge, disregarding the decisions of his predecessors, should vary the rule of law
according to his individual interpretation of it ....[Second,] because an
exposition of the law, publicly made, and repeatedly confirmed by the
constituted authority, carried with it, by fair inference, the sanction of
those who, having made the law through their legislative organ, appear,
under such circumstances, to have determined its meaning through
their judiciary organ.
Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), reprinted in M.
Clarke & D. Hall, supra note 2, at 778-79.
It was even more important, he added, to apply this doctrine to the Constitution than to an ordinary law since it was more necessary that the meaning of the
Constitution be fixed and known than that of an ordinary law. Otherwise,
if a particular legislature, differing in the construction of the constitution, from a series of preceding constructions, proceed to act on that
difference, they not only introduce uncertainty and instability on the
constitution, but in the laws themselves; inasmuch as all laws preceding
the new construction, and inconsistent with it, are not only annulled for
the future, but virtually pronounced nullities from the beginning.
Id. at 779.
There might be an exception to this rule, Madison continued. Nevertheless,
even
the most ardent theorist... will find it impossible to adhere to, and act
officially upon, his solitary opinions as to the meaning of the law or constitution, in opposition to a construction reduced to practice, during a
reasonable period of time; more especially where no prospect existed of
a change of construction by the public or its agent.
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as the requirements of certainty and stability, induced Madison in
1815 to abandon his constitutional stand against the incorporation
of a national bank. As Henry Clay explained these pressures to his
Kentucky constituents, three hundred state banks were emitting the
country's actual currency, in paper. In effect, they were exercising
"one of the highest attributes of sovereignty-the regulation of the
current [monetary] medium." 27 8 But by then, Representative Clay
continued, this paper was obstructing the works of the Treasury:
[I]t would accumulate where it was not wanted, and could not
be used where it was wanted for the purposes of Government,
without a ruinous and arbitrary brokerage. Every man who
paid or received from the Government, paid or received as
much less than he ought to have done, as was the difference
between the medium in which the payment was effected and
specie. Taxes were no longer uniform. In New England,
where specie payments have not been suspended, the people
were called upon to pay larger contributions than where they
were suspended. In Kentucky, as much more was paid by the
people in their taxes, than was paid, for example, in the State
of Ohio,9 as Kentucky paper was worth more than Ohio
paper.

27

Id. at 780. To do otherwise would constitute an "individual prerogative" without
limit to its exercise. Id.
Prescription was a doctrine which did not appeal tq Andrew Jackson or to his
Secretary of the Treasury, Roger B. Taney, or, when the time came to write Dred
Scott, to ChiefJustice Roger B. Taney. See Veto Message from President A. Jackson
to the Senate (July 10, 1832) reprinted in 3 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 266, at 1144-45; see also B. HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN
AMERICA, supra note 42 at 326-29 (for a recapitulation of the Jacksonian assault on
the second United States Bank). For a discussion of Taney's participation in the
veto, see C. SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 185-97 (1935). For Taney's views on prescription in Dred Scott, see supra note 196 and accompanying text. But prescription
was one of the cornerstones of the Court during Marshall's tenure. Justice Paterson relied on it in Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803) (upholding the
validity of the act amending the judicial system and appointing the Justices of the
Supreme Court as judges of the circuit courts of appeal). Justice Story relied on it
in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (holding that the constitutionality of the appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over judgments of
state courts involving federal questions was assumed by the First Congress in 1789,
and in practice by the various state courts thereafter); and Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (holding that Congress' power to regulate commerce included navigation, relying on the early adoption of acts affecting
navigation); and of course in McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401-02. In the beginning, past legislative practice was an important guide to the judicial construction of
the Constitution. Madison's defense in 1831, was the most able exposition of this
doctrine.
278 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 1192 (1816) (statement of Rep. Clay).
279 Id. at 1192-93.
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Clay admitted that in 1811 he had said that a national bank was
not "necessary. "' 2 8 Now he was of the opinion that it was "indispensably necessary." ' 28 ' Such a bank was the only practical method
whereby Congress could recover control of the general currency.
That general currency, then consisting of state bank paper, was effectively under the control of the eighteen several states. Neither
Congress nor the country was ready to apply "a remedy directly acting upon the banks, and their paper. ' 28 2 In other words, Congress,
subject to the pressures of state bank interest, would not tax state
bank paper out of circulation. For these reasons, it had to tolerate
the banks and their paper, but while tolerating them, bring them
under national control. The national bank would be the instrument
whereby, through the gradual renewal of specie payments, the quantity of state bank paper would in time be reduced and its quality
improved. The paper of the United States Bank would in the
meantime afford a uniform standard.2 8 3
It was left to Secretary Dallas in his report to Congress on December 6, 1815, to place the establishment of the Bank on the con2 84
stitutional authority of the United States to emit bills of credit.

Departing from Hamilton's argument of "necessary and proper,"
Dallas argued that the grant of a specific power in Congress to coin
money and to regulate the value of coin in circulation included by
"necessary implication from positive provisions" a generic power to
emit bills of credit.2 85 Disregarding Hamilton's convoluted artifices,
Dallas boldly asserted that the power of the federal government to
institute and regulate a national monetary system, "whether the circulating medium consist of coin or of bills of credit, must, in its general policy, as well as in the terms of its investment, be deemed an
2 86
exclusive power."
The basis for this extension of federal power was practical:
[A] system depending upon the agency of precious metals will
be affected by the various circumstances which diminish their
quantity, or deteriorate their quality. The coin of a State
sometimes vanishes under the influence of political alarms;
sometimes in consequence of the explosion of mercantile
280
281
282

283
284

See id. at 1191-92.
Id. at 1193.
Id. at 1194.

Id.

Secretary of Treasury's Report on the State of the Finances, 14th Cong., 1st
Sess., 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 1602, 1639 (1815) reprinted in, 11 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 17.
285 Id.
286 Id. at 18.
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speculations, and sometimes by the drain of an unfavorable
course of trade.2 8 7
But, he added, translating practicality into terms of constitutional
authority, "whenever the emergency occurs that demands a change
of system it seems necessarily to follow that the authority, which was
alone competent to establish the national coin, is alone competent
to create a national substitute.

2 88

In effect, Dallas argued that necessity required the establishment of a national monetary system, of whatever medium. In fact,
he continued, while the coin of the United States had ceased to be
the circulating medium, Congress had provided for no substitute. 28 9
The Secretary noted that when in the preceding year the state banks
west and south of New England had suspended payment of coin for
their notes, their action had had the immediate effect of suspending
the only legal currency. By this act state-created banks had been
able to circulate a paper medium subject to many of the practical
inconveniences of the bills of credit which under the Constitution
the states themselves were forbidden to emit. While it was true, he
said, that wartime conditions made the suspension of specie necessary, its continuance in time of peace was an evil, which the states
individually were unable to remedy. Consequently, he argued that
"a recurrence to the national authority [was] indispensable for the
restoration of a national currency. 219 He regarded the establishment of a national bank "as the best, and, perhaps, the only adequate resource" for supplying a circulating medium of equal use
and value in every state.2 9 ' By its resources and example the national bank "will conciliate, aid, and lead the State banks, in all that
is necessary for the restoration of credit, public and private ...

and

292
to restore the currency of the national coin."
In response to Secretary Dallas' report, John C. Calhoun, chairman of a select committee of the House, on January 8, 1816, introduced a bill to reincorporate the United States Bank in terms similar
to those contained in its 1791 charter.2 93 Speaking in support of the
bill, Calhoun stated that he would not discuss "the power of Congress to grant bank charters, nor [entertain discussion of] whether
287
288
289

Id.
Id.
Id.

290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293

at 19.

See Bill to Incorporate the Subscribers to the Bank of the United States, 14th

Cong., 1st Sess., 29

ANNALS OF

CONG. 494 (1816).
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the general tendency of banks was favorable .

.

. to the liberty and

prosperity of the country; nor.... whether a National Bank would be
favorable to the operations of the Government. ' 29 4 Those were the
issues which had greatly moved the House in 1791 and 1811, but
Calhoun now regarded their discussion a waste of time. By 1816,
the existence of banks and their ultimate relation with the commerce
and industry of the nation was so complete as to make this inquiry
irrelevant. Nor did he think it debatable that a national bank would
29 5
aid the administration of the finances of the national government.
Rather, Calhoun would examine the state of the nation's currencies, its disorders and the causes for those disorders. The power
to regulate the circulating medium was in express terms given to
Congress. But, he maintained, that power was not in its hands. The
power was exercised by state banks which were not constitutionally
responsible for its management. Gold and silver had entirely disappeared. Paper money was the only money, and that money was beyond the control of Congress. The Constitution, he reasoned, had
not prohibited the creation of state banks, because at the time the
Constitution was framed banks were little known, and it was then
the universal opinion that their notes always represented gold and
silver and could not be multiplied beyond the demands of the country. The creation of the present banking system was not foreseen:
the multiplication of banks from one to two hundred sixty, from a
total capital fund of $400,000 to $80,000,000, and the departure
from a punctuality in redeeming a limited number of bills in specie
to the issuance of bills "ad infinitum, in violation of their contract,
without a dollar in their vaults."' 29 6 By a kind of undercurrent, Calhoun continued, "the power of Congress to regulate the money of
the country had caved in, and upon its ruin had sprung up those
institutions which now exercised the right of making money . . . in

the United States."-29 7 This "great and wonderful" change, he commented ironically, had returned the country to the days of the
Revolution, in which every state had issued bills of credit of various
value, yet employable as legal tender.2 9 8
The state banks were in effect paper machines. No coin in fact
circulated. Indeed, they had issued more money than they could
possibly redeem. From 1811, the time of the dissolution of the first
United States Bank, to 1816, the amount of paper in circulation had
294
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295
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Id.
Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1062.
Id.
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1060 (1816) (statement of Rep. Calhoun).
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increased from eighty or ninety million to two hundred million until
the paper had come to be derisively called "trash or rags.

' 29 9

The

state banks could cure the excess but would not because of the gains
they would have to forego. Resumption of specie payment would
cost them, and they would only do so if they were constrained. In
an argument similar to Henry Clay's,30 0 Calhoun concluded that a
national bank itself paying specie would influence the state banks to
30
do the same by its example. '
Calhoun's state of the currency speech gave factual support to
Secretary Dallas' contention that Congress had the constitutional
power to create a national bank as a means of gaining some governmental control over the currency. It was not the most direct form of
control, but considering the countervailing pressures exerted by the
state banks, it was, as Clay had said, the best measure that Congress
could enact. In this way it could best repair the deficiency caused by
the framers' failure to make an adequate provision for the national
currency.
Because of these circumstances, the constitutionality of the bill
was largely taken for granted. 30 2 There were no long debates on the
evils of corporations or the limits of "necessary and proper." The
national bank was a practical necessity and subsequent debate
turned on the details of the bill and whether its underlying policy
was sound. Webster, as Congressman from New Hampshire, who
would later defend the constitutionality of the Bank before the
Supreme Court in McCulloch, opposed its creation on the grounds
that the paper money the Bank would introduce in circulation represented a departure from the framers', and Hamilton's, hard-money
principles. The evil was the issuance of paper currency in greater
sums than could be redeemed in gold or silver. The bank by virtue
of its limited powers could not remedy the evil. Its bills, based on
specie, would necessarily be short-term and local in circulation, and
so could not affect the profligate circulation of irredeemable state
bank notes. Therefore, Webster announced that he would vote
against it. The true remedy lay in a resolution he would propose:
that the Treasury accept in payment of its revenues only redeemable
bank notes. Thus constrained, state banks would quickly constrict
299 Id. (emphasis omitted).
300 See supra notes 278-83 and accompanying text.
301 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 1062-64 (1816) (statement of Rep. Calhoun).
302 See, e.g., 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 258 (1816) (statement of Sen. Wells) (questioning not the authority of Congress to incorporate a bank, but the extent of that
authority).
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their paper to conform. 3 3 Despite the opposition of Webster and
many Federalists, however, Calhoun's bill passed the House on
March 14, 1816, by a vote of eighty to seventy-one.30 4 It was sent to
the Senate, where after some desultory debate, it was passed on
April 3, by a vote of twenty-two to twelve. 30 5 A week later, Madison
signed it into law.30 6 The second Bank of the United States would
open its doors for business on January 7, 1817.307
But the Bank was after all not the only means by which Congress was to assert control over the currency. Webster, faithful to
the argument he made during the debates, introduced a joint resolution requiring that after February 20, 1817, payments to the
United States be either in specie, notes of the Treasury or of the
United States Bank, or 3of
such state banks as would on demand redeem them in specie. 0 ' This resolution was adopted in April
1816.309 Its impact was varied among the different regions. The

banks of New England had never suspended payment and the banks
from the South and West, which during the war had been bereft of
specie, had by 1816 a sufficient supply and were ready to resume
payment on demand.31 0 Indeed, without support from areas where
specie was readily available, Webster's resolution could not have
passed. The banks in the Middle Atlantic States which were then
overextended, however, held back. Eventually, pressured by the
Treasury to comply, and aided by the newly organized United States
Bank, they too met the February 20 deadline. 3 1 State banks which
were short of specie received short-term loans from the United
States Bank to help them meet balances due from other money markets. Officially, all state banks had resumed payment in specie, but
in reality, there was still a premium paid for gold and silver and a
discount on some state bank notes. 312 Treasury bills were restored
to par.3 13 The national currency was restored, although the achievement was less the Bank's and more that of the new Secretary of the
See id. at 1091-94 (statement of Rep. Webster).
Id. at 1219.
305 Id. at 280-81.
306 See Act of Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, 3 Stat. 266, 277.
307 HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, supra note 42, at 246.
308 Resolution on Collection of Revenue, 14th Cong., 1st Sess., 29 ANNALS OF
CONG. 1440 (1816).
309 The House adopted this resolution on Apr. 26, 1816, id. 1450-51, as did the
Senate on April 29, 1816, id. at 371.
310 9 ADAMS, supra note 185, at 128-29.
311 Id. at 129-32.
312 HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, supra note 42, at 248.
313 9 ADAMS, supra note 185, at 127-28.
303
304
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Treasury, the former Senator from Georgia, William H. Crawford.
Only through his persistent coaxing and cajoling of' state banks
could the mischief resulting from the expiration of the first United
States Bank be gradually undone.3" 4
4.

The "Necessity and Propriety" of the Results:
McCulloch v. Maryland

a.

The Background of the Case

The Bank once organized did not live happily ever after. In
fact it was poorly organized. The post-war period was initially a
time of rapid expansion of trade and credit. Those who could
gain ready access to credit could quickly make their fortune. The
Bank, a ready target for easy credit, fell into the resourceful
hands of a group of Baltimore schemers who through manipulation of its stock elected their man, a Philadelphia merchant
named William Jones, its president, and through him controlled
its policies. Under Jones, stockholders were permitted to pay for
their stock with little or no gold or silver, and the various Bank's
3 15
branches were allowed a free and unsupervised operation.
Consequently, the Bank opened with less than a third of the specie the enabling statute contemplated. 3 16 And in Baltimore, the
unsupervised officers advanced themselves loans without
collateral.31 7
1817 was a year of broad optimism and prosperity. Trade
was active. The Bank, under the control of the Baltimore adventurers followed the mood of the country and did what a central
bank should not do: make easy credit easier by the expansion of
credit on generous terms. In 1818, the general overextension of
credit inevitably led to default, widespread contraction of bank
credit, recession and finally panic and depression. The Bank, instead of doing what a central bank should do in times of general
contraction-become the lender of last resort-accelerated the
depression by calling in its loans. Having begun its operations in
1817, with insufficient gold and silver, despite the statutory plan,
it had by October 1818, almost none. To protect itself against
the disgrace of suspending payment in specie, its directors de314 HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLIrICS IN AMERICA, supra note 42,
315 See id. at 254-61.
316 Id. at 253-54. It has been estimated the Bank should have

at 249-50.

received from its
stockholders seven million dollars in coin instead of the two million it actually did
receive. Id. at 254.
317

Id. at 261.
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cided to contract credit and accumulate specie. 18 In January
1819, it ousted Jones and replaced him with the conservative and
honest Langdon Cheves of South Carolina, who ordered further
loan calls or the actual underlying collateral security. 1 9
The effect on the frontier states was devastating. The Bank's
branches in Kentucky, Ohio and Tennessee had liberally extended loans for land settlement and farming with the land itself,
at prosperity's heightened value, as collateral. When the Philadelphia headquarters demanded payment in specie for the installments due, landowners in great numbers went into default.
In Cincinnati, men left their families and went into the backwoods to raise food. In the East, factories closed, unemployment
spread and thousands became insolvent and went to debtors'
prison. Soup kitchens were set up in Baltimore, Philadelphia and
New York as the country for the first time encountered urban
pauperism. 2 °
Hatred sprang up against banks in general, and against the
United States Bank in particular. Its existence once again became a political issue, the issue of its constitutionality was once
again revived. In February 1818, when times were still good, the
State of Maryland had imposed a tax of $15,000 a year on all
banks or bank branches within the state not chartered by the
state legislature. 32 1 In 1819, when times were bad, five other
35
32 3 Ohio, 3 24 North Carolina
states, Kentucky, 322 Tennessee,

1

Georgia 326

and
adopted similar statutes and other states contemplated following.3 27 The Baltimore branch of the United States
Bank refused to pay the Maryland tax and was sued in the name
of McCulloch, its cashier. It lost in the state courts and appealed
to the Supreme Court. 328 By the time of its argument in Febru-

ary 1819, the question of the repeal of its charter was mooted in
Id. at 258.
See id. at 259.
320 See Rezneck, The Depression of 1819-1822, A Social History, 39 AM. HIST. REV.
30-33 (1934); R. CATrERALL, THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 61-64
(1903).
321 HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, supra note 42, at 263; 1817 Md.
Laws 174.
322 See Act of Jan. 28, 1819, ch. 343, 1819 Ky. Acts 637.
323 See Act of Nov. 22, 1817, ch. 131, 1817 Tenn. Pub. Acts 138.
324 See Act of Feb. 8, 1819, ch. 83, 1819 Ohio Laws 190.
325 See Act of 1818, ch. 7, 1818 N.C. Sess. Laws 18.
326 See Act of Dec. 19, 1817, 1817 Ga. Laws 47.
327 R. CATTERALL, supra note 320, at 64-65.
328 11cCldloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 317.
318
319
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the House. A bill to repeal lost by a heavy majority, 32 9 but the
pall of the Bank's unpopularity lay over the nation's capitol. After Congress adjourned in early March, the Court quickly came
to a decision. 33 0 Two issues were involved: first, whether the
Bank was validly created; second, whether, even if the Bank were
constitutionally created, a state government had the power to tax
it.
b.

The argument: "Necessary and Proper."

On appeal before the Supreme Court, counsel for Maryland
had reverted to the old arguments of 1791 and 1811: that the
powers of the national government were limited to the expressed
powers and to the incidental powers of indispensable necessity,
so as to deny effect to "necessary and proper" as a "sweeping
clause" and to carry out instead the intent of the tenth amendment. Luther Martin, as Attorney General from Maryland, with
his venerable status as constitutional framer, read extracts from
The Federalistand from the debates of the ratifying conventions of
Virginia and New York to show that the contemporaneous exposition of the Constitution by its framers and those favoring its
adoption was wholly at odds with a liberal construction of "necessary and proper." 3 3 ' The Court was reminded that the Hamilton of 1788, in opposition to the Hamilton of 1791, had stated in
The Federalist that the clause was but a harmless bit of "redundancy or tautology." It was reminded that the Madison of 1788,
in opposition to the Madison of 1814 and 1816, had also regarded "necessary" as meaning "indispensably necessary," affording such limited powers in government as should accrue by
"unavoidable implication." It was reminded that the tenth
amendment had been adopted to calm the fears aroused by the
specter of a "sweeping clause," and that the authority of establishing corporations was one of the great sovereign powers of
government. 3~32
Walter Jones for Maryland followed the arguments of 1811,
"that the [C]onstitution was formed and adopted, not by the people of the United States at large, but by the people of the respec329 See 34 ANNALS OF CONG. 1406,
330 Congress adjourned on March

1409 (1819),
3, 1819. See 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 288 (1819);
34 ANNALS OF CONG. 1444 (1819) (House of Representatives). The Supreme
Court's decision was delivered on March 6, 1819. 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT
IN HIS'tORY 510 (1926).
33' 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 372 (argument of L. Martin).
332 See id. at 374.
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tive states;" that the Constitution was "therefore, a compact
between the states, and [that] all the powers . . .not expressly
relinquished by it are reserved to the states; '3 3 3 and that the

Bank to be valid must be both necessary and proper-it must be in
its nature fit and adapted to the accomplishment of the desired
end. 334 The Bank, he concluded, was really a business corporation licensed to make loans, print money and make money and
therefore not proper. 3 5 But having said this, he weakened his
argument by concluding that the business of banking was a matter left to the states, 336 thereby flying in the face of the constitutional provision for the Congressional coinage and regulation of
money.
Joseph Hopkinson, also for Maryland, argued for the permanent necessity of a subject of Congressional legislation. Since in
1819 the state banks could accomplish the augmentation of a paper circulation, make loans to the national government in times
of emergency and collect state taxes, the establishment of a national bank was not permanently
necessary and therefore not
' ' 337
"necessary and proper.

Both Jones and Hopkinson assumed

the constitutional legitimacy and propriety of a national fiscal system based on the issuance of state paper.
In response, counsel for the Bank joined issue with Maryland
and followed the arguments advanced by Hamilton in 1791, that
the creation of the Bank was an exercise of power conducive to
the purposes of the various enumerated powers of tax collection,
borrowing, commerce, property and defense, and consequently
was provided for under the "necessary and proper" clause. 38
They did not follow the Dallas-Calhoun argument of 1816 that
the national bank was a ready instrument whereby the national
government could gain control over the nation's currency which
by then largely consisted of state bank paper. 39 Perhaps the
Bank's subsequent mismanagement of the national credit had
rendered that argument incongruous. Or perhaps, more importantly, the presence of Luther Martin made it impossible. Martin,
as a framer, knew perfectly well that the framers intended a total
333
334
335
336
337
338
339

Id.
Id.
See
Id.
See
See
See

at 363 (argument of W. Jones).
at 367.
id. at 366-67.
at 368.
id. at 333 (argument of Mr. Hopkinson).
supra note 7 and accompanying text.
supra notes 284-301 and accompanying text.
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prohibition of paper money, state and federal. 340 The Dallas-

Calhoun argument, inferring from the provision enabling Congress to coin money and regulate its value a generic intent enabling it to regulate paper money as well, would dissolve in the
acid of Martin's memory.34 ' Perhaps, because of Martin, neither
side wished to inquire too closely into the paper-money aspects
of the case. They had to confine themselves in the matter of the
constitutional text to the pros and cons of the "necessary and
proper" clause.
Counsel for the Bank, nevertheless, did not consider Hamilton's arguments their principal arguments. This was after all
1819, and not 1791 or even 1811. They elected to begin on the
very practical note of the Bank's long establishment. Daniel
Webster opened his remarks on that note: "[I]t might have been
hoped that it [the matter of the Bank's constitutionality] was not
now to be considered as an open question.

'3 4 '

The first Con-

gress and nearly each succeeding Congress had legislated on the
presumption of power. The executive branch had acted on it.
The courts of law had acted on it. "[I]t would seem almost too
late to call it in question, unless its repugnancy with the constitution were plain and manifest.

'3 43

William Pinkney echoed this

44

approach.
In their mouths, the question of "necessary and
proper" seemed stale and profitless. William Wirt, following
Webster, dwelt on the embarrassment suffered by the country
and the national government in relying on state banks during the
recent war. 345 The cumulative effects of these arguments was

that the Bank was, as a matter of practical fact, necessary and that
the arguments of Maryland regarding "necessary and proper"
were remote and impractical. Besides which, everyone in Washington knew that the Bank was necessary in order to control the
national paper money supply. The Court knew it. Therefore
counsel to the Bank formally argued the meaning of "necessary
and proper" in the constitutional text, knowing
that "necessary"
3 46
would have to include the Bank's necessity.
340
341

See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 284-301 and accompanying text.

342 McCulloch,

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 322 (argument of Mr. Webster).

Id. at 323.
344 See id. at 378-81 (argument of Mr. Pinkney). Pinkney, not to be confused with
the Pinkneys of South Carolina, was from Maryland.
345 See id. at 354.
346 There was precedent for this reading. In United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 358 (1805), the Court had justified under the "necessary and proper"
clause the grant of a priority in state insolvency proceedings in favor of the United
343
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c. The Argument: The Power of the State to Tax the Bank
Maryland's second argument was equally supported in The
Federalist: that even if the Bank were constitutionally created, a
state government had the power to tax it. Pursuing the line of
reasoning Hamilton had employed in The Federalist, Maryland argued (from the specific provision in Article I, section 10 of the
Constitution, prohibiting a state tax on imports or exports, and
States against the insolvent's private creditors. The creditors had challenged the
creation of the priority as the exercise of a nondelegated power. In response, the
government had not tried to justify its creation under the power "to establish ...
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Instead it had argued that the priority was for the purpose
of protecting revenue. The government had the expressed power to borrow money
and to collect a revenue for its repayment. The protection of the revenue was an
incident to its collection and the grant of a bankruptcy priority was an incident to its
preservation and therefore "necessary and proper." Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at
384. The creditors had argued that "necessary" meant "indispensably necessary."
Id. at 396. The government's priority was not indispensably necessary. The revenue would survive, although without it, it might suffer occasional losses.
Strictly speaking, the government's argument was not in point, because the
priority it asserted was not in aid of revenue collection, but of a governmental
transaction unrelated to revenue collection. Nevertheless Justice Marshall, in his
opinion for the Court, followed the government's argument. The statute had been
adopted as a "necessary and proper" exercise of power. The government had to
pay its debt and therefore had the right to take those precautions which would
render its financial transactions safe. The priority was a means properly intended
to effect that object. Id. The Justice wrote:
In construing this clause it would be incorrect and would produce
endless difficulties, if the opinion should be maintained that no law was
authorised which was not indispensably necessary to give effect to a
specified power.
Where various systems might be adopted for that purpose it might
be said with respect to each, that it was not necessary because the end
might be obtained by other means. Congress must possess the choice of
means, and must be empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the constitution.
Id.
In other words, the "endless difficulties" for the government flowing from
Fisher's position outweighed the textual deficiencies of the government's position.
If the government did not have the power, it would not work. (Literally it would
work, but not in the ordinary sense of the word, meaning to work well.) The Constitution therefore would not work. Since this was unacceptable, reasoning backwards from the desired result that both Constitution and government would have
to work, "necessary and proper" must stop producing difficulties and mean what
the government said. It must mean helpful or conducive to one of the specified
powers or to the general needs of the government created to exercise those powers.
Counsel for the United States Bank, considering the circumstances underlying
the authorization of its charter in 1816, could rely on that reading of "necessary
and proper." Without it the government could not work, the Constitution could
not work. "Necessary and proper" had to be shaped by the pressure of practical
circumstance.
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from the absence of any other specific limitation on state taxation
to a constitutional intent) that the states retain, in the words of
Hamilton, "an independent and uncontroullable [sic] authority
to raise revenue to any extent of which they may stand in need by
every kind of taxation except duties on imports and exports. 34 7
In fact, Hamilton had gone further and in his usual decisive manner had asserted without qualification that a federal law "abrogating or preventing the collection of a tax laid by the authority
of a State (unless upon imports and exports) would not be the
supreme law of the land, but an usurpation of power not granted
by the [C]onstitution. "348
Maryland advanced other arguments. The thing taxed was
bank stock, an item commonly the subject of taxation. The stock
was property and as such subject to tax irrespective of its ownership by the United States. Bank stock should be distinguished
from federal forts, magazines and the like, which are immune
from taxation, because they are located in a state only with the
state's consent.3

49

Finally, the authority of the United States to

a reciprocal authority in the states to
tax state banks suggested
3 50
tax a national bank.

Once again Maryland apparently had history and constitutional intent on its side. Once again the practical implications of
its argument were disturbing. In the climate of existing opinion,
the legislatures of the southern and western states, representing
the dispossessed or hard-pressed land interests, would, if allowed, tax the Bank to death. The Bank would have to withdraw
its branches from those states and lose its control over the national currency.
The practical consequences flowing from the state's position
led counsel for the Bank to ignore the argument from The Federalist and to summon up a countervailing principle, discerned in the
implications of the supremacy clause. The Constitution, they argued, had respected the power of state governments to be sure,
347 THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 7, at 208. Martin in his argument on the
states' taxing power also relied on the reports of the debates in the state ratifying
conventions, including the report of Marshall's speech in the Virginia convention in
which he closely followed Hamilton's argument from The Federalist. On hearing his
own words read back to him, the Chief Justice was reported to have taken a deep
breath. See WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 4 THE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 239
(1988).
348

Id.

349
350

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 342 (argument ofJ. Hopkinson).
Id. at 350-52.
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but it had also made provision for federal power. The people,
Webster said, had established a complex system of divided sovereignty. From the fact of divided sovereignty, it had been easy to
foresee that questions of competing power would arise between
these governments. For this reason, it had been "of great moment" to determine upon what principle these questions of competing power would be decided and who would decide them.
The determining principle was the principle of federal
supremacy contained in the supremacy clause: federal laws
passed pursuant to the Constitution should control inconsistent
state laws and state constitutions. "The ultimate power" of applying this principle and deciding these questions rested in the
Supreme Court of the United States."'
Having thus posited the principle of the supremacy clause as
the Constitution's paramount provision and as its cardinal rule of
interpretation, Webster proceeded to apply it to the determination of the case. The Maryland tax was inconsistent with the free
operations of the Bank and was therefore invalid. If the state
could tax, it could tax without limitation and without discretion.
And an "unlimited power to tax involves, necessarily, a power to
destroy. "352 Moreover, the United States must have property located in the states free of state taxation. Just as a state could not
tax proceedings in the federal courts, so it could not tax a national bank. 53
Pinkney pushed this argument further. Whatever the United
States had a right to do, it could do free of a contrary state action.
Just as impliedly under the Constitution the army, navy and the
national treasury, as well as the federal courts, were immune
from state taxation-a single state could by a tax destroy themso then necessarily the United States Bank was immune. There
was a manifest repugnancy between the power of Maryland to tax
and the power of Congress to preserve the Bank. 54
To summarize the arguments on the second issue of the appeal, counsel for Maryland had argued from a specific prohibition of state taxes on imports and exports to an implied general
constitutional intention to allow the states the power to impose
any other tax, and relied for support on the imposing authority of
Hamilton in The Federalist. In reply, the Bank had argued, from
351 Id. at 326-27 (argument of D. Webster).
352

Id. at 327.

353 Id. at 328.
354

See id. at 396 (argument of W. Pinkney).
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the supremacy clause, for the presence in the Constitution of a
paramount principle, overcoming any other constitutional principle, whereby the operations of the federal government were systematically immunized from state action; and from the
application of that principle to the present case, an implied constitutional provision prohibiting all state taxation of the national
government's property, including that of the stock of the United
States Bank.
On the first issue of the appeal, Maryland had argued from
the Constitution a paramount principle memorialized in the
tenth amendment, supported again by the authority of both
Hamilton and Madison in The Federalist, that the national government was strictly limited to the execution of its delegated powers
and only to such incidental powers as might be "indispensably
necessary" by "unavoidable implication." And the Bank had argued from established practice and considerations of practicality
for a broader range of implied powers necessary to meet the ends
of government, as covered by the "necessary and proper" clause.
On both questions, the Bank, unable to point to specific provisions in support of its position, relied on constitutional implications in the face of the contrary authority of The Federalist. But
the weight of practicality and the national necessity lay in its
favor. The written provisions of the Constitution had to be construed in the light of the underlying practicality and necessity,
regardless of The Federalist. Marshall would have to find a way.
5.
a.

The Opinion
The Power to Create the Bank

Viewed in its essential terms, McCulloch v. Maryland was not
an ordinary case, not even an ordinary constitutional case. Both
sides knew very well that the framers had misconceived the role
that paper money necessarily had to play in the economy of the
country. The framers' way had simply not worked and a different
way had grown by trial and error, largely through state authority.
The wartime experiences had revealed the necessity of a controlling national participation. Pragmatism had required that this
participation be constituted in the form of a national bank. Now
three-years later, the state of Maryland intended to limit its effectiveness or tax it out of existence and, when challenged, asserted
before the Court that its action was founded on the terms of the
written Constitution and that the federal action was not. It was
an argument based on a version of the Constitution that could
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not work but, because it had a certain historical authenticity, had
the ring of plausibility and, for a rural constituency which disliked national control, a popular appeal. In practical terms, as
Andrew Jackson would prove, it could win votes, elect a President and overturn the established order of national government.
It would, when successful, distort past history, make hash out of
Madison's argument based on prescription, and, as Van Buren
would discover leave the national currency disastrously uncontrolled, invite speculation, an overexpansion of credit, inflation
and subsequent panic and depression.3 5 5 It would make of the
central government a holding company for western and southern
For a recapitulation of the Jacksonian policies that led to this cycle, see HAMIN AMERICA, supra note 42, at 412. First Jackson, gratified by nis reelection in 1832, following his veto earlier that year of the bill to
recharter the United States Bank, decided upon a strategy calculated to destroy its
influence prior to its expiration in 1836. In December 1833, he suggested to Congress the sale of the government's stock in the Bank and the removal of the government's deposits from it. Id. When the House rejected these suggestions, Jackson
was determined on the removals anyway. When McLane, Secretary of the Treasury,
opposed the removals, he was made Secretary of State and was replaced with William J. Duane. When eventually Duane also opposed the removals, he was dismissed and replaced in September 1833, with the Attorney General Roger B. Taney
who faithfully carried out the removals and placed them in certain "pet" state
banks. Id. at 417-20, 456. As a result, from that time on the United States Bank no
longer functioned as a regulator of the currency. On the contrary, it began extending its credit at a rate substantially greater than that recognized as sound practice in the commercial center banks. Id. at 438-39. From 1834 through 1836, the
number of state banks grew nearly by half, and with it the expansion of credit,
speculation, the price of commodities and land and the nation's trade deficit. See id.
at 452-53, 494.
Jackson, in the summer of 1836, attempting to thwart land speculation, ordered the issuance of his "specie circular," directing government land agents to
accept only gold and silver in payment for the purchase of public lands. The result
was to impound specie in the West, where the land sales were, At the same time,
under another administration measure requiring the distribution of surplus federal
revenues among the states according to population, specie was required mainly in
the East, where most of the population was located. See id. at 454-58. The specie
circulation and the revenue distribution therefore worked at cross-purposes, and
produced an absurd disorder: "[mlillions upon millions of coin were in transitu in
every direction and consequently withdrawn from useful employment. Specie was
going up and down the same river to and from the South and North and the East
and West at the same time." Id. at 456 (footnote omitted).
Not coincidently, the Bank of England discovering that its specie resources
were failing rapidly, directed its Liverpool agent to reject the paper of certain commercial houses having American connections. Id. at 457. The British stopped buying and lending and expected payment of their debts. A crisis soon followed.
Demand for cotton contracted and cotton prices fell, leading to business failures in
New Orleans and New York in March 1837. Business fell off drastically. Id. at 459.
In May 1837, a run on the banks for gold and silver ensued and on May 10, the
American banks began to suspend payment in specie. Id. at 466. The Panic of 1837
had started only two months after Van Buren had taken office.
355
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landowners, as the southern Democrats after Van Buren would
ensure.3 56 In those terms, the abstract arguments of "necessary
and proper" did not make lawyer's sense, but they did make
political sense. McCulloch v. Maryland was a political forum for a
political movement to be born and a political leader yet to be
named. It might be Spencer Roane, then ChiefJustice of the Virginia Court of Appeals. It might be a man from the West. It was
a case and movement in search of a constituency and an available
candidate.
Only if viewed in these terms does Marshall's opinion for the
Court make sense. Realizing the inchoate underlying forces and
the threat they represented to national sovereignty, Marshall
quickly moved to the defense of the national government, and
like an advocate for the United States wrote an opinion which
from its opening sentence to its final conclusion revealed a consistent bias in favor of the national position.
In his opening sentence Marshall subtly set the tone of his
entire opinion by down-grading the status of the several states
and exalting the status of the national government, and by depreciating the position of the state of Maryland and appreciating the
position of the United States Bank. He began this way: "In the
case now to be determined, the defendant, a sovereign state, denies the obligation of a law enacted by the legislature of the
Union, and the plaintiff on his part, contests the validity of an act
which has been passed by the legislature of that state. ' 357 Maryland, it will be noted, he had referred to in the lower case, as: "a
sovereign state;" the national government in the upper case, as
"the Union." The Court understood the symbolic value of upper
and lower case.3 5 8
356 For an excellent study of the influence of regional politics on the national
government before the Civil War and especially of the crucial role played by the
South in using its swing votes in the struggle between East and West for power and
to influence Presidential elections and thereby national policy, see C. WILTSE, JOHN
C. CALHOUN: NULLIFIER, 1829-1839 343 (1949); see generally C. WILTSE, JOHN C.
CALHOUN: SECTIONALIST, 1840-1850 (1951).
357 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 400.
358 Some years later, after Marshall's death and after Jackson had appointed to
the Court men reflecting his more pronounced states' rights convictions, the Court
reversed the Marshall practice, customarily referring to the individual states in the
upper case, as "the sovereign State," and to the national government, not as "the
Union," which suggests a governmental entity separate and apart from the several
states, but as "the United States," suggesting an agent of limited powers acting in
behalf of the all-powerful principal states. See, e.g., Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 139 (1837) ("[I]t is not only the right, but the bounden and
solemn duty of a State, to advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of its people
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This statement subtly characterized the position of the parties as well: "obligation" and "law," suggested binding authority, "denies," the odor of impious defiance; while "the validity of
an act ...

by the legislature of that state," suggested the naked

assertion of state power without the color of law. He continued
in similar vein:
The constitution of our country, in its most interesting and
vital parts, is to be considered; the conflicting powers of the
government of the Union and of its members, as marked in
that constitution, are to be discussed; and an opinion given,
which may essentially
influence the great operations of the
35 9
government.
The Union having star billing was "the government," the states as
supporting cast were "the members."
Having set the stage, Marshall alluded to the political pressures
felt by the Court in deciding these questions and the dangers of federal and state conflict. Instead of avoiding these pressures, he explicitly brought them to the fore and made of them a necessity for
peaceful solution, a solution which, picking up on Webster's suggestion, could only come from the Court.3 6 ° In short swift words he
suggested the Court's peculiar function. Without it, constitutional
disputes over the proper allocation of federal and state power could
quickly escalate into civil war. In the place of violence, judicial
supremacy was a political necessity. Both the federal and the state
governments needed the Court:
No tribunal can approach such a question without a deep
sense of its importance, and of the awful responsibility involved in its decision. But it must be decided peacefully, or
remain a source of hostile legislation, perhaps of hostility of a
still more serious nature; and if it is to be so decided, by this
tribunal alone can the decision be made. On the Supreme
Court of the United States has the constitution of our country
devolved this important duty.3 6'
This majestic assumption and assertion of exclusive jurisdiction
in cases involving the competing claims of state and federal governand to provide for its general welfare ....
") In that opinion, the national government was consistently referred to as that of "The United States." As noted in G.
DUNNE, MONETARY DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT 48 n.37 (1960): "Up to the
Civil War and for a short time subsequently 'the United States' is frequently followed in treaties and other like documents by the third person plural; thereafter it
is usually followed by the third person singular."
359 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 400.
360 Id. at 400-01.
361

Id.
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ment was, though simple and direct in terms, nevertheless an important moment in the history of the Court and its crucial power of
judicial review. Both assumption and assertion were made easy by
the fact that the State of Maryland had, in not challenging the
Court's jurisdiction, conceded it. Again, the presence of Luther
Martin was a significant factor. Martin knew that by the supremacy
clause in Article VI, as much as by the language of Article III, the
framers had intended that the Court should be the instrument
whereby such state laws as were inconsistent with federal laws, treaties and the Constitution could be set aside. Originally the framers
had provided for the invalidation of such state laws by Congress. It
had been Martin himself who had instead proposed the supremacy
clause as the more suitable alternative, thereby providing for a judicial rather than a Congressional involvement in the business of
invalidation.3 6 2
Fortunately for the Court, Martin had also been of counsel in
the landmark case of Fletcher v. Peck, 63 where the Court had for the
first time assumed and asserted a power of judicial review over a
state law for the purpose of passing on its validity under the Constitution.
Martin, who in effect represented Georgia's position in
that case, had not challenged the Court's power of judicial review,
but confined his argument to the merits.3 6 5 McCulloch represented a
more important extension of the power asserted in Fletcher. In
Fletcher, no question of federal legislative power had been involved
and state legislative power had been challenged as in conflict with a
specific prohibition of the Constitution's contract clause. In McCulloch, however, federal legislation was involved and its exercise challenged on substantial textual grounds. Moreover, state legislation
was challenged, not under a specific constitutional prohibition, but
under the necessities of the challenged federal legislation and the
general implications of the supremacy clause.
In both Fletcher and McCulloch then, Marshall and the Court
362 The sixth resolution of the Virginia plan had proposed that Congress be empowered to "negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the
opinion of the national legislature, the articles of union." 2 FARRAND, supra note 40,
at 21-22. Eventually, onJuly 17th, this resolution was considered and defeated. Id.
at 22, 28. Instead, immediately thereafter, Luther Martin proposed the resolution
embodying the supremacy clause. It was adopted unanimously. Id. at 22, 28-29.
363 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). The Court there held that a Georgia statute
rescinding a prior land grant was invalid under the contract clause. See generally
Lynch, Fletcher v. Peck: The Nature of the Contract Clause, 13 SETON HALL L. REV. 1
(1982).
364
365

See Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 130-39.
See id. at 115, 124-25 (argument of Mr. Martin).
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were lucky that the presence of Luther Martin3 6 6 insured the absence of a challenge to the judicial power of the Court. Such challenges, as would later develop, would be mounted offstage, in the
press, where Marshall would respond in kind.3 6 7 In the meantime,
366 On the other hand, Martin's presence meant the Bank could not advance the
Dallas-Calhoun argument of a supposed generic intent that Congress assume the
control over all forms of currency, paper as well as coin. See supra notes 284-301
and accompanying text.
367 Later Spencer Roane, writing under the pseudonym "Hampden," as part of a
wide-ranging newspaper attack on the opinion as a whole, would attack Marshall's
assertion of the Court's exclusive jurisdiction as without express support in the
Constitution. See Letter from "Hampden" (S. Roane) to The Richmond Enquirer
(June 22, 1819) reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE Or McCulloch v. Maryland 152
(G. Gunther ed. 1969) [hereinafter GUNTHER, DEFENSE]. See also infra text accompanying note 425. Marshall's position was untenable, Roane said, when considered in
light of the fact that the right denied was that of a sovereign state, one of the contracting parties to the Constitution, and that the tribunal denying the right was but
a deputy or department of another contracting party. He argued in addition, that
since the general government was interested in the case, the Court as a department
of that government was disqualified to decide a matter which he said was its own
cause. The better course, he implicitly suggested, was to have referred the matter
to an impartial arbiter for determination. Letter from "Hampden" (S. Roane) to
the Richmond Enquirer (June 22, 1819) reprintedin GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra. The
course followed by the Court, he concluded, might work to change the Constitution, entirely destroy the state authorities and lead to the national government's
easy and complete triumph over the liberties of the people. Letter from
"Hampden" (S. Roane) to The Richmond Enquirer (June 22, 1819) reprinted in
GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra, at 154.
Thereafter Marshall, writing under the pseudonym "A Friend of the Constitution," responded in kind. The alternative to the peaceful execution of federal laws
by the judiciary was either resistance with impunity or enforcement by the sword,
involving perhaps a civil war. Letter from "A Friend of the Constitution" (J. Marshall) to The Alexandria Gazette (July 15, 1819) reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE,
supra, at 208. Moreover, recourse to arbitration was spurious. The parties might
not agree. The arbitrator might not be competent or, worse, might judge according to considerations of policy and intrigue rather than principles of right, and by
aiding the weaker party "foment divisions, animate discord, and finally produce
dismemberment[.]" Letter from "A Friend of the Constitution" (J. Marshall) to
The Alexandria Gazette (July 15, 1819) reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra, at
208. Moreover, the United States created by the Constitution was not a league. It
was a government. Letter From "A Friend of the Constitution" (J. Marshall) to the
Alexandria Gazette (July 9, 1819), reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra, at 199.
Nor was the Constitution a compact. There were no parties. The government of
the United States could "not be a party to the instrument by which it was created."
Letter From "A Friend of the Constitution" (J. Marshall) to The Alexandria Gazette (July 14, 1819), reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra, at 203. Nor were the
states parties, because the acts leading to the Constitution's adoption were that of
the people themselves, assembling in their respective states. Finally, the judiciary
was not the deputy or department of Congress. In deciding a judicial question the
judicial power was the government of the United States. Letter from "A Friend of
the Constitution" (J. Marshall) to The Alexandria Gazette (July 15, 1819), reprinted
in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra, at 210. When someone challenged the authority of the
United States and one of its laws, proceedings for its enforcement were started. As

296

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 18:223

unencumbered with the jurisdictional issue, he could at once proceed to the merits and the first question of the appeal: whether Congress had the power to incorporate a bank. At once he adopted the
practical argument from prescription, first raised in the House debates in 181 1,368 then by Madison in his message vetoing the bill to
recharter the bank in 18 15,369 and by Webster at the outset of his
oral presentation in McCulloch.3 7 ° In fact, Marshall closely followed
Webster's language: "It has been truly said that this can scarcely be
a matter of plain common sense, the question must be referred to a court for settlement or remain forever suspended. To that end agents had to be furnished. And
who were more suited for this function than the judges? Letter from "A Friend of
the Constitution" (J. Marshall) to The Alexandria Gazette (July 15, 1819), reprinted

in GUNTHER,

DEFENSE,

supra at 211.

But before examining the question, Marshall ironically expressed his surprise
that the argument had not occurred to counsel for Maryland, since with ingenuity
they had made every other argument "on which a decent self-respect would permit
them to insist." Letter from "A Friend of the Constitution (J. Marshall) to The
Alexandria Gazette (July 15, 1819), reprintedin GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra, at 201. In
other words, Maryland understood that it was the framers' intent to provide for a
federal judicial review of such state proceedings as were inconsistent with federal
laws, treaties and the Constitution, and that such intent had been embodied in the
supremacy clause of Article VI and in Article III. Luther Martin knew this because
it was he who at the Convention introduced the supremacy clause and moved its
adoption in lieu of another provision advanced by Charles Pinckney and Madison
that would have placed in Congress the power to negative all state laws inconsistent
with federal laws, treaties and the Constitution. See supra note 361 and accompanying text.
Justification of Marshall's reasoning may be found in Hamilton's writings:
[T]here ought always to be a constitutional method of giving efficacy to
constitutional provisions. What for instance would avail restrictions on
the authority of the state legislatures, without some constitutional mode
of enforcing the observance of them? The states, by the plan of the
convention are prohibited from doing a variety of things; some of which
are incompatible with the interests of the Union, and others with the
principles of good government .... No man of sense will believe that
such prohibitions would be scrupulously regarded, without some effectual power in the government to restrain or correct the infractions of
them. This power must either be a direct negative on the state laws, or
an authority in the federal courts to over-rule such as might be in manifest contravention of the articles of Union. There is no third course that
I can imagine. The latter appears to have been thought by the convention preferable to the former, and I presume will be most agreeable to
the states.
THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 535 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Essentially, Roane was continuing the controversy he had opened with the
Court, following its decision in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304
(1816), and which he would later continue following its decision in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
368 See supra notes 191-97 and accompanying text.
369 See supra notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
370 See supra notes 341-42 and accompanying text.
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considered as an open question ... .,,371 The legitimacy of the Bank
had been early and finally established in practice. It did not concern
the great principles of liberty, but the adjustment of the respective
powers of those governments which are equally the representatives
of the people, upon which an immense property had already been
advanced. 72 He referred to the wartime difficulties which Wirt had
mentioned.3 73 Not only was the act authorizing the first bank widely
debated, Marshall wrote, but the embarrassments consequent upon
the expiration of its charter
convinced those who were most prejudiced against the measure of its necessity and induced the passage of the present
law. It would require no ordinary share of intrepidity to assert
that a measure adopted under those circumstances was a bold
and plain usurpation,
to which the constitution gave no
3 74
countenance.

In other words, the Bank was more than established. It was a practical, working "necessity." In this necessity, lying outside the text of
the written Constitution, the words of the text were construed.
Of course, the theory argued by Maryland, was quite different.
The words must mean now what they meant in the beginning. "Necessity" and "circumstances" after the fact are immaterial. But
judges are more than technical exegetes. They are an integral part
of government. Whatever the words might have meant "then," they
cannot be allowed to mean that now, if it would seriously impair the
work the government must do. The meaning must bend, the words
grow more elastic, and if possible, be found to have meant the same
all along. If the Court must adjust the respective powers of the state
and federal governments, the necessity of circumstances, not the
limits of constitutional text, must be the standard for its adjustment.
Theory must be stated or restated to fit the facts, so that it is the
Constitution which seems to control, whereas in reality it is more
controlled than controlling. As Marshall said, immediately after referring to the practical necessity of "circumstances": "These observations belong to the cause; but they are not made under the
impression that, were the question entirely new, the law would be
found irreconcilable with the constitution. '3 7 5 Happily, of course,
theory did accord with the necessity disclosed in the facts.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401. Cf. supra text accompanying note 341.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401.
373 For Wirt's recounting of the embarrassments growing out of the War, see
supra note 345 and accompanying text.
374 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402.
375 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402.
371
372
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Then Marshall, having told all men of sense that it could not
very well be otherwise, turned next to the Constitution and, facing
Maryland's argument of limited expressed powers granted by sovereign independent states, bounded beyond it in one leap. This being
a political case, he would match politics with politics and take his
case to the people. The Constitution came not from the states, he
wrote, but from the people of the states in convention assembled.
Therefore, the government of the Union "proceeds directly from
the people; is 'ordained and established' in the name of the people;
and is declared to be ordained, 'in order to form a more perfect
union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity [sic], and secure
the blessings of liberty to themselves and to their posterity.' -376
The conclusion followed: "The government of the Union .

.

. is,

emphatically, and truly, a government of the people. In form and in
substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them,
37 7
and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.Of course this was really not so much legal as political theorizing. It was a view of the government with which the South could
not agree. For John Taylor, the future southern spokesman for
states' rights, the powers of the federal government under the Constitution were no more than what the states had said they were. In
Taylor's opinion, the meaning of the Constitution was for the states
to decide, and not for the Court which, more dangerously than Congress and in the name of the people, skillfully and endlessly assumed a supreme command position.3 7 8 The operative provisions of
the Constitution provided its correct meaning, not the preamble
quoted by Marshall. That was oratory to be limited by the executory
37 9

language.

There was a profound difference between the theories of Marshall and Taylor. Marshall's was based on political reality, in support of a government in place and working, whose representatives
had been elected and reelected. Taylor attacked this theory of government with its direct links to the electorate and argued instead for
a national government answerable to state legislatures which would
decide whether the federal government had acted within its proper
sphere of limits. Taylor would deny the operations of the elective
process in the name of a more proper, legal constitutionalism. Such
a theory, however learnedly supported by historical and philosophi376

Id. at 403-04 (quoting U.S.

377
378

Id. at 404-05.

J.

CONST.

preamble).

TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED

59 (1970).
379 See id. at 164-65.

158-
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cal arguments, was both profoundly anti-democratic and oblivious
of the history of the country since the Constitution had been
adopted.3 80 It was a theory doomed to decline and defeat.
Having occupied the higher ground on the purely political
question, whether the states or the people were the ultimate source
of national authority, Marshall now moved in this highly political
case to the legal question, whether the creation of the Bank was
within the enumerated powers of the national government. The
Bank's position rested on tentative ground. Congress was of course
limited in its actions to the enumerated powers, and obviously the
creation of the Bank was not the exercise of an expressed power,
but, at best, of implied or incidental powers. Before entering upon a
380 Taylor had a selective historical memory. He ignored the immense accretions
of national powers implicit in the purchase of Louisiana and the embargo against
American shipping undertaken by his friend, Thomas Jefferson, and concentrated
instead on the accretion of power implicit in the creation of national bank. He also

ignored the fact that in 1816, the year the Bank was rechartered, its constitutional-

ity had almost universally been conceded.
Moreover, he was impractical. M-.rshall, by largely leaving the selection of
means under the "necessary and proper" clause to Congress, had converted the
question largely into one wholly political or non-justiciable. The Court many years
later in not passing on the constitutionality of a law making the government's paper
money legal tender in time of peace under the "necessary and proper" clause completed the process, holding the question entirely political and non-justiciable:

The question whether at any particular time, in war or in peace, the
exigency is such, by reason of unusual and pressing demands on the
resources of the government, or of the inadequacy of the supply of gold

and silver coin to furnish the currency needed for the uses of the government and of the people, that it is, as a matter of fact, wise and expedient to resort to this means, is a political question, to be determined by
Congress when the question of exigency arises, and not a judicial question, to be afterwards passed upon by the courts.
Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 421, 450 (1884).
See also Letter from J. Madison to Spencer Roane (May 6, 1821), reprintedin 9
55 (1910) (response to a letter from

HUNT, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON

Roane criticizing the Court's decision in Cohens v. Virginia). The states, Madison
wrote, had less to fear for their reserved sovereignties from a
latitude of Jurisdiction assumed by the Judicial Power of the U.S ....
than ... [from] the National Legislature; ... [whose] encroachments...
are more to be apprehended from impulses given to it by a majority of
the States seduced by expected advantages, than from the love of Power
in the Body itself ....
Such is the plastic faculty of Legislation, that notwithstanding the
firm tenure which judges have on their offices, they can by various regulations be kept or reduced within the paths of duty; more especially with
the aid of their amenability to the Legislative tribunal in the form of
impeachment. It is not probable that the Supreme Court would long be
indulged in a career of usurpation opposed to the decided opinions &
policy of the Legislature.
Id. at 57-58.
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discussion of these powers, Marshall again sought the advantage of
higher ground. Ascending to the pinnacle of the Constitution, he
claimed the protective authority of the supremacy clause, its paramount provision. As though the state were challenging not the
power of the national government to act, but the duty of the state to
observe a validly enacted law, Marshall wrote:
If any one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind, we might expect it would be this-that the
government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is
supreme within its sphere of action. This would seem to result
necessarily from its nature. It is the government of all; its
powers are delegated by all; it represents all, and acts for all.
Though any one state may be willing to control its operations,
no state is willing to allow others to control them. The nation,
on those subjects on which it can act, must necessarily bind its
component parts. But this question is not left to mere reason;
the people have, in express terms, decided it by saying, "this
Constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be
made in pursuance thereof," "shall be the supreme law of the
land," and by requiring that the members of the state legislatures, and the officers of the executive and judicial departments of the states shall take the oath of fidelity to it.
The government of the United States, then, though limited in its powers, is supreme; and its laws, when made in pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land,
"anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the con8
trary notwithstanding." 1
It was stirring language, the effect of which was calculated to
induce the reader to acknowledge that the Union occupied the
higher ground, the individual states the lower. Left to be demonstrated was that in creating the Bank the government of the Union
had not stepped down from the higher ground. To resolve that,
Marshall would resort to "a fair construction of the whole instru381

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405-06. Compare what Hamilton wrote:
If it would be necessary to bring proof to a proposition so clear, as
that which affirms that the powers of the Federal Government, as to its
objects, are sovereign, there is a clause of its constitution which would
be decisive: it is that which declares, that the constitution, and the laws
of the United States made in pursuance of it, and all treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their authority, shall be the supreme law of the
land. The power which can create the supreme law of the land, in any

case, is doubtless sovereign as to such case.
Opinion Letter of Sec'y of Treasury Alexander Hamilton to Pres. Washington (Feb.
23, 1791), reprinted in M. Clarke & D. Hall, supra note 2, at 96.
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ment. ' ' 38 2 With stirring language hard upon stirring language, he

read the Constitution as a great provider:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means

by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of
a prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by
the human mind .... Its nature, therefore, requires, that only

its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.
That this idea was entertained by the framers of the American
constitution, is not only to be inferred from the nature of the
instrument, but from the language. .

.

.In considering this

question, then, we must
never forget that it is a constitution
3 83
we are expounding.

"
These were the familiar arguments of 1791 and 1811,384
but
from Marshall's pen they rolled with majestic eloquence across the
mountains and valleys of constitutional argument, and sweeping
aside the low-lying considerations of the states' rights advocates, revealed in triumphant outline the lofty design of the Constitution,
whose true exposition was the task of Marshall and the Court.
There in the Constitution, could be found the great powers of the
national government, the powers "to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a war;

382
383
384

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406.
Id. at 407.
For example, refer to the speech of Rep. Sedgwick of Massachusetts on Feb-

ruary 4, 1791:
[T]he Constitution had expressly declared the ends of Legislation; but

in almost every instance had left the means to the... Legislature. From
the nature of things this must ever be the case; for otherwise the Constitution must contain not only all the necessary laws under the existing

circumstances of the community, but also a code so extensive as to
adapt itself to all future possible contingencies.
1912 (Feb. 4, 1791) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick).
Indeed, Marshall's words were but a recast of Madison's own words in explaining the "necessary and proper" clause:
Had the Convention attempted a positive enumeration of the powers necessary and proper for carrying their other powers into effect; the
attempt would have involved a complete digest of laws on every subject
to which the Constitution relates; accommodated too not only to the
existing state of things, but to all the possible changes which futurity

2

ANNALS OF CONG.

may produce ....
THE FEDERALIST No.44, at 304

(J.Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also supra note
120 (discussing Randolph's remarks in the Virginia ratifying debates); McCulloch, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 384-85 (argument of Mr. Pinkney).
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and to raise and support armies and navies." 38 15 Marshall proceeded
to swathe Hamilton's original argument, that the operation of the
Bank was conducive to these varied powers, in his wonderful constitutional rhetoric:
The sword and the purse, all the external relations, and no
inconsiderable portion of the industry of the nation, are entrusted to its government. It can never be pretended that
these vast powers draw after them others of inferior importance, merely because they are inferior ....

But it may with

great reason be contended, that a government, entrusted with
such ample powers, on the due execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the nations so vitally depends [sic],
must also be entrusted with ample means for their execution. .

.

. It can never be their interest, and cannot be pre-

sumed to have been their intention, to clog and embarrass its
execution by withholding- the most appropriate means.
Throughout this vast republic, from the St. Croix to the Gulf
of Mexico, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, revenue is to be
collected and expended, armies are to be marched and supported. The exigencies of the nation may require that the
treasure raised in the north should be transported to the
south, that raised in the east conveyed to the west, or that this
order should be reversed. Is that construction of the constitution to be preferred which would render these operations difficult, hazardous, and expensive?3 8 6
Marshall with his happy images of sword and purse and marching armies was referring to the unhappy experiences of the recent
war. With his graphic evocation of the nation's expanse, he was appealing to pride in the Union and to the incipient spirit of Manifest
Destiny. He continued in this elevated style: vast operations turned
on the details of execution. Great powers require workable methods. The choice of the appropriate details and methods, including
among them the power to create a corporation, was for Congress.
He dismissed the notion that the creation of a corporation was a
special attribute of sovereignty. 8 7 Moreover, the right of Congress
to employ the necessary means for the execution of the general
powers had not been left to general reasoning. The Constitution
had specifically provided for it in the "necessary and proper"
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
Id. at 407-08.
Id. at 410-11. Here Marshall essentially followed Hamilton's reasoning. See
supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 294-95 and accompanying text (for Calhoun's comments in 1816, that objections to Congress' power to
create a corporation were not worthy of discussion).
385
386
387
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clause. 8 8
Hamilton's argument in The Federalist, that the clause was tautological or redundant, Marshall dismissed out of hand because such
an interpretation would render the language itself without purpose.189 He did not refer to Hamilton or The Federalist by name.
Madison's argument in The Federalist, that the word, "necessary,"
limited the power to pass laws for the execution of the express powers only to such as were indispensable, Marshall further rejected as
not in accordance with common usage. Again, he did not refer to
Madison or The Federalist by name. 390 Rightly to construe the clause,
it was appropriate once again to lift up one's eyes and consider that:
The subject is the execution of those great powers on which
the welfare of a nation essentially depends ....

This provision

is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to
come ....

To have declared that the best means shall not be

used, but those alone without which the power given would be
nugatory, would have been to deprive the legislature of the
capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its3 9reason, and
to accommodate its legislation to circumstances. '
Again we can discern in his elevated discourse the lofty design
of the Constitution: the provision for the great powers of government for a great country and for the supreme authority in that government to act intelligently and with flexibility. Then having
directed our vision to these commanding heights, he concluded: "If
we apply this principle of construction [that of indispensable necessity] to any of the powers of the government, we shall find it-so pernicious in its operations that we shall be compelled to discard it." '3 92
In these conclusive terms, he rejected the apparently imposing authority of The Federalist, without so much as mentioning it. Nevertheless, he continued in six additional pages to demonstrate why the
words, "necessary and proper," could not mean what Hamilton and
Madison had originally said they meant, 39 3 and concluded again
with his other magnificent peroration: "Let the end be legitimate,
let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 411-12.
See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 412-13. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text (discussing Hamilton's interpretation of the "necessary and
proper" clause).
390 M4cCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text (discussing Madison's interpretation of the necessary and proper clause).
391 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415.
392 Id. at 416.
388
389

393

Id. at 416-21.
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prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional.- 39 4 Whereupon in four additional pages, he held
again that a corporation was a proper means for Congress to employ in the execution of its powers. 9 5 Then after briefly adverting
to the existence of state banks, Marshall concluded that Congress
might prefer a national bank to state banks and held that the act to
create the national bank was consequently valid.3 9 6
In writing his opinion, Marshall had followed the outlines and
issues of oral argument. Maryland had only in passing raised the
issue of the Bank's propriety; that is, conceding arguendo that it was
necessary, was its creation "proper?" It had been content merely to
controvert the meaning of "necessary" as an abstract question, devoid of circumstance, and had not drawn into question the relation
of the Bank's lending operations to the various powers of government. The Bank in response had made its stand first on practical
grounds. Long-established practice and the wartime history had revealed its necessity to the nation and government. Then linking the
practical necessities of the nation and government to the words of
the Constitution, the Bank had proceeded to join issue with Maryland and argue in the abstract for a broad construction of the "necessary and proper" clause. Taken as a whole, its argument
suggested something akin to what Hamilton had elsewhere written
in The Federalist, but which had not been mentioned in McCulloch
either in the oral arguments or in the opinion. "[N]ations," he
wrote, "pay little regard to rules and maxims calculated in their very
nature to run counter to the necessities of society. Wise politicians
will be cautious about fettering the government with rcstrictions,
that cannot be observed .

. . ."

The consequent alternatives were

either a feeble government, which unable to provide for its constituents' necessities would lose their respect, or a government, which
compelled by the necessities, breached the Constitution, such
breaches of necessity leading to constitutional irreverence and in
time to breaches of non-necessity. To prevent either of these unacceptable alternatives, the Constitution should have been written to
provide for these broad powers of government and should be so
construed by the Court.
Marshall followed the Bank's argument. The Bank was long established in practice and the wartime experiences had revealed its
394 Id. at 421.
395 Id. at 421-24.
396

Id. at 424.

397 THE FEDERALIST

No. 25, at 163 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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necessity. The written text of the Constitution was accordingly read
in the light of these unwritten considerations of practicality and necessity. Judicial review became as much an exercise in the unwritten
as in the written and the Court more the master of the Constitution
than its servant. Only in this way would the Constitution work. The
length and breadth of words had to depend on the exigency of circumstance and not vice versa. The meaning of "necessary and
proper" was therefore not abstract but inherently related to the
practical. As Marshall later wrote, what was impracticable was erroneous. 39 8 Happily, ignoring the authority of The Federalist, it was not
too difficult, as a matter of usage, to construe "necessary and
proper" as meaning "needful or conducive to" the general powers.
The argument worked so long as it was not connected; so long
as no nexus was made between the money-lending, paper-making
functions for which the Bank was created and the general powers of
the government conducive to which its creation was generally attributed. Connected, the government was guilty of the forbidden
breach of necessity: creating an instrument of national control over
the nation's money supply, which consisted largely of constitutionally prohibited paper. Unconnected, the argument enabled Congress to provide for the needs of the country. Naturally, the Bank
had not attempted the connection. Its argument intentionally contained a missing link, the absence of which Maryland forbore to
mention.
Marshall, constrained by the same practicalities, did not mention the missing link either. "Necessary and proper" meant "needful or conducive to" one of the general powers. The Bank was
therefore necessary and proper because its operations were needful
or conducive to the various, mentioned powers. In form, the Court
held only that Congress, in creating the Bank, had exercised a
power incidental to the ends of the various expressed general powers. In substance, by its failure to insist on a demonstrated link between means and ends, the Court had held that Congress had the
power to do whatever was incidental to, and by implication,
whatever was necessary for, the good of the country. "Necessary
398 In his letter under the pseudonym of"A Friend to the Union," in response to
the pseudonymous attack by Amphictyon on the Court's reasoning in McCulloch,
Marshall, after analyzing the argument that "necessary" in the "necessary and
proper" clause meant "indispensably necessary," concluded that: "The rule... laid
down by Amphyction [sic] is an impracticable, and consequently an erroneous
rule." Letter From "A Friend to the Union" (J. Marshall) to the Philadelphia
Union (Apr. 24, 1819), reprinted inGUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 95.
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and proper" meant more than counsel had formally argued for and
more than the opinion of the Court had disclosed.
b.

The Power of the State to Tax the Bank

Having held the Bank "necessary and proper," Marshall
then turned to the question of whether a state could constitutionally tax a branch of the Bank located in that state. He noted the
express constitutional prohibition in Article I, section 10 against
state duties on imports or exports,3 9 9 upon which Maryland had
relied. But instead of considering the Maryland argument, Marshall proceeded almost at once to a discussion of the supremacy
clause. It was, he wrote, a principle of "paramount character
[which] would seem to restrain ... a state from such other exercise of this power [to tax], as is in its nature incompatible with,
and repugnant to, the constitutional laws of the Union. '40 It followed that a "law, absolutely repugnant to another, as entirely
repeals that other as if express terms of repeal were used."4 0 1 In
other words, the supremacy principle contained an implied
repealer.
Marshall disregarded the authority of The Federalist, which
had deduced from the presence of the specific prohibition
against a tax on imports and duties and the absence of any other
specific prohibition, a general constitutional intent to leave the
state power to tax untrammelled. 40 2 He focused instead on the
Bank's claim and, in highly figurative language, concluded that
the tax was vitiated by a "principle which so entirely pervades the
constitution, is so intermixed with the materials which compose
it, so interwoven with its.web, so blended with its texture, as to be
incapable of being separated from it without rending it into
shreds."40 3 Once again, Marshall, with the instincts of a rhetorician, enwrapped the controlling principle of his argument in the
striking and graceful flow of literary dress, and with rhythms and
imagery appealing both to the inner ear and the outward eye,
beguiled his reader to the willing acceptance of his major prem399 U.S. CONST. art. J, § 10, cl. 2. This clause provides in pertinent part: "No
State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its in-

spection Laws ....

" Id.

400 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 425.
401 Id. at 425-26. Marshall's reasoning followed Webster's argument. See supra
notes 351-53 and accompanying text.
402 This was the substance of Maryland's arguments, see supra notes 347-48 and
accompanying text.
403 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 426.
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ise, from which in imperious logic he could sweep to his desired
conclusion. Marshall was more than a logician and a jurist, he
was a consummate artist.
His major premise was the paramountcy of federal
supremacy under the Constitution and under such laws as the
federal government enacted pursuant to it. From this, he rapidly
deduced further corollaries. First, the power to create implies a
power to preserve. Second, placing the power to destroy in different hands is incompatible with the power to create and preserve. Third, such incompatibility mandates that that power must
control which is supreme and not yield to the power over which it
is supreme. Applying these corollaries to the case at hand, Marshall concluded that the power of Congress to create the Bank
included the power to preserve it; that the power of the states to
tax the Bank might destroy it and was thus incompatible with the
national power to create and preserve it; and that such a power in
the state to tax was incompatible with the legitimate operations
of the supreme national government. 404 He concluded with a reversion to the supremacy clause and a consideration of the implications of supremacy: "It is of the very essence of supremacy to
remove all obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and so to
modify every power vested in subordinate governments
as to ex' 40 5
empt its own operations from their own influence.

Then, as if aware that it might be objected that nothing he
had written had been expressed in the Constitution and that he
had gone beyond the written text into the realm of unwritten implication, he formally asserted the necessity of constitutional construction by implication: "This effect [of the supremacy
principle] need not be stated in terms. It is so involved in the
declaration of supremacy, so necessarily implied in it, that the
expression of it could not make it more certain. We must, therefore, keep it in view while construing the constitution. "406
Again this seemed to run counter to what Hamilton had written in The Federalist. During the ratifying process, he asserted,
critics of the Constitution had suggested that the
power [of the Court] of construing the laws according to the
spirit of the constitution, will enable that court to mould [sic]
them into whatever shape it may think proper; especially as its
decision will not be in any manner subject to the revision or
404
405

406

Id. at 426-27.
Id. at 427.
Id.
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correction of the legislative body. This is [a power] unprecedented as it is dangerous.40 7
In response, Hamilton had characterized this suggestion as "altogether made up of false reasoning upon misconceived fact." ' 40 8 He

assured his readers that "there is not a syllable in the plan under
consideration, which directly empowers the national courts to construe the laws according to the spirit of the constitution, or which
gives them any greater latitude in this respect, than may be claimed
by the courts of every state. "409
Hamilton's response may be faulted for containing a negative
pregnant, a form of pleading defective at common law. His denial
of a direct empowerment failed to negate and consequently had the
effect of admitting an indirect empowerment. But such a nice distinction, surreptitiously conceding to the Court a dangerous power,
would convict Hamilton of an intentionally misleading pleading. It
would be preferable to accept his denial at face value. The Court
would not have the power of construction according to the spirit, or
at most such power as would be limited to the case of an "evident
opposition" between laws and Constitution.4 1 0
If this was Hamilton's meaning, Marshall disagreed. According
to Marshall, the Court would construe the Constitution liberally according to its spirit. The power of liberal construction would include not only the power to wrest from words, such as "necessary
and proper," a meaning broad enough to suit the exigencies of the
case, but the power to perceive in words a principle of preeminent
weight and bearing, in the consequence of which all other constitutional words and phrases would have to yield. In the case of the
supremacy clause, the power of judicial review was as broad as the
requirements of the national government, and the construction of
the written Constitution was as broad as the unwritten implications
of those requirements.
Marshall, having through this method of necessary implication
established the superiority of the federal position under the Constitution and having thereby overrun the state's position, turned aside
and in a mopping-up exercise finally considered the arguments for
Maryland and deftly disposed of them. State taxation, he conceded,
might be so limited as not to destroy but, he asserted, as a matter of
political principle the powers of Congress given by the people of the
407 THE FEDERALIST
408
409
410

Id. at 543.
Id.
See id.

No. 81, at 542 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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entire United States could not be subject to the sovereignty of a
single state. This principle preserved the Court from "the perplexing inquiry, so unfit for the judicial department, what degree of taxation is the legitimate use, and what degree may amount to the
abuse of the power." 4 1 ' In other words, the issue was non-justiciable, and since non-justiciable, the operations of the national government must be protected and held in principle to be immune from
state taxation. 412
Moreover, Marshall continued, adopting the Bank's argument,
if a state could tax the property of the United States in the Bank, as
Maryland claimed, and its power to tax had no other limit than that
specifically prohibited in Article I, section 10, then it could, if it
wished, tax the federal mint, mails and courts. There was no limiting principle by which to distinguish the cases. But if this were
so, the supremacy clause was an "empty and unmeaning
13
declamation.

4

Marshall considered the argument from The Federalistand while
acknowledging its authority declined to follow it. In general terms,
he said, that "in applying their opinions to the cases which may arise
in the progress of our government, a right to judge of their correctness must be retained. ' 41 4 The Federalist then would not be controlling authority. The Court retained an independent judgment. It,
and not The Federalist, was the judge of what the Constitution had
intended to say. Marshall had not made that point in the preceding
part of the opinion where he had come to the conclusion that the
arguments of The Federalist concerning the "necessary and proper"
clause were incorrect and had to be disregarded. Here he did not
disregard their views concerning the unlimited power of state taxation but distinguished them. The Federalist argument was directed
against the objections of an unlimited power of taxation vested in
411 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 430. The Court, of course, has long since
changed its position with regard to state taxation of interstate commerce and has at
times entered upon this "perplexing inquiry." See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin
Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes
of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978);
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959) (all

relating to the power of a state to impose a net income tax on income derived from
interstate commerce). But as to state taxation, the legal incidence of which falls on
the federal government, see Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S. 392

(1983) (invalidating a Tennessee tax on earnings of banks doing business in the
state, including income derived from federal obligations but excluding income derived from obligations of Tennessee or of its political subdivisions).
412

See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 432-33.

413

Id. at 433.
Id.

414

310

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW
0

[Vol. 18:223

the federal government, he wrote, and not to the incidental privilege of exempting its own measures from state taxation. It was intended to allay the fears that federal taxation would involve the
exclusion of state taxation and the destruction of state
governments. 1 5
Marshall did not mention, however, that Hamilton in his eagerness to appease state apprehensions had written in absolute terms:
"the individual States should possess an independent and uncontroulable [sic] authority to raise their own revenues for the supply of
their wants. And ...I affirm that (with the sole exception of duties
on imports and exports) they would under the plan of the Convention retain that authority in the most absolute and unqualified sense
... 416 By his opinion, Marshall had limited Hamilton's absolute:
the not so absolute power of the state to tax was limited by the implication of the supremacy clause.
The ultimate meaning of the Constitution then lay beyond the
written text in its unwritten implications. Counsel for the Bank understood this, in arguing the unwritten implications in the
supremacy clause of a paramount principle, bearing within it certain
necessary corollaries of decisive application. They had so argued
because practicality and necessity so compelled it. Without such an
argument the Bank would have been destroyed, the national government's control over the currency undone and the nation, left to
the vagaries of competing state currencies, driven once again to financial chaos. For the same reasons, the argument had to prevail.
The primary importance of McCulloch lies in this assertion and
in these conclusions. Implicit in them is the declaration that all constitutional texts are not created equal. Since the supremacy clause
and the principle it contained are paramount, all other clauses in the
Constitution and all other principles implicit in those clauses had to
be construed in their light. The various extensions and application
of the other clauses would have to be qualified accordingly, despite
any contrary opinion in The Federalist and possibly, in the absence of
any specific contrary provision, despite the intent of the framers
themselves. The Constitution was more than a collection of written
provisions and more than a collection of underlying purposes. As
drafted by the framers, it possessed a grand design, a predominant
purpose: the creation of a national government, invested with
broad powers, intended in their exercise to be supreme. The maintenance of that grand design, the effectuation of that predominant
415

See id. at 433-35.

416 THE FEDERALIST

No. 32, at 199 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1971).
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purpose was the paramount principle. The supremacy clause, read
as the embodiment of this paramount principle, would in due time
tend to the systematic curtailment of state power.41 7
Since all constitutional texts were not created equal, the
breadth and depth of these texts were to be measured in the light of
unwritten principle. In the construction of the supremacy principle,
judicial review was, as in the construction of "necessary and proper," more an exercise in the unwritten than in the written. Again,
as with "necessary and proper," the Court was more the master of
the unwritten Constitution than its servant. Paradoxically, only in
this fashion could the Constitution work.
It is the genius of Marshall that he understood all this, could
overcome the deficiencies of literal text, omissions of the framers
and damaging statements in The Federalist, and could with lofty language corresponding to the lofty design and purpose of the Constitution, skillfully and magnificently implement it. Substantively, his
defense of national power in the first part of his opinion and of its
exception from the operations of state power in the second part are
the cornerstones of constitutional law. His opinion in McCulloch v.
Maryland, both in form and in substance, is a masterpiece.
6. Judicial Duty, Honor and Truth: The Necessity of a National
Money Supply.
Neither the Bank nor the Court nor its opinion in McCulloch
lived happily ever after. The Bank was already in trouble before
the decision in McCulloch. One week after the decision was rendered, its troubles multiplied in the public disclosures of the
deep losses sustained in its Maryland branch. Its Baltimore cashier, J.W. McCulloch of McCulloch fame, was revealed as a colossal
embezzler.4 1 The discredit of the United States Bank was almost
complete.
Opposition to both the Bank and to McCulloch was widespread. Newspapers in Kentucky, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ten417 Implicitly foreshadowed in this reading were the future opinions in Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (upholding the constitutionality of section
25 of the judiciary Act of 1781, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 85-87, as it applied to appeals to the
Court from judgments of state courts in criminal cases); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (striking down another state tax on
the United States Bank); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) and Brown
v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827) (both construing a federal licensing
statute in such a way as to control the facts of the case and in light of the supremacy
clause invalidate a state monopoly statute).

418 HAMMOND,

supra note 42, at 261-63.
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nessee, Georgia, Mississippi and Ohio came out against federal
encroachment of states rights and state sovereignty.4" 9 Despite
McCulloch, Ohio contemplated the collection of a recently imposed tax in the sum of $50,000 on the Ohio branches of the
United States Bank. In Kentucky, litigation enjoining the collection of a similar tax was pending in federal court.42 0
In Virginia, the birthplace of Presidents, steps were taken to
wrest from the controversy a substantial profit and to further
both the political and the financial interests of a closely related
group known as the Richmond Junto. Thomas Ritchie, one of
the Junto's members, published the Richmond Enquirer.4 2 1 A sec-

ond, his cousin Dr. John Brockenbrough, was president of Richmond's Bank of Virginia, which had a history of attempting
monopolistic control of all banking in the state of Virginia.422 A
third, Brockenbrough's brother William, was a state judge;42 3 a
fourth was Ritchie's uncle,4 2 4 Spencer Roane, ChiefJustice of the
Virginia Court of Appeals, and his perennial candidate for the
office of the President of the United States.4 2 5 Shortly after the
decision in McCulloch was announced, the Enquirerbegan publication of a series of sharply polemical essays directed against the
manner of its decision, the scope of its discussion, its rationale,
the Court itself (for its assumption of jurisdiction) and by :nnuendo the writer of the opinion. The essays appearing under the
pseudonyms of Amphictyon and Hampden were probably the
products of Judge Brockenbrough and Chief Justice Roane
respectively.4 26
Though legal in form, the essays were laced with frequent
allusions to the dangers to states' rights, state sovereignty and
419 C.

WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT,

supra note 330, at 519.

420 Id. at 526.

19 (1913).
27-28.
423 Born in 1778, William Brockenbrough was appointed judge of the general
court in 1809, and justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals in 1834, where he
served until his death in 1838. 2 TYLER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF VIRGINIA BIOGRAPHY 64421 AMBLER, THOMAS RITCHIE

422 Id. at

65 (1915). For the relation of the Brockenbroughs, see HAYDEN, VIRGINIA GENEALOGIES 110 (1966).
424 AMBLER, supra note 421, at 27.
425 Id. at 87. Roane was also Jefferson's candidate. Jefferson urged Roane to run

as Vice-President under William Crawford at the end of Monroe's term with a view
to his eventually succeeding Crawford as President, but Roane died in 1822. 2
TYLER,

supra note 423, at 61-62.

426 These essays are reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 52-77,

106-54. See also id. at 1 (for the attribution of these essays as the work of Judge
Brockenbrough and Chief Justice Roane).
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individual liberties occasioned by the troubles of 1798 and 1799,
and the Alien and Sedition laws of the Federalists.4 27 The selection of pen names revealed their purpose. Amphictyon and
Hampden, proverbial protectors and defenders of the people's
liberties against despotism, 4

28

would in 1819 remind their read-

ers of the dangers to Virginia's liberties from Alexander Hamilton, to whom were attributed the Alien and Sedition laws of
1798,429 and the creation of the United States Bank in 1791, and
whose characteristic modus operandi had been the "necessary
and proper" clause. And just as the Federalist judges of that day
had upheld the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition
laws, 430 so they had upheld the validity of the United States Bank.

In substance the attacks were really against President
Monroe and those in Congress who had supported the Bank. For
practical reasons, however, the attack had to focus on the Court,
and particularly on Marshall, the conspicuous Federalist holdover, who in McCulloch had chosen to follow the rationale prescribed by Hamilton in 1791 of an implied liberal power in
Congress to establish the means necessary to effectuate the permitted purposes. Marshall, as the prominent Federalist in the
picture, was the obvious fall guy and the rest of the justices, the
unwitting dupes who went along with his opinion. That Monroe
understood the significance of these attacks is suggested by the
support given McCulloch in the National Intelligencer,4 3 1 his quasi427 See, e.g., Letter from "Amphictyon" (W. Brockenbrough) to The Richmond
Enquirer (Mar. 30, 1819) reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 56-69;
Letter from "Hampden" (S. Roane) to The Richmond Enquirer (June 11, 1819),
reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367 at 108-14; Letter From "Hampden"
(S. Roane) to The Richmond Enquirer (June 22, 1819), reprintedin GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 153-54.
428 Amphictyon is a play on the Greek word, Amphictyony, a group of states sharing and protecting a common center, as in the Amphictyonic League or confederacy, protecting the Temple of Apollo at Delphi. See Address of Hamilton to the
New York Legislature (June 20, 1788) (concerning the Amphictyonic confederacy)
reprintedin 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 42, at 234. "The council which managed
the affairs of this league possessed powers of a similar complexion to those of our
present Congress. The same feeble mode of legislation in the head, and the same
power of resistance in the members, prevailed. When a requisition was made, it
rarely met a compliance; and a civil war was the consequence." Id. To Virginians,
Amphictyon connoted a confederacy rather than a Union.
John Hampden (1594-1643) was a parliamentary leader, famous for his opposition to Charles I over a levy for ship money. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANICA 43
(1972).
429 Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570; Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat.
577.
430 1 WARREN, supra note 330, at 165-67.
431 Id. at 511-12.
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official newspaper in Washington. Monroe, seeking reelection
the following year, had to guard his flanks against this dangerous
movement of his fellow Virginians.4 3 2
At the same time, Marshall, who was not without political
instincts of his own, sprang to his own defense in a series of
newspaper essays published under the pseudonyms of "A Friend
to the Union" and "A Friend of the Constitution. ' '4 33 At once he
was plain to call a candidate a candidate. The decision in McCulloch, he wrote, "has been seized as a fair occasion for once more
agitating the publick [sic] mind, and reviving those unfounded
jealousies by whose blind aid ambition climbs the ladder of
power. ' 4 34 The Court and not the executive and legislative
branches had been singled out for attack because the latter were
elected by the people, were popular, possessed great power and
patronage, and, had they been attacked, would have been zealously defended.4 3 5 He added:
But the Judges of the Supreme Court, separated from the people by the tenure of office, by age, and by the nature of their
duties, are viewed with respect, unmingled with affection, or
interest. They possess neither power nor patronage. They
have no sops to give; and every coffeehouse furnished a Cerberus, hoping some reward for that watchfulness which his
bark proclaims; and restrained by no apprehension that any
can be stimulated by personal considerations to expose the injustice of his attacks. We ought not, therefore, to be surprised
if it should be deemed criminal in the judicial department to
sustain a measure, which was adopted by the legislature, and
by the executive with impunity. Hostility to the Union, must
cease to be guided by its usual skill, when it fails to select the
weakest department as that through which a breach may be
effected.4 3 6
Marshall defended his opinion in McCulloch against the criticism
that it was unanimous. 4 7 Amphictyon had written that the occasion
432 Significantly, Ritchie disapproved of Monroe's agreement to the Missouri
Compromise in 1820, an agreement which Monroe had to make in order to get
reelected. The sacrifice, Ritchie said, was too great. AMBLER, RITCHIE, supra note
421, at 79.
433 These essays are GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 78-105; Letter from
"A Friend of the Constitution" (J. Marshall) to The Alexandria Gazette (June 30,
1819) reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 155-214.
434 See Letter from "A Friend of the Union" (J. Marshall) to the Philadelphia
Union (Apr. 24, 1819) reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 78.
435 Id.
436 Id., reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 78-79.
437 See id., reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 79.
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had called for seriatim opinions,4 s8 that the opinion of the Court,
though able, had maintained certain doctrines contrary to the principles theretofore "advocated by the republican party in this country."-4 39 Marshall in reply stated it was unanimous because it was
unanimous and to suggest otherwise impugned the character of the
Justices of the Court who sat by in silence while the opinion was
read.4 40 Moreover, four of them, "in addition to being eminent lawyers [had] the still greater advantage of being sound republicans,"
selected by Jefferson and Madison. 4 4 ' Against Amphictyon's charge
that the opinion had, in discussing the source of the national government's authority, whether from the states or from the people,
needlessly involved itself in dictum which was erroneous and dangerous to the sovereignty of the states and to the freedom of their
people,4 4 2 Marshall replied that the issue, having been introduced in
the case by Maryland, required an answer.4 43 Moreover, Marshall
added, the failure to mention that betrayed an "eagerness to censure ...stronger than his sense ofjustice, who will criminate a court
for noticing an argument advanced by eminent counsel, as one of
leading importance in the cause. ' 44 4 He proceeded to refute the
44 5
charge that the opinion in this respect was erroneous.
A third charge lay in the impropriety of the rationale based on
the "necessary and proper" clause. Once again, Amphictyon
rehashed the controversies of 1791 and 181 1446 Hampden followed at even greater length, flavoring his rehash with even
stronger doses of anti-judicial political diatribe. 44 7 Adopting the rationale of "necessary and proper," he maintained, had constituted
"a judicial coup de main: to give a general letter of attorney to the
future legislatures of the union: .. .That man must be a deplorable

idiot who does not see that there is no earthly difference between an
438 Letter from "Amphictyon" (W. Brockenbrough) to The Richmond Enquirer
(Mar. 30, 1819), reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 53.
439 Id., reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 54.
440 Letter from "A Friend to the Union" to the Philadelphia Union (Apr. 24,
1819), reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 80-81.
441 Id., reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 81-82.
442 See Letter from "Amphictyon" (W. Brockenbrough) to The Richmond Enquirer (Mar. 30, 1819), reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 55-57.
443 See Letter from "A Friend to the Union" to the Philadelphia Union (Apr. 24,
1819), reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 83-84.
444 Id., reprinted in GUNTHER DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 84.
445 Id.
446 See Letter from "Amphictyon" (W. Brockenbrough) to The Richmond Enquirer (Apr. 2, 1819) reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 64-76.
447 Letter from "Hampden" (S. Roane) to The Richmond Enquirer (June 11,
1819), reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 110-38.
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unlimited grant of power, and a grant limited in its terms, but accom'
panied with unlimited means of carrying it into execution." 448
He
himself would not be "over-awed by the parasites of a government
gigantic in itself."4' 4 9 Finally, as though his cousins and friends had
not for years enjoyed oligarchic, if not monopolistic, control of state
banking in Virginia, he called upon his fellow citizens to rouse themselves from the apathy and torpor: "Instead of that noble and magnanimous spirit which achieved our independence, and has often
preserved us since, we are sodden in the luxuries of banking. A
money-loving, funding, stock-jobbing spirit has taken foothold
among us. We are almost prepared to sell our liberties, for 'a mess
of pottage.' "450
Then in a clever ploy, both Amphictyon and Hampden attempted to drive a wedge between the political branches and the
Court. Both were willing to acquiesce in the result reached in McCulloch: that of the constitutionality of the statute creating the Bank. It
was the principles of 1791 against which they railed. 45 ' As
Hampden put it, there was "a great difference... between particular
infractions of the constitution, and declaratory doctrines having the
'
effect to change the constitution." 452
In other words, it was all the
fault of the Court. It should have written an opinion somewhat
along the lines of Madison's veto message of 1815: that the constitutionality of the Bank had been established by prescription, if not
by the text itself.4 5 3
Fingered as the fall guy, Marshall went to equally great lengths
in defending his reliance on "necessary and proper." He too repeated the old arguments of 1791 and 1811, 4 5 4 finally concluding
that in any event the Constitution could be construed in the same
448 Id., reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 110 (footnote omitted).
(Note Hampden's use of the lower case for "union.") See also supra note 357 and
accompanying text.
449 Letter from "Hampden" (S. Roane) to The Richmond Enquirer (June 11,
1819), reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 112.
450 Id., reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, (quoting Genesis 25:34)
(footnotes omitted).
451 Letter from "Amphictyon" (W. Brockenbrough) to The Richmond Enquirer
(Apr. 2, 1819), reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 72; Letter from
"Hampden" (S. Roane) to The Richmond Enquirer (June 11, 1819), reprinted in
GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 135.
452 Letter from "Hampden" (S. Roane) to the Richmond Enquirer (June 11,
1819), reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 135.
453 Letter from "Amphictyon" (W. Brockenbrough) to The Richmond Enquirer
(Apr. 2, 1819), reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 73. See supra notes
275 & 277 and accompanying text.
454 Letter from "Hampden" (S. Roane) to The Richmond Enquirer (June 11,
1819), reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 93-103; Letter from "A
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way even "if the clause which has been so much discussed, had been
entirely omitted.

455

Then having addressed the issue on the merits, he proceeded to
defend the opinion against the suggestion that it should not have
attempted any rationale based on the text. He questioned whether a
reasoning based merely on past practice would have satisfied the
public.4 5 6 And, he added, if as the opinion stated the Court was
"'unanimously and decidedly of opinion that the law is constitutional,' would it comport with [the judges'] honour, with their duty,
or with truth, to insinuate an opinion that Congress had violated the
constitution?

'4 5 7

That of course was a rhetorical question which ex-

pected a negative answer. Since this was so, "it was incumbent on
45 8
[the judges] to state their real opinion and their reasons for it."

This they had done and, if read with fairness, what they had done
would be approved.4 5 9 On that dismissive note he ended his
discussion.
But was the opinion in McCulloch concerned with "the truth" of
the Bank's validity under the Constitution? A close reading of the
debates of 1791, 1811 and 1816, indicates that in neither the opinion, nor in the letters of Amphictyon and Hampden, nor in the replies of a Friend of the Union and of the Constitution, did the whole
truth emerge. A statement of the whole truth must have included
the practical necessity for a national control over the nation's paper
money. But the letters of Amphictyon and Hampden were political
attacks and Richmond state bankers and their relatives and friends
had a vested interest in not alluding to the necessity or, if alluding to
it, denying it. Marshall in his letters mounted a political defense and
in the thrust and counterthrust of political polemic the cause of
truth and nothing but the truth was an inevitable casualty. And with
Luther Martin participating in McCulloch, the Bank could not in its
argument have alluded to this practical necessity nor could the
Court in its opinion. In truth, the Court in publishing the opinion
had been faced with three exceedingly disagreeable alternatives.
First, in the name of duty, honor and truth, it could have held
Friend of the Constitution" (J. Marshall) to The Alexandria Gazette (July 1, 1819),
reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 161-91.
455 Letter from "A Friend of the Constitution" (J. Marshall) to The Alexandria
Gazette (July 1, 1819), reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 186.
456 Letter from "Hampden" (S. Roane) to The Richmond Enquirer (June 11,
1819), reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 105.
457 Id.

458 Id.
459 Id.
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the statute unconstitutional as an indirect attempt to impose upon
the country a forbidden paper money, and thereby thrown the country back upon the financial chaos of 1811. Failing the improbable
prompt adoption of an enabling constitutional amendment, a repetition of the 1815 financial paralysis of the United States Government
was foreseeable. If this was the Court's duty, it is doubtful that fidelity to duty would have gathered to it honor. Instead the doleful consequences attendant upon such a decision would have, in rather
quick order, been laid at its feet. McCulloch v. Maryland would have
become in the history of American Constitutional Law, the Court's
first "self-inflicted wound."4 6
The second alternative was to have upheld the constitutionality
of the statute and, adopting the suggestions of Amphictyon and
Hampden, rely on the argument from prescription and some vague
formula, such as the fear of "endless difficulties," 4 6 ' had the case
been decided the other way. But could this have worked in McCulloch? The case was a cause celebre. Even before the opinion the
Bank was a very unpopular institution. Any opinion upholding it
was bound to suffer from unpopularity-its reasoning picked to
pieces. It would have been regarded as, in effect, convicting both
the Congress and the President of unconstitutional acts and the
Court itself of being an accessory to constitutional violations after
the fact. Honor and duty would hardly lie in that course.
The third alternative was to do what it did do, that is, uphold
the constitutionality of the statute, despite the lack of specific constitutional provision for it, on the ground that the Constitution, despite this lack, nevertheless provided for it. Was not this the path
that duty prompted them to follow, the path that would enable the
national government to gain control of the nation's paper money
supply? This was the only feasible path, as Clay had told his Kentucky constituents in 1816, whereby the United States Government
could in the future avoid the financial chaos of the war years.4 62 It
460 The phrase is from Chief Justice Hughes: "In three notable instances the
Court has suffered severely from self-inflicted wounds." C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 50 (1928). The first in its decision in Dred Scott v.
Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). The second by the manner of its decisions
in the Legal Tender Cases, Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870);Julliard v.
Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1878); and in finally the income tax case, Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, on petition for reh'g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
461 United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1805). This was the
phrase used by Chief Justice Marshall in justifying the constitutionality of a provision of the Bankruptcy Act under the "necessary and proper" clause. See also supra
note 345 (discussing Fisher).
462 See supra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
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was the only way, as Calhoun had demonstrated, whereby the Congress could stem the flow of excessive state bank paper, which the
Constitution had most certainly intended to prohibit.4 6 If, again
because of Luther Martin, it could not be argued in McCulloch what
Dallas and Calhoun had argued in 1816, that the specific congressional power to coin money and regulate its value implied a generic
intent to enable Congress to regulate paper money, 464 and if a constitutional amendment to supply the deficiency was extremely unlikely, was it not the duty of the Court, in order to promote the
prosperity of the country, to cover the deficiencies of constitutional
provision under the broad cloak of the "necessary and proper"
clause? As Marshall wrote elsewhere in his letters of defense, the
judges through tenure are perfectly independent and impartial:
"They have no personal interest in aggrandizing the legislative
power. Their paramount interest is the public prosperity, in which
is involved their own and that of their families." 4'6 5
Ultimately then, the Constitution was construed in the light of
the paramount interest in the public prosperity. This and not the
bare words of the text guided the Court. The Justices in deciding
what the Constitution meant were not mere exegetes of the written
word. They were the government and as such committed to the
common good. From this it followed that in the broadest sense it
was the constitutional duty of the Justices to uphold the constitutionality of the Bank. What was impracticable in consequence was
erroneous in concept. 4 66 They stood between the text and reality

and monitored the text to accord with reality. Doing their duty in
this manner, honor eventually followed in the testimonials heaped
upon their Chief Justice and upon his opinion in McCulloch, and by
implication upon his associates for unanimously following his lead.
As to truth, it must be remembered that like the good and the
beautiful, it was placed by Aquinas among the transcendentals.4 6 7
Just as there are for instance many kinds of beauty, there are many
kinds of truths. Perhaps, in his opinion in McCulloch and in his letters of defense, the great Chief Justice did not tell the whole truth:
See supra notes 297-301 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 285-88, 297-301 and accompanying text.
Letter from "A Friend of the Constitution" (J. Marshall) to the Alexandria
Gazette (July 15, 1789) reprintedin GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 212.
466 Or as Marshall put it: "The rule then laid down by Amphyction [sic] is an
impracticable, and consequently an erroneous rule." Letter from "A Friend to the
Union" (J. Marshall) to the Philadelphia Union (Apr. 28, 1819), reprinted in GUNTHER, DEFENSE, supra note 367, at 95.
463
464
465

467

See

162-63 (1952). Cf.4
(Blackfriars ed. 1964).

MARITAIN, CREATIVE INTUITION IN ART AND POETRY
6

AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA,

pt. la, q.1
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that if, as Hamilton said, societies will go where necessity leads them
and in so doing break the rules and maxims that would hinder its
pursuit, then prudence requires a Constitution sufficiently supple to
accommodate that necessity. It is incumbent upon the Court, where
the people have approved the resort to necessity and where individual liberty is not involved, to find in the Constitution the unwritten
principle upon which this necessity can be accommodated.
Then after a time, some of the truth did emerge. The state of
Ohio, which had, effective September 15, 1819, laid a tax of $50,000
on each office of the United States Bank operating in the state,
moved to the collection through its Auditor, Ralph Osborn. Since
there were two bank offices in Ohio, the sum due was $ 100,000.468
On September 17, 1819, Osborn's employee entered the Bank's offices at Chilicothe by force, took from it the sum of $100,000 in specie and bank notes in payment of the taxes due, and delivered it to
the state treasurer.4 6 9 The Bank filed a complaint in the federal circuit court in Ohio seeking an injunction against the further enforcement of the state statute by Osborn and other state officials and a
return of the money taken from the Bank.4 70 The trial court found
for the Bank and the state officers took an appeal to the Court.4 7 '
Appellants contended, among other things, that Ohio had a
right to tax the Bank. The Bank, they said, was an entirely private
concern, its capital private property, its business a private trade and
its object private profit.4 72 Therefore it was subject to a tax on its
business. The form of its business structure, corporate instead of
individual, did not provide it with an immunity.4 7 3 While it was true
that it did perform services for the national government, it was not a
public corporation and the tax was based not on those services but
on the property by which it did its private business and made its
private profit.4 7 4 In this light, they requested that the Court reconsider its holding in McCulloch, that the Bank was immune from state
taxation.4 7 5
Marshall for the Court quickly declined to revise that holding.
468

Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 740-41 (1824). There

were two branch offices, the one at Chilicothe, the other at Cincinnati. Id. at 795.
469
470

Id. at 741-42.

471
472
473
474
475

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Actually the Bank had filed its complaint before the entry, alleging a threat to
enter. After the entry and conversion, the Bank amended its complaint to state
these facts and amended its demand for relief accordingly. Id. at 741.
at
at
at
at
at

743-44.
766-67.
784.
785-95.
765.
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The Bank was not a private corporation; since it was created for
public and national purposes, it was a public corporation. While it
"trad[ed] with individuals for its own advantage," it was "the great
instrument by which the fiscal operations of the government are effected,"4' 7 6 and as such was "necessary and proper." Unless endowed with the faculty of the lending and dealing in money, which it
did for its own advantage, it could not carry on the fiscal operations
of government. If it could not, then the "faculty [was] necessary to
the legitimate operations of government" and was therefore
constitutional.4 7 7
Putting it that way, however, was making the tail wag the dog.
The Bank had not been established to lend and trade money and
thereby to make a profit in order to serve the government by handling its money. It was established so that by lending and trading
money it could create a sound national paper currency redeemable
in specie. Marshall finally alluded to this somewhat obliquely, in
writing:
The operations of the Bank are believed not only to yield the
compensation for its services to the government, but to be essential to the performance of those services. Those operations
give its value to the currency in which all the transactions of
the government are conducted. They are, therefore, inseparably connected with those transactions.4 7 8
Later he wrote: "The currency which it circulates, by means of its
trade with individuals, is believed to make it a more fit instrument
for the purposes of the government, than it could otherwise be
"479

Justice Johnson stated this proposition more directly. He
agreed with the Court on the merits, that the state could not tax the
Bank.4 8 The Bank, he wrote, had become "the functionary that col476
477

478
479
480

Id. at 860.
Id. at 861.

Id. at 863.
Id. at 864.

See id. at 871-72. Justice Johnson dissented, however, from the Court's other

holding, that the federal court had jurisdiction to try the case. Id. at 901 (Johnson,
J., dissenting). The Court held that the enchartering statute in authorizing the
Bank to sue in the federal circuit courts had conferred jurisdiction on such courts to

entertain any suit brought by the Bank. Id. at 817-28. Moreover, it was a constitutional grant ofjurisdiction, "arising under ... the laws of the United States." Id. at
819. Johnson disagreed: The statute had not so intended, and had not meant to
depart from the holding in United States v. Deveaux, limiting the Bank's access to

federal courts to cases involving a complete diversity of citizenship, of all its stockholders from the citizenship of all adverse parties. Id. at 876-84 (Johnson, J., dissenting); see supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text. And, Johnson continued,
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lects, the depository that holds, the vehicle that transports, the
guard that protects, and the agent that distributes and pays away,
the millions that pass annually through the national treasury," and
indoes so at a loss to itself "without expense to the government,"
48
deed after paying a large bonus to the government. '
But, he added, if this were all that it did, the laws in which it
originated and the suit which was before the Court would never
have existed. The termination of the former bank had led to a rage
for the multiplication of state banks, which "soon inundated the
country with a new description of bills of credit, against which it was
obvious that the provisions of the constitution opposed no adequate
inhibition." 4 8 2
Johnson at long last made the essential point:
A specie-paying Bank, with an overwhelming capital, and the
whole aid of the government deposits, presented the only resource to which the government could resort, to restore that
power over the currency of the country, which the framers of
the constitution evidently intended to give to Congress alone.
But this necessarily involved a restraint upon individual cupidity, and the exercise of State power; and, in the nature of
things, it was hardly possible for the mighty effort necessary to
put down an evil spread so wide, and arrived to such maturity,
to be made without embodying against it an immense moneyed combination, which could not fail of making its influence
to be felt, wherever its claimances could reach or its industry
and wealth be brought to operate.4 8 3
The Bank was therefore essentially created for purposes of currency control. Through its issuance of a paper money redeemable
in specie the Bank would create a national paper currency and by its
discount practices in trade would establish a control over the paper
currency of the state banks, decrease its quantity and improve its
quality, thereby integrating it into a national paper currency system
all redeemable in specie. Basically this is how Clay had described the
functions of the Bank, its necessity and the reasons for its constitutionality in his address to his Kentucky constituents in 1816.484 It
was an argument which overlooked the constitutional inability of the
government itself to create paper and forbore from the necessity of
had it intended to confer jurisdiction, as the majority held, it would have been unconstitutional. Id. at 884-85 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
481 Id. at 872 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
482 Id. at 873 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
483 Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
484 See supra notes 278-83 and accompanying text.
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arguing that the specific power to coin money implied a generic
power to regulate the currency. It remained on the level of the
practicai and, while asserting the government's power to control the
currency, neglected to cite a supporting constitutional text. Perhaps
not coincidently, Luther Martin did not participate in the oral argument in Osborn, but Henry Clay did, for the Bank.4 8 5
Not the whole truth, but something of the truth had emerged.
The Bank was not so much a depository institution as one suited for
the control of the money supply. For that purpose, Hamilton had
created it in the first place and Dallas, Calhoun and Clay recreated it
in the second place. For that reason, Maryland and Ohio had taxed
it. For that reason, McCulloch and Osborn had been litigated. For
that reason it had been upheld. It was certainly necessary. Its propriety and constitutionality had to follow.
485 Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 795.
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APPENDIX

The practical necessities of the government for money and
of the country for a circulating medium drove successive Congresses and presidential administrations toward a more flexible
fiscal system. Following the expiration of the Charter of the
United States Bank in 1811, Congress in 1812, faced with the
need to finance the cost of the war with Britain without the resources of the Bank, authorized for the first time the issuance of
one-year, interest-bearing notes in anticipation of its revenues as
an incident to borrowing.' The authorization was repeated in
1813.2 While the statutes had not specified, notes in denominations of $100 were the lowest offered. But in 1814, because of
wartime difficulties restricting the circulation of money and the
availability of money for loans, Congress authorized for the first
time the issuance of notes in denominations smaller than $100,
albeit bearing interest: twenty dollar notes were issued. In the
following term of Congress, a fourth issuance was authorized.4
But despite the authorization for issuance in small denominations, these notes did not suit the purposes of a circulating medium. Since they contained a provision that their holders could
exchange them in sums of not less than $100 for certificates of
federal indebtedness bearing interest at seven percent, they were
5
quickly accumulated and converted, passing out of circulation.
To prevent a facile conversion, the fifth wartime act provided, in
part, for the issuance of small Treasury notes, under $100, without interest and payable to the bearer but convertible into seven
percent debt certificates after December 15, 1815, and for Treasury notes of $100 and over, payable to order on endorsement, at
five and two-fifth's percent interest. 6 In fact, notes were issued in
denominations of $3, $5, $10, $20 and $50. While these could
be considered a circulating paper medium, since they contained a
significant interest-bearing feature, they too could be said to possess the characteristics of note-paper thereby constituting an incident to borrowing.
Following the expiration of the charter of the Second United
States Bank, the nation's circulation medium was once again
1 Act ofJune 30, 1812, ch. 111, 2 Stat. 766; KNOX, UNITED STATES NOTES 21-26
(1884).
2 Act of Feb. 25, 1813, ch. 27, 2 Stat. 801; KNOX, supra note 1, at 21-26.
3 See Act of Mar. 4, 1814, ch. 18, 3 Stat. 100; KNOX, supra note 1, at 29-30.
4 Act of Feb. 14, 1815, ch. 56, 3 Stat. 213.

5 Id., 3 Stat. at 214; KNOX, supra note 1, at 37-38.
6 Act of Feb. 14, 1815, ch. 56, 3 Stat. 213-14; KNOX, supra note 1, at 37.
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thrown into disarray and once again the government was led by
the necessity of deficit financing to the issuance of Treasury
notes.7 In this case, the Van Buren administration frankly desired the authorization of some notes for circulating purposes.
When the Congress authorized the Treasury to issue short-term
notes at interest not exceeding six percent, it issued nine million
in notes, four million at the annual rate of 5 percent, three at 2
percent and two at the nominal annual rate of one mill per cent. 8
This was repeated in 1838, in 1839, and again in 1840, 9 over the
protest of the Whigs in Congress that all notes must bear interest
of not less than two percent and be negotiable.' 0 The purpose of
the threshold was to prevent their circulation as money, and to
avoid an unconstitutional evasion of the prohibition against bills
of credit. "
In 1843, the Tyler Administration again issued a small
amount of Treasury notes, in denominations of $50 payable in
one year and bearing a nominal annual interest rate of one mill.
percent, but this authority was again challenged by Congress as
unconstitutional.12 Thereafter no other issuance of paper money
was attempted until the Civil War, although interest-bearing
Treasury notes were issued during the Mexican War.' 3 Despite
this history, Chief Justice Chase in Veazie Bank v. Fenno," stated
that it had been
settled by the uniform practice of the government and by repeated decisions, that Congress may constitutionally authorize
the emission of bills of credit ....
[I]t is enough to say, that
there can be no question of the power of government to emit
them ... to make them a currency, uniform in value and description, and convenient and useful for circulation. These
powers, until recently, were only partially and occasionally exercised. Lately, however, they have been called into full activsupra note 1, at 20.
Stat. 201; KNOX, supra, note 1, at 42. In doing
so, the Van Buren administration followed the counsel of Calhoun, who in Congress had expressed his views in favor of a paper currency, and voted for a proposal
that the notes bear no interest whatsoever. 14 CONG. DEB. 62, 75 (1837); see also
7 KNOX, UNITED STATES NOTES,
8 Act of Oct. 12, 1837, ch. 2, 5

LOVE, FEDERAL FINANCING 61

(1931).

9 Act of May 21, 1838, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 222; Act of Mar. 2, 1839, ch. 37, 5 Stat.
323; Act of Mar. 31, 1840, ch. 5, 5 Stat. 201. In each Act the rate of interest was left
to the discretion of the Treasury Department.
10 KNOX, supra note 1, at 45.
11 Id. at 46.
12 Id. at 52-61.
13 Id. at 63-79.
14 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1870).
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ity, and Congress has undertaken to supply a currency for the
entire country."
Chase was referring to the then recent circulation of greenbacks
during the Civil War. He did not, however, attempt to show how
the emission of bills of credit had become a "settled uniform practice," nor did he cite the "repeated decisions" by which the settlement had come about. In fact, there had been no judicial decisions.
The wartime governmental practice under Madison had been carefully structured so that the notes, by reason of their conversion to
interest-bearing debt, would not constitute bills of credit. The
peacetime practice under Van Buren had been challenged on constitutional grounds and discontinued. And the practice under Tyler
had been minimal, even more vigorously challenged, and discontinued. If any, these were the exceptions which proved the rule.
Later, Chase, in his majority opinion in Hepburn v. Griswold, 6
apparently realizing that his naked assertion in Veazie Bank required
some justification, referred to the power to emit bills of credit as
incidental to other powers,17 and still later, in his dissenting opinion
in the Legal Tender Cases, as "an exercise of the power to borrow
money."'" "[I]ts power over the currency was incidental to that
power [to emit bills of credit] and the power to regulate
commerce." 19
This was confusion more confounded. The issuance of bearer
instruments, having no definite date for payment and without interest is not the normal evidence of indebtedness for loans and cannot
therefore be regarded as a normal incident to borrowing. And while
an adequate money supply undoubtedly is conducive to commerce
and promotes it, as Hamilton wrote in his report of 1790, advocating the establishment of a national bank, it is not, in the ordinary
sense, the subject of commerce. Rather it is the medium by which
commerce, literally the exchange of merchandise, transpires. The
framers knew the difference between commerce and currency, and
borrowing and currency. They confronted the requirements of currency in the coinage clause and, as Luther Martin and James
Madison said, they decided against paper money.
In order to sustain Chase's opinion, we should be prepared to
assault Madison directly and say that regardless of what he wrote in
15

Id. at 548.

16

75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).

17

Id. at 617.

Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 574 (1870) (Chase, C.J., dissenting).
19 Id. at 574-75 (Chase, C.J., dissenting).
18
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his Notes regarding Gouverneur Morris' motion, he did not know
what he was writing about. We should also be prepared to assault
Luther Martin and dismiss his Address to the Maryland Legislature
as a phillipic against the ratification of the Constitution, thereby implying his statements regarding paper money were made out of
whole cloth. Instead, we should look at the debates themselves,
look at the Constitution which does not expressly prohibit the issuance of paper, bear in mind that the issuance of paper is under some
circumstances a matter of national necessity, and the control over
the national currency ordinarily a matter within the national sovereignty and argue, therefore, that the Constitution must provide for
the power to issue paper. This in effect is what Justice Bradley did
in his concurring opinion in the Legal Tender Cases.2" He concluded:
The views of particular members or the course of proceedings
in the Convention cannot control the fair meaning and general
scope of the Constitution as it was finally framed and now
stands. It is a finished document, complete in itself, and to be
interpreted in the light of history and of the circumstances of
the period in which it was framed. 2 '
Bradley's was a very selective reading of history. He argued
from the colonial practice, and that of the Congress and states during the Revolution, that it was an "historicalfact that when the Constitution was adopted, the employment of bills of credit [as
currency] was deemed a legitimate means of meeting the exigencies
of a regularly constituted government. '"22 He did not mention the
adverse effects of the widespread use of paper in the Revolution and
the consequent change in American opinion. Thus, the experience
of the colonies had been good, that of the states during the Revolution had been bad. 2 3 As Madison wrote:

The loss which America has sustained since the peace, from
the pestilent effects of paper money, on necessary confidence
between man and man; on the necessary confidence in the
public councils; on the industry and morals of the people, and
on the character of Republican Government, constitutes an
enormous debt against the States chargeable with this unadvised measure, which must long remain unsatisfied; or rather
an accumulation of guilt, which can be expiated no otherwise
than by a voluntary sacrifice on the altar of justice, of the
power which has been the instrument of it. In addition to
20
21
22
23

Id. at 554 (Bradley, J., concurring).
Id. at 560 (Bradley, J., concurring).
Id. at 558 (Bradley, J., concurring).
See B. HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS
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these persuasive considerations, it may be observed that the
same reasons which shew the necessity of denying to the
States the power of regulating coin, prove with equal force
that they ought not to be 24at liberty to substitute a paper medium in the place of coin.
Moreover the colonial practice of issuing paper money had also
been severely criticized by Adam Smith as "a scheme of fraudulent
debtors to cheat their creditors."'25 As Smith explained, and as
Hamilton advocated in proposing the Bank, paper was feasible only
when issued by a bank and subject to redemption for the gold and
silver held in its vaults. Since paper money represented gold and
silver, the amount of paper in circulation, Smith counseled, should
be such as to satisfy public confidence in its ability to pay specie on
demand. 26 The Bank of America had in 1790 limited the dollar
amount of its paper in circulation to less than the amount of specie
it held. Hamilton advocated that the proposed United States Bank
go beyond this, allowing a ratio of two or three dollars in paper to
one in specie.2 7 Smith tolerated, in certain cases, a ratio of five to
one. 2' Bradley's reading of the currency clause then was wholly
anachronistic. It was a reading entirely contrary to the circumstances of the period in which it was framed. Of course, as uttered
in the Legal Tender Cases, it was a necessary step in the final assault
against the argument, based on the authority of Madison's Notes,
that the power of Congress to make its paper currency a legal
29
tender, was unconstitutional, even in time of war.
This assault was completed in Juilliard v. Greenman,3 ° in which
the Court, going beyond the holding in the Legal Tender Cases, that
Congress has the power to make its paper currency legal tender in
time of war, held that Congress possessed such power in time of
peace. Justice Gray, for the Court, was puzzled as to why Madison
in his Notes to the debates "thought that striking out the words 'and
emit bills' would leave the power to emit bills, and deny the power
to make them a tender in payment of debts."'" The Justice and the
Court apparently overlooked the distinction between the emission
24 THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 300 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
25 1 A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF

NATIONS 326 (R. Campbell, A. Skinner & W. Todd eds. 1976) (1st ed. 1776).
26 id. at 389.
27 Secretary of Treasury's Report to the House of Representatives, reprinted in 7
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 307 (H. Syrette &J. Cooke eds. 1963).
28
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See Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
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supra note 25, at 296-97.

110 U.S. 421 (1884).
Id. at 443.
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of interest-bearing bills in large denominations unfit for currency, as
the ordinary incident of borrowing, and the emission of interest-free
notes in small denominations intended for circulation and currency.
But secure in its oversight, the opinion could march to its conclusion that Madison must have been in error regarding the power to
make paper a legal tender. The Court went on to hold that since
this power was not expressly prohibited, it was included in the borrowing power.3 2 And in view of the other powers, to tax, to pay
debts, provide for the common defense and the general welfare, and
to coin money; and in view of the additional powers of Congress, as
incidental to the foregoing powers, to emit bills of credit, to charter
national banks and provide a national currency in coin, bills and
notes, it was "necessary and proper" that Congress make its currency a legal tender. The question of circumstance, whether it was
necessary and proper in war or in peace, was not justiciable, but a
question wholly within the purview of Congress. 3 Madison, it
could with truth be said, was just one more casualty of the Civil War.
In sum, to justify legal tender, both Gray inJuilliard,and Bradley in concurrence in the Legal Tender Cases had to dispose of
Madison's commentary on bills of credit, and in the process had to
justify the emission of a national paper currency, contrary to the intent of the framers.3 4
Id. at 448.
Id. at 449-50.
See Editor's note to 1 KENT'S COMMENTARIES 254 (0. Holmes, ed., 12 ed.
1873). See also Letter from 0. Holmes to the Editors of the American Law Review,
4 AM. L. REV. 768 (1870) (restating Holmes' views).
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